"Amazing Stories Hidden Within": The Reinvention of Identity in Genetic Ancestry Advertisements
In: The journal of popular culture: the official publication of the Popular Culture Association, Band 53, Heft 1, S. 58-71
ISSN: 1540-5931
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In: The journal of popular culture: the official publication of the Popular Culture Association, Band 53, Heft 1, S. 58-71
ISSN: 1540-5931
In: The Salisbury review: a quarterly magazine of conservative thought, Band 22, Heft 4, S. 36-37
ISSN: 0265-4881
In: Economic affairs: journal of the Institute of Economic Affairs, Band 22, Heft 1, S. 58-59
ISSN: 1468-0270
In: Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper No. 179
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In: Oxford review of economic policy, Band 35, Heft 4, S. 614-637
ISSN: 1460-2121
Abstract
Antitrust investigations typically focus on the competitive pressures coming from within the defined markets of interest. However, competitive pressures can also come from other markets. Even when individually these markets place only weak constraints on one another, collectively they may matter. A networks approach to modelling competition permits a systemic view of competition that can sometimes paint a more accurate picture. We demonstrate this through some simple examples, and show more generally how tools from the networks literature can be applied to capture competition across a system of interrelated markets. As a leading example, we consider antitrust investigations into supermarkets where local geographic markets have been used as the basis of investigation.
In: Journal of political economy, Band 127, Heft 2, S. 730-776
ISSN: 1537-534X
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Working paper
In: Economic affairs: journal of the Institute of Economic Affairs, Band 20, Heft 2, S. 42-48
ISSN: 1468-0270
This paper uses public choice theories to explain why agricultural subsidies were centralised and why this hinders reform. It shows that the Commission is not responsible for the expansion of the CAP by arguing that budget‐maximising behaviour is irrational in the circumstances and that bureau shaping explains its stance on reform. The input process and the success of agricultural groups vis‐à‐vis consumer and taxpayer groups is explained using both the pluralist and Olsonian account of interest group politics. The conclusion analyses the latest difficulties in achieving reform at Berlin and the prospects for reform.
-"This incisive Handbook provides a global update on the state of knowledge in cooperatives and mutuals, expertly describing future directions for research and education. Showcasing extensive discussions of cooperative theory, Matthew Elliott and Michael Boland, and the contributors assess cooperatives' social, economic and environmental effects and analyse the impact of regional and cultural features that make cooperatives unique. The insightful chapters are organised into key sections, including theory, organisation, governance and cross-sector applications, and introduce a relevant theory, framework, special topic or mini case on cooperatives and mutuals. The Handbook also examines the role of leaders, members and producers in supply chain governance and looks at different forms of cooperatives and mutuals and their prominence in the economy. Offering an excellent in-depth read, this Handbook will be a vital additional resource for economics scholars and researchers, and those teaching and working on cooperatives and mutualism. It will also prove helpful for conducting leader and member education programs"--
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In: American economic review, Band 104, Heft 5, S. 463-468
ISSN: 1944-7981
We model the strategic provision of advice in environments where a principal's optimal action depends on an unobserved, binary state of interest. Experts receive signals about the state and each recommends an action. The principal and all experts dislike making errors in their decision and recommendations, respectively, but may have different costs of different errors. Is it in the principal's interest to let experts share information? Although sharing improves experts' ability to avoid errors, we identify a simple environment in which any principal, regardless of how he trades off the different errors, is worse off if he permits information sharing.
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In: American economic review, Band 112, Heft 8, S. 2701-2747
ISSN: 1944-7981
We model the production of complex goods in a large supply network. Each firm sources several essential inputs through relationships with other firms. Individual supply relationships are at risk of idiosyncratic failure, which threatens to disrupt production. To protect against this, firms multisource inputs and strategically invest to make relationships stronger, trading off the cost of investment against the benefits of increased robustness. A supply network is called fragile if aggregate output is very sensitive to small aggregate shocks. We show that supply networks of intermediate productivity are fragile in equilibrium, even though this is always inefficient. The endogenous configuration of supply networks provides a new channel for the powerful amplification of shocks. (JEL D21, G31, L14)
In: American Economic Review, 2022, 112(8):2701–47
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Working paper