Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis study examines securityholder returns around nine major repurchase announcements and 10 other repurchase‐related announcements by the Teledyne Corporation between 1972 and 1984. Statistically significant positive excess returns to common stock and convertible preferred stockholders are documented. Contrary to prior research that investigated the average response to repurchase announcements, however, there is a wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders. Bondholder returns around the repurchase announcements are significantly negative. These returns are examined for each announcement and each bond issue.

We examine the stock market reaction to 1227 inter‐corporate ordinary business contract announcements reported by Dow Jones between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2001. Around contract announcement dates, we find statistically significant positive average abnormal returns and abnormal trading volume for contractors, but insignificant positive abnormal returns and negative abnormal volume for contractees. Cross‐sectionally, contract announcement period returns are higher for contractors who are small relative to the contract size, have higher return volatility, larger market‐to‐book ratios and higher profitability. The announcement period returns of contract‐awarding firms are not significant and are only marginally related to cross‐sectional explanatory factors. The results are consistent with two explanatory stories: contractor quasi‐rents induced by the winner's curse and information signalling about contractor production costs. The results are not consistent with perfect competition, with contracts having positive net present values for both parties, and with a version of incomplete contracting theory.

During 2002 and 2003, 140 publicly traded U.S. firms announced their intention to recognize an accounting expense when stock options are granted to employees. Many similar firms elected not to expense options. We study the stock market's reaction. There is no evidence whatsoever that expensing options reduces the stock price. To the contrary, around announcement dates, we find significant price increases for firms electing to expense options and significant price declines for industry/size/performance-matched firms that did not announce expensing at the same moment. The average relative change in market values is 3.65% during a six-day window around the announcement. The magnitude of the market's reaction to expensing depends on agency costs, the magnitude of option expenses, and financial reporting costs. The market's reaction does not seem to be affected by contracting costs (e.g., induced by debt covenants), growth opportunities, or potential political repercussions. Moreover, the decision to expense and the magnitude of the market's reaction are not signals of future operating performance. The market seems to react favorably to transparent reporting while it penalizes firms that give the appearance of having something to hide.