AbstractThe labour provisions of the EU's trade agreements have been of limited effectiveness as a means of enforcing labour standards within the jurisdictions of the respective parties. However, the author argues, these provisions could serve other useful purposes in this regard. In particular, he focuses on their potential as a framework for channelling capacity‐building activities relating to labour standards through the EU's development cooperation instruments. He also considers options for increasing the potential effectiveness of labour provisions in framing capacity‐building activities through a change in their design, particularly by reducing the parties' discretion in applying the relevant provisions.
ResumenLas disposiciones laborales de los acuerdos comerciales de la UE son de eficacia limitada como medio de hacer cumplir normas del trabajo en las jurisdicciones de las partes, pero, según el autor, pueden servir otros fines al respecto, en concreto si se utilizan como marco para canalizar actividades de creación de capacidad en relación con las normas del trabajo a través de los instrumentos de cooperación para el desarrollo de la Unión. Se examinan alternativas para aumentar la eficacia potencial de las disposiciones laborales a dicho efecto modificando su diseño y, en particular, reduciendo la discreción de las partes en lo que respecta a las modalidades de aplicación.
RésuméLes dispositions relatives au travail contenues dans les accords commerciaux européens n'ont pas été capables véritablement d'assurer l'application effective des principes qu'elles consacrent sur le territoire des parties. Pour l'auteur, si elles peuvent servir cet objectif, ce serait plutôt en tant que support pour la réalisation d'activités de renforcement des capacités dans le domaine du travail, dans le cadre des instruments européens relatifs à la coopération pour le développement. L'auteur examine les possibilités en la matière et recommande de revoir la conception de ces dispositions, notamment afin que leur application ne repose plus autant sur le bon vouloir des parties.
While labour provisions have been inserted in a number of EU free trade agreements (FTAs), extant clauses are widely perceived as ineffective. This article argues that there is a need to rethink the dispute settlement mechanisms related to labour provisions if their effectiveness is to be increased. It proceeds in three steps. First, we look at the current state of the art of labour provisions in EU FTAs in terms of legal design and practice and argue that the current arrangements are ill-equipped to foster compliance with labour standards. Second, we explore avenues to enhance the design of FTA labour provisions by reconsidering basic elements of the dispute settlement structure. Examining US FTA labour provisions, we highlight the importance of a formal complaint mechanism, on the one hand, and the availability of economic sanctions, on the other. Based on a review of existing practice, we contend, however, that these elements alone are not sufficient to effectively enforce FTA labour provisions. We argue that for FTA labour provisions to be effective, the current state-to-state model of dispute settlement needs to be complemented by a third-party-state dimension and that, additionally, there are good reasons to consider a third party–third party dispute settlement component. We ground these reflections in experiences with already existing instruments in other areas, namely investor-state dispute settlement and voluntary sustainability standards. Thirdly, we discuss options to better connect the dispute settlement mechanisms of FTA labour provisions to other international instruments for labour standards protection with a view to creating synergies and avoiding fragmentation between the different regimes. The focus here is on the International Labour Organization's supervisory mechanism and the framework of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.
While labour provisions have been inserted in a number of EU free trade agreements (FTAs), extant clauses are widely perceived as ineffective. This article argues that there is a need to rethink the dispute settlement mechanisms related to labour provisions if their effectiveness is to be increased. It proceeds in three steps. First, we look at the current state of the art of labour provisions in EU FTAs in terms of legal design and practice and argue that the current arrangements are ill-equipped to foster compliance with labour standards. Second, we explore avenues to enhance the design of FTA labour provisions by reconsidering basic elements of the dispute settlement structure. Examining US FTA labour provisions, we highlight the importance of a formal complaint mechanism, on the one hand, and the availability of economic sanctions, on the other. Based on a review of existing practice, we contend, however, that these elements alone are not sufficient to effectively enforce FTA labour provisions. We argue that for FTA labour provisions to be effective, the current state-to-state model of dispute settlement needs to be complemented by a third-party-state dimension and that, additionally, there are good reasons to consider a third party–third party dispute settlement component. We ground these reflections in experiences with already existing instruments in other areas, namely investor-state dispute settlement and voluntary sustainability standards. Thirdly, we discuss options to better connect the dispute settlement mechanisms of FTA labour provisions to other international instruments for labour standards protection with a view to creating synergies and avoiding fragmentation between the different regimes. The focus here is on the International Labour Organization's supervisory mechanism and the framework of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.
