Suchergebnisse

This article appeared in Strategic Insights, Summer 2011 ; On May 1, 2011, US President Barack Obama announced that US Special Forces had successfully killed Osama bin Laden, mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. Crowds gathered publicly in cities across the United States to celebrate the news, waving flags, lighting fireworks, and chanting "U-S-A!" Over 56.5 million Americans watched President Obama's announcement on television, giving him his largest audience since he won the 2008 election. Despite attaining this long-held goal, the US still faces the legacy of 9/11. US troops continue to serve in Afghanistan and Iraq; US intelligence agencies are still heavily organized against the threat of international terrorism; US relations with Muslim-majority states are still heavily influenced by reaction to the 9/11 attacks. How might these change with the death of the man who provoked the United States into two wars? What might the post-9/11 world look like post-Bin Laden? And, perhaps most importantly in the minds of Americans, has the death of Osama bin Laden made the United States safer?

This article appeared in Strategic Insights, v.10, issue 3 (Winter 2011), i-ii. Topic: North Atlantic Treaty Organization ; Since the end of the Cold War 20 years ago, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has sought new roles in the world while facing existential questions about its purposes. The Allies have provided some answers to those questions in the 2010 Strategic Concept and other fundamental policy statements, and the Alliance has enlarged to include twelve new member-statesââ'¬â€mostly from the former Warsaw Pactââ'¬â€and has conducted missions in Europe, Africa, and Central Asia. Despite an active military and diplomatic agenda, NATO continues to grapple with foundational questions. ; This issue begins with arguments regarding the future of NATO, one from Stanley R. Sloan and another from Julian Lindley-French, both keynote speakers at the workshop on deterrence held in Tallinn, Estonia, in May 2011, and co-sponsored by NATO and the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Mr. Sloan argues that the debate about strategic matters neglects a crucial problem facing NATO, namely, perceived gaps in commitment and investment between the United States and the European Allies. Americans often see themselves as paying for the defense of European countries that are unwilling the defend themselves or even help the United States protect its interests. Meanwhile, there is a perception in Europe that the United States is using NATO to pursue its own interests at European expense. Mr. Sloan argues that these viewpoints must be addressed, or they will hinder NATO's pursuit of its political goals. Mr. Lindley-French examines similar questions from another angle. While NATO excels at grand strategy and tactical cooperation in its various missions, it has, he argues, neglected its foundation: the coordination of national defense policies to ensure a cohesive alliance. ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.