Suchergebnisse

Die Rettung systemrelevanter Banken und internationaler Finanzinstitute zum Schutz des internationalen Finanzsystems vor dem Zusammenbruch hat für viele Staaten in der Eurozone zu einem weiteren massiven Anstieg ihrer bereits schon vorher hohen Verschuldung geführt. Dies mindert ihre finanziellen Möglichkeiten, in zukünftigen Krisen in ähnlichem Ausmaß intervenieren zu können, und wirft generell die Frage auf, ob sie überhaupt in der Lage sein werden, langfristig ihren Verpflichtungen nachzukommen. Vor dem Hintergrund der gegenwärtigen Euro- und Verschuldungskrise gewinnt dabei die Suche nach institutionellen Maßnahmen, welche langfristig die Nachhaltigkeit der staatlichen Finanzen garantieren sollen, an Bedeutung. Schuldenregeln nehmen dabei im Moment eine prominente Stellung ein.Ziel dieses Bandes ist daher eine umfassende, interdisziplinäre Bestandsaufnahme des Instrumentariums zu Schuldenregeln und die Bewertung ihres Potentials zur Lösung der gegenwärtigen Euro- und Schuldenkrise.Der Band ging aus einem interdisziplinären internationalen Symposium vom Dezember 2011 an der Andrássy Universität Budapest hervor, ergänzt um weitere Beiträge, die die zwischenzeitlichen Neuerungen auf europäischer Ebene aus wirtschafts- und politikwissenschaftlicher Sicht reflektieren.

Insurance markets are characterized by profound market imperfections. Insurance intermediaries reduce transaction costs and information asymmetries. From transaction cost economics, agency theory, and law and economics literature the hypothesis is derived that insurance brokers may provide more high-quality information and advisory services which are better suited for the needs of the consumers than insurance agents. Empirical tests for German insurance intermediaries confirm this thesis. But there are also findings that structural factors like firm size, employment structure and degree of specialization may outweigh the incentives set by different legal settings.

AbstractEU digital policy is currently one of the most ambitious and far-reaching endeavors to regulate the digital economy. Online platforms in multisided markets with digital ecosystems lie at the heart of digital technologies and business models. Among others, they pose new challenges with regard to the abuse of a dominant market position, thus ultimately reducing competition and innovation. This paper outlines an evolutionary approach to the co-evolution of law and technology with collective cognitive constructs and wealth effects as essential drivers (Eckardt (2001, 2008). It is then applied to the evolution of EU law in this field. After an overview of the evolution from telecommunication monopolies to the current digital platform economy, a case study presents firstly the Google Search (Shopping) case (2010–2024). Based on traditional EU competition law, it resulted in gradual judge-made legal innovation. It also generated new knowledge about the shortcomings of the ex post approach of EU competition law when applying it to the digital platform economy. As a consequence, secondly, the introduction of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) (2020 onwards) as a radical statutory innovation is discussed. The DMA introduced a novel ex ante regulation for large online platforms to overcome the problems of traditional EU competition law. Finally, the paper reflects on the impact of wealth effects and the (co-evolving) cognitive constructs of the relevant players as drivers in this current example of the co-evolution of law and technology. The paper concludes with an outlook on further areas of empirical and conceptual research that can provide a better understanding of the co-evolution of law and technology and allow for better policies in regard to disruptive technological innovation.