Cover -- Ugliness: A Cultural History -- Imprint Page -- Contents -- Introduction: Pretty Ugly: A Question of Culture -- One: Ugly Ones: Uncomfortable Anomalies -- Polyphemus: 'A Monster of a Man' -- Dame Ragnell: 'She was a Loathly One!' -- A Grotesque Old Woman: 'The Ugly Duchess' -- William Hay: 'Never was, Nor will be, a Member of the Ugly Club' -- Julia Pastrana: 'The Ugliest Woman in the World' -- Orlan: 'A Beautiful Woman Who is Deliberately Becoming Ugly' -- Ugly Ones: Uncomfortably Grouped -- Two: Ugly Groups: Resisting Classification -- Monsters and Monstrosities: Bordering Uglies -- Outcasts and Outward Signs: Signifying Uglies -- Primitives and Venuses: Colonizing Uglies -- Broken Faces and Degenerate Bodies: Militarizing Uglies -- Ugly Laws and Ugly Dolls: Legislating Uglies -- Uglies United? Commercializing Ugly Groups -- Three: Ugly Senses: Transgressing Perceived Borders -- Ugly Sight: Seeing is Believing? -- Ugly Sound: Do You Hear What I Hear? -- Ugly Smell: A Nose for Trouble? -- Ugly Taste: Are You What You Eat? -- Ugly Touch: Do Not Touch? -- Sixth Sense: Feeling is Believing? -- Epilogue: Ugly us: A Cultural Quest? -- References -- Acknowledgements -- Photo Acknowledgements -- Index.
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Through careful analyses of notable cases from Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom, Greig Henderson analyses how the rhetoric of storytelling often carries as much argumentative weight within a judgement as the logic of legal distinctions
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The world environmental regime has influenced government policy and improved environmental conditions around the globe, but its influence on governance is sometimes decoupled from, or loosely connected with, actual practice. This article examines the influence of the environmental regime on foreign aid and proposes that economic incentive, in the form of FDI, is a source of decoupling between aid donors' stated environmental goals and actual aid commitments. Using a three-dimensional panel design (donor × recipient × year), I test allocations of environmental protection and fossil fuel aid in a two-stage process where first the aid recipient is chosen, and then the aid amount. I find that although donor and recipient environmental regime integration are associated with higher likelihood of exchanging environmental aid, other factors (donor/recipient GDP, recipient democracy, etc.) determine the amount of aid. Regime integration does not reduce the likelihood of exchanging fossil fuel aid, but donor regime integration is associated with giving less fossil fuel aid, contingent on the donor's level of FDI in the recipient nation. I conclude that the world environmental regime and the global economy exert contradictory pressures on aid organizations that result in policy–practice decoupling. The world environmental regime, therefore, has only been partially successful in improving foreign aid, and its effect is constrained by donors' economic incentive to ignore environmental norms.