Reporting Behavior and Transparency in European Banks' Country-by-Country Reports
In: ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 21-019
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In: ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 21-019
SSRN
Die Studie, erstellt vom ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, analysiert die aktuellen steuerpolitischen Forderungen und deren Folgen für den Steuerwettbewerb. Deutschland weist laut Studie aktuell eine um neun Prozentpunkte höhere Steuerbelastung für Unternehmen auf als der Länderdurchschnitt unter den 27 EU-Staaten, Großbritannien, der Schweiz, den USA, Kanada und Japan. Die Analyse bewertet, wie sich die einzelnen Steuerpläne im Vorfeld der Bundestagswahl auf diese Positionierung im internationalen Steuerwettbewerb auswirken würden.
BASE
We create a novel database of hand-collected information from the country-by-country reports (CbCRs) of more than 100 multinational bank groups headquartered in the EU for 2014-2016. We compare this new dataset with information from Orbis and Bank Focus to assess in how far the new disclosure obligation increased transparency on banks' tax avoidance behavior. Our descriptive analysis shows that CbCRs uncover a large fraction of worldwide profits and real activities in terms of employees of EU bank groups, especially in tax havens. We also document a striking disconnect between reported profits and real activity, noting considerable heterogeneity between different tax havens and bank groups from different headquarter countries. Regression analysis based on CbCR data and Bank Focus data leads us to expect a tax semi-elasticity of banks' reported profits of about -4.6. In this regard, CbCRs are indicative of a more pronounced tax sensitivity than conventional databases suggest. However, the lack of important economic variables (total assets and staff cost) impedes an exact estimation of banks' profit shifting based on CbCR data alone and with standard methods. These insights are especially relevant in the context of the ongoing political discussions whether to introduce a public CbCR for all large multinational firms in the EU.
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In: ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 19-042, 10/2019
SSRN
We employ an event study methodology to investigate the stock price reaction around the day of the political decision to include a country-by-country reporting obligation for EU financial institutions. We do not find significant abnormal returns for the banks affected. Sample splits according to the effective tax rate and the degree of B2C orientation do not reveal a more pronounced negative investor response for banks engaging more strongly in tax avoidance or being potentially more concerned about reputational risks, respectively. We conclude that the implementation of a CbCR requirement for EU financial institutions did not trigger a noticeable investor response. Contrary prior findings regarding other public tax disclosure obligations might be driven by the distinct motivation of the rules and the way the information is presented. We contend that capital market reactions to an upcoming increase in tax transparency are not generalizable to other industries and settings, but that consideration must be given to the context and the exact design of the rule.
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In: ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 18-019
SSRN
Working paper
We employ an event study methodology to investigate the stock price reaction around the day of the political decision to include a country-by-country reporting obligation for EU financial institutions. We do not find significant abnormal returns for the banks affected. Sample splits according to the effective tax rate and the degree of B2C orientation do not reveal a more pronounced negative investor response for banks engaging more strongly in tax avoidance or being potentially more concerned about reputational risks, respectively. We conclude that the implementation of a CbCR requirement for EU financial institutions did not trigger a noticeable investor response. Contrary prior findings regarding other public tax disclosure obligations might be driven by the distinct motivation of the rules and the way the information is presented. We contend that capital market reactions to an upcoming increase in tax transparency are not generalizable to other industries and settings, but that consideration must be given to the context and the exact design of the rule.
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