Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Contents -- The International Economic Association -- Acknowledgements -- List of Contributors -- List of Abbreviations and Acronyms -- 1 Introduction: Advances and Challenges in Macroeconomics -- Part I: The General Framework -- 2 From Neoclassical Growth Theory to New Classical Macroeconomics -- 3 On the Macroeconomics of Uncertainty and Incomplete Markets -- 4 Macroeconomic Frictions: What Have We Learned from the Real Business Cycle Research Programme? -- Part II: Money and Finance -- 5 How the Rational Expectations Revolution has Changed Macroeconomic Policy Research -- 6 Monetary Policy in an Imperfect Information World -- 7 Understanding Inflation: Implications for Monetary Policy -- Part III: Wages and Employment -- 8 Single-Peaked versus Diversified Capitalism: The Relation between Economic Institutions and Outcomes -- 9 Institutions, Restructuring and Macroeconomic Performance -- 10 Rigid Wages: What Have We Learnt from Microeconometric Studies? -- Part IV: Econometrics -- 11 The Getting of Macroeconomic Wisdom -- Part V: Dynamics -- 12 Learning Dynamics: Complete and Incomplete Learning -- 13 Standard-of-Living Aspirations and Economic Cycles -- Part VI: Development -- 14 Development Policies Beyond Export-led Growth -- 15 Macroeconomic Policies: Can We Transfer Lessons Across LDCs? -- 16 Cross-Country Growth Comparison: Theory to Empirics -- 17 Volatility and Macroeconomic Paradigms for Rich and Poor Countries.

A player i's actions in a game are determined by her beliefs about other players; these depend on the game's real-life context, not only its formal description. Define a game situation as a game together with such beliefs; call the beliefs—and i's resulting expectation—rational if there is common knowledge of rationality and a common prior. In two-person zero-sum games, i's only rational expectation is the game's value. In an arbitrary game G, we characterize i's rational expectations in terms of the correlated equilibria of the doubled game 2G in which each of i's strategies in G appears twice. (JEL C72, D83, D84)

International audience ; The European economic integration leads to increasing mobility of factors, thereby threatening the stability of social transfer programs. This article investigates the possibility to achieve by means of voluntary matching grants both the optimal allocation of factors and the optimal level of redistribution in the presence of factor mobility. We use a fiscal competition model a la Wildasin (1991) in which states differ in their technologies and preferences for redistribution. We first investigate a simple process in which the federal authority progressively raises the matching grants to the district choosing the lowest transfer and all districts respond optimally to the resulting change in transfers all around. This process is shown to increase efficiency of both production and redistribution. However, it does not guarantee that all districts gain, nor that an efficient level of redistribution is attained. Assuming complete information among districts, we derive the willingness of each district to match the contribution of other districts and we show that the aggregate willingness to pay for matching rates converges to zero when both the efficient level of redistribution and the efficient allocation of factors are achieved. We then describe an adjustment process for the matching rates that will lead districts to the efficient outcome and guarantee that everyone will gain.

International audience ; The European economic integration leads to increasing mobility of factors, thereby threatening the stability of social transfer programs. This article investigates the possibility to achieve by means of voluntary matching grants both the optimal allocation of factors and the optimal level of redistribution in the presence of factor mobility. We use a fiscal competition model a la Wildasin (1991) in which states differ in their technologies and preferences for redistribution. We first investigate a simple process in which the federal authority progressively raises the matching grants to the district choosing the lowest transfer and all districts respond optimally to the resulting change in transfers all around. This process is shown to increase efficiency of both production and redistribution. However, it does not guarantee that all districts gain, nor that an efficient level of redistribution is attained. Assuming complete information among districts, we derive the willingness of each district to match the contribution of other districts and we show that the aggregate willingness to pay for matching rates converges to zero when both the efficient level of redistribution and the efficient allocation of factors are achieved. We then describe an adjustment process for the matching rates that will lead districts to the efficient outcome and guarantee that everyone will gain.

International audience The European economic integration leads to increasing mobility of factors, thereby threatening the stability of social transfer programs. This article investigates the possibility to achieve by means of voluntary matching grants both the optimal allocation of factors and the optimal level of redistribution in the presence of factor mobility. We use a fiscal competition model a la Wildasin (1991) in which states differ in their technologies and preferences for redistribution. We first investigate a simple process in which the federal authority progressively raises the matching grants to the district choosing the lowest transfer and all districts respond optimally to the resulting change in transfers all around. This process is shown to increase efficiency of both production and redistribution. However, it does not guarantee that all districts gain, nor that an efficient level of redistribution is attained. Assuming complete information among districts, we derive the willingness of each district to match the contribution of other districts and we show that the aggregate willingness to pay for matching rates converges to zero when both the efficient level of redistribution and the efficient allocation of factors are achieved. We then describe an adjustment process for the matching rates that will lead districts to the efficient outcome and guarantee that everyone will gain.