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Previous studies have demonstrated that communication facilitates the provision of public goods, and that part of the success of communication lies in its propensity to elicit promises to contribute. In this article we focus on reactions to conditional promises, and in particular on `promises than cannot be broken' (i.e. conditional contributions). In an experimental study, participants were led to believe they were a member of a five-person group in which one member made a conditional contribution. The results of this study suggest that behavioral reactions to conditional contributions are a function of the motivation ascribed to conditional contributors, which in turn appears to be a function of the interest conditional contributors have in providing the public good. In more general terms, the results suggest that group members reciprocate the motivation they ascribe to the conditional contributor.

Previous research on the allocation of scarce resources shows that when people are assigned labels of leader or follower in their group, leaders allocate more of the scarce resources to themselves than followers do. In three laboratory studies, we examine the idea that how people are selected for the leader role (i.e. election or appointment) determines whether leaders take more or equal shares (relative to followers) from a common resource. In a first experiment, we show that participants were more accepting of norm violating behavior by an appointed versus elected leader. In a second experiment, we show that when participants were assigned to a leader or follower role, allocations of appointed leaders differed significantly from those of elected leaders and followers, whereas there was no difference between the two latter conditions. Moreover, elected leaders were shown to feel more social responsibility than both appointed leaders and followers. In a final experiment, we show that when participants were primed with the concept of social responsibility (relative to a neutral condition) no difference in allocations between appointed and elected leaders emerged.

Emotions fulfil many social functions, but data on their essential function of establishing cooperation are lacking. We investigated how communicating anger and disappointment guides reciprocal cooperative behavior. Although anger may force cooperation by announcing retaliation, we predicted that communicating disappointment was less likely to backfire. A laboratory study in which participants played against the reciprocal strategy of tit-for-tat showed that communicated disappointment established more cooperation than did anger. This effect also carried over to future cooperation decisions. Partners communicating disappointment evoked less anger, were evaluated more positively and as forgiving rather than retaliatory. Communication of disappointment thus appears conducive to establishing mutually beneficial relationships.

Research on multiparty negotiation has investigated how parties form coalitions to secure payoffs but has not addressed how emotions may affect such coalition decisions. Extending research on bilateral negotiations which has generally argued that it is beneficial to communicate anger, we argue that it constitutes a considerable risk when there are more than two people present at the negotiation table. Using a computer-mediated coalition game we show that communicating anger is a risky strategy in multiparty bargaining. The main findings of three studies were that participants: (1) form negative impressions of players who communicate anger and therefore (2) exclude such players from coalitions and from obtaining a payoff share, but (3) make considerable concessions on those rare occasions that they choose to form a coalition with an angry player, or (4) when they had to form a coalition with an angry player. We discuss the implications of these results for theorizing on emotions, negotiations, and coalition formation.

"Two laboratory studies investigated how groups may deal with the strong emotions that social dilemmas often elicit. A first study showed that a new group member evaluated guilt communicated by a fellow group member as more instrumental than neutral emotion feedback when the amount of required resources to obtain the public good (i.e., provision point) was perceived as difficult to obtain. A second study revealed that participants use communicated guilt to draw inferences about both past and future contributions from all fellow group members. Participants also contributed more themselves and adhered to equality more often when guilt versus no emotion was communicated, but only when the provision point was high. Expected contributions from fellow group members mediated this effect." [author's abstract]

Inaction inertia refers to the effect that missing a more attractive opportunity decreases the likelihood to act on an attractive current opportunity in the same domain. We studied the influence of how people cope with negative decision outcomes (i.e., action vs. state orientation) on this inaction inertia effect. Experiment 1 used an experimental induction of action vs. state orientation and confirmed our prediction that state oriented people showed more inaction inertia than action oriented people. Experiment 2 replicated these results with a measure of chronic action orientation and showed a mediating effect of valuation of the current opportunity. Experiment 3 showed that temporal segregation of the current from the missed opportunity decreased inaction inertia effects for state oriented, but not for action oriented people. We discuss the implications of these results for the inaction inertia and action vs. state orientation literatures.

"In this study we investigate how outcome valence affects the importance of self-interest and fairness in ultimatum bargaining. In three experiments we systematically study the effect of outcome valence on fairness accessibility, norms, and behavior. Results on all three aspects show strong evidence for the hypothesis that fairness becomes more important and self-interest becomes less important in negative valence bargaining. Fairness accessibility was higher when bargaining involved negative payoffs than when it involved positive payoffs (Experiment 1), the fairness norm was stronger in negatively versus positively valenced bargaining when an identical unequal offer benefiting the allocators was evaluated (Experiment 2), and allocators allocated more to recipients in negative valence bargaining than in positive valence bargaining (Experiment 3). We relate our findings to insights derived from the do-no-harm principle." [author's abstract]

In two studies, we investigate the effects of group size (un)certainty and social value orientations in common resource dilemmas. By focusing on this largely unexplored type of environmental uncertainty, we show that, in contrast to the often replicated finding that resource size uncertainty leads to over-harvesting in common resource dilemmas, group size uncertainty is not necessarily detrimental to the collective interest. Furthermore, we argue and show that whereas under group size certainty people base their individual harvests on the equal division rule, under group size uncertainty they base their harvests on their own social value orientations: whereas under group size certainty both proselfs and pro-socials harvest about an equal share of the common resource, under uncertainty prosocials show self-restraint in order to further their group's outcomes.