Suchergebnisse

This is the publisher's version, also available electronically from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/467377. ; Lax enforcement of environmental protection laws in the formerly communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe is offered as one contributing factor to the large‐scale environmental degradation that these countries have experienced. This article empirically examines enforcement responses to water‐damaging "accidents" (for example, an oil spill) in the Czech Republic for the year 1988–92, a time period that spans both the communist political regime and the democratic political regime. In particular, it focuses on ex post penalties: required remediation (for example, cleanup after an oil spill) and monetary fines. Empirical analysis reveals the factors driving enforcement strategies in each political period and contrasts their influence under the two regimes. In particular, it identifies the operative liability rules guiding remediation and monetary fine decisions.

This is the publisher's version, also available electronically from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/003465304323023895#.U1q6GIUvDGI. ; This paper analyzes the regulatory factors shaping environmental performance at individual polluting facilities. In particular, it examines the influence of actual government interventions, namely, inspections and enforcement actions performed at specific facilities. This influence represents specific deterrence. This paper also examines general deterrence, that is, the threat of receiving an intervention. As important, it controls for differences in certain regulatory features of facility-specific pollution control permits. Unlike previous attempts to examine regulatory factors, this analysis uses panel data techniques to capture the heterogeneity across individual facilities, while exploring the dynamics of each facility; the analysis also captures heterogeneity across individual time periods.

Environmental agencies have several options for dealing with alleged noncompliance with environmental regulations. These options include pursuit of administrative or judicial civil penalties and injunctions to prevent future violations. Scholars have begun exploring whether these options induce better performance by regulated entities. This Article addresses a largely neglected question: whether a regulated facility's characteristics affect the efficacy of the different enforcement options. The Article stems from a study of compliance by the chemical industry with federal Clean Water Act permits. It assesses whether facility characteristics, including effluent limit level and type, permit modifications, facility size, capacity utilization, discharge volatility, and ownership structure, theoretically should make a difference and actually appeared to do so at the facilities covered by the study. The findings should be of interest to both facilities regulated under the Clean Water Act and federal and state regulators seeking to maximize the impact of their enforcement actions.