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Although the Chinese leadership and international observers disagree on many things about China, they share at least one assessment: corruption has penetrated China's public sector, and the state financial system is among the worst examples. In Transparency International'sCorruption Perception Indexreleased annually since the early 1990s, China has been placed either into the bottom group ("the most corrupt") or at the lower tier ("more corrupt than the majority"). During the Asian financial crisisThe Economisteven called the Chinese state banks "the worst banking system in Asia." The Communist Party leader Jiang Zemin, when addressing a 1996 general meeting on Party discipline, marked several domains as the "major problem area" where big corruption and crime cases concentrated, and the financial sector topped the list. The Prosecutor General, in his 1998 work report, urged law enforcers to pay special attention to the abuses of power by financial officials.

China's remarkable business expansion abroad since the mid-1980s cannot be explained simply by applying existing theories, which focus on conventional international businesses from capitalist systems. Many puzzling phenomena in Chinese investments abroad become intelligible only when we introduce a key variable - illicit privatization through internationalization. So far only advantageously-placed nomenklatura members and their kin have had access to crossborder ownership, but many of them are accumulating sizeable private wealth at the cost of nationalized property. Contrary to an impression held by many in the West, the Chinese economy under Communist rule experiences spontaneous privatization parallel to what has happened in European postcommunist nations - though with a few Chinese characteristics. An examination of informal privatization in China's multinationals adds a new dimension to our understanding of the shift from state socialism to market capitalism. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)

China's remarkable business expansion abroad since the mid-1980s cannot be explained simply by applying existing theories, which focus on conventional international businesses from capitalist systems. Many puzzling phenomena in Chinese investments abroad become intelligible only when we introduce a key variable–illicit privatization through internationalization. So far only advantageously-placed nomenklatura members and their kin have had access to crossborder ownership, but many of them are accumulating sizeable private wealth at the cost of nationalized property. Contrary to an impression held by many in the West, the Chinese economy under Communist rule experiences spontaneous privatization parallel to what has happened in European postcommunist nations–though with a few Chinese characteristics. An examination of informal privatization in China's multinationals adds a new dimension to our understanding of the shift from state socialism to market capitalism.

Use of the shareholding system to convert small and medium-sized wholly government owned enterprises into mixed public-private companies. Included in a collection of articles under the overall title "Privatization: irregular and stalled". Argues that allowing administrative and managerial cadres to create new property rights arrangements has led to creation of private property for themselves.

In the practice of social science, the most conspicuous recent attempt at theorizing about nonconformity and protest in late communism rests on the conceptual schema of 'civil society versus the state'. Based on a case study of the institutional basis of criticism of, and dissent against, communism in China, I contend that the dichotomous concept 'civil society versus the state'. when used to explain the transition from communism, is applicable only in rare, extreme cases and misleading in most cases. Instead, I introduce the concept of 'institutional amphibiousness', stressing institutional parasitism and institutional manipulation and conversion. In most cases, institutional amphibiousness more adequately accounts for the dynamics of the erosion of communism than the concept of 'civil society versus the state'.