Suchergebnisse

AbstractObjectiveThis study examined experiences of involuntary childlessness as a function of sexual identity and gender in the United States (U.S.) and Israel.BackgroundSexual minority individuals may experience more involuntary childlessness than heterosexual people, and, to our knowledge, no studies have compared involuntary childlessness between the U.S., which is socially, but not politically pronatal, and Israel, which is both socially and politically pronatal.MethodTwo online surveys were distributed, one per country. The combined dataset was 1739 people (470 heterosexual men, 521 heterosexual women, 421 sexual minority men, and 327 sexual minority women). Differences in pronatalism, experiences of involuntary childlessness, and stress related to involuntary childlessness were assessed as a function of gender, sexual identity, and country.ResultsParticipants in the U.S. reported higher levels of pronatalism, more frequent involuntary childlessness, and greater stress from these experiences than did Israeli participants. In Israel, 68% of sexual minority people reported having experienced involuntary childlessness compared to 32% of heterosexual people. In the U.S., around 50% of people reported involuntary childlessness regardless of group. However, sexual minority individuals reported more frequent experiences of and stress from these experiences than did heterosexual people in both countries.ConclusionA concerning proportion of people in the U.S. and sexual minority adults in Israel experience involuntary childlessness. Overall, there are implications for the potential protective factor of effective fertility policies, such as in Israel, for those facing involuntary childlessness.

Trench warfare became associated with the First World War from late 1914 until 1918. Where possible, trenches were laid out by military engineers in line with the most recent military manuals. The effectiveness of individual trenches was to a large extent controlled by the nature of the ground conditions. Engineering geology had a major role to play in: slope stability—as the ideal for trenches was to maintain slopes in an over-steepened condition relative to normal angle of repose; and, drainage—as excess surface and ground waters not only weakened trench slopes but also created untenable conditions for the troops occupying their positions. Recent archaeological investigations around the city of Ypres (Ieper) in Belgium, and in northern France provide opportunities to examine slope engineering and drainage solutions for trenches in Palaeogene clay/silt sediments and Cretaceous chalk. In Flanders, the failure of slope engineering early war led to the creation of 'A' frames to support slopes at the required batter, with the provision of drainage channels beneath duckboard walkways. In northern France, where frost-shattered chalk was close to the surface, drainage and slope support was less of a problem, though trenches cut through thick Quaternary deposits similarly required imaginative solutions.

Gallipoli continues to be a cause célèbre for those seeking to assign blame for this ill-fated military campaign fought against the Ottoman Empire from April to December 1915. Variously blamed are weak generals, poor planning and preparation—and even inadequate topographical mapping. Intended to assist the Allied naval fleet in breaking through the Dardanelles Straits, thereby threatening the Ottoman Capital of Constantinople (and, it was hoped, forcing the Ottomans out of the war), the military campaign was certainly hastily conceived and under-resourced. Commencing on 25 April 1915 as an amphibious landing, the campaign soon degenerated into a desperate struggle, as the Allies attempted in vain to break out of tightly constrained beachheads. This study investigates the role of terrain in the warfare of the ANZAC (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) Sector, from initial landings in April, to attempted breakout in August. At ANZAC, an 'unfortunate accident of geography' brought, dry, mostly fine-grained Pliocene sediments to the coast. An upland area created by the North Anatolian Fault System, the fine sediments were (and are) quickly weathered and eroded to form topographically complex gullied surfaces. This would be the almost hopeless battleground of the Australians and New Zealanders in April–December 1915. With the Ottomans holding a firm grip on the ridge top, the ANZAC troops were constrained to a small, deeply dissected and mostly waterless sector of the scarp slope of the Sari Bair Plateau and ridge system. The war here would be hard fought and bloody, with geology having a major impact on its outcome; the withdrawal of ANZAC troops in December 1915.

In 1940, with the fall of France imminent, Britain prepared for invasion. After Dunkirk, with most armour and transport lost, a defence 'stop line' (GHQ Line) was prepared. Local Defence Volunteers (later Home Guard) were raised to buy time for the Home Army to deploy. Secret 'Auxiliary Units' were also formed, tasked with 'Scallywagging' – guerrilla activities ––in the invading army's rear. 4-8 patrol men were highly skilled, often gamekeepers and poachers, with expert local area knowledge, with below-ground Operational Bases (OBs) in remote locations to avoid detection. No official records are released; but OBs were 'Mark I', enlarged deer setts, smuggler caves, etc., and Mark II, prefabricated designs by the Royal Engineers. This paper details three sites in Suffolk. One unknown Mark I was destroyed, a Mark II was partially-intact and a Mark II was fully intact, all in secluded woods. Geophysical surveys found metal detectors optimal for location, with mid-frequency GPR/ERT optimal for characterisation. Archaeological finds included home-made braziers, 1940 kerosene heater stove, metal pans, ventilation systems and escape tunnels. This study shows OBs varied in construction and condition, with surveys detecting and characterising them, bringing WWII British 'invasion' history into the wider scientific community and public domain.

Just before WW2, the British government prepared for an aerial onslaught that was predicted to raze cities and cause mass casualties. By 1938, the Air Raid Precautions Act officially stated that population protection would be through dispersal, meaning evacuation and small-scale protection, local authority responsibility often devolving to householders. Archaeological records of remaining air-raid shelters are relatively rare and under threat. This paper reports on geophysical surveys on three sites in Stoke-on-Trent and London. Results found three intact Stanton shelters in Stoke-on-Trent, located by GPR, electrical resistivity, magnetometry, gravity and electromagnetic methods. In London, partially demolished shelters and an intact, mass public shelter were both detected by EM and GPR methods, with subsequent intrusive investigations confirming results. Study outcomes shows hitherto-neglected wartime shelters are in varied condition, with geophysical surveys able to detect, characterise and assess them, helping bring WWII British history into the wider scientific community and public domain.