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This volume assembles the philosophical and aesthetic perspectives in current European thought and writing that have been inspired and systematically influenced by Nietzsche's work. Key problems they address include the dynamics of understanding man (e.g. as Superman), the contradictory handling of nihilism, perspectives on art and philosophy, and the tension between discursivity and transcendence of reason

Kant used Copernicus' upheaval in thinking on astronomy to illustrate the profoundness of his critique of traditional metaphysics as 'system of pure reason'. The consequence for philosophy is the following: the perspective of an eternally valid pure reason as a means of gaining knowledge of the world is abandoned – because this approach results not in knowledge, but only in dogmas. Instead, we engage with Kant in a change of perspective. It is grasped how the operative subject manages perception in a changing, agitated world. Instead of understanding perception merely as a mirroring, mimetic achievement, Kant moves to understanding perception as poiesis, as construction, as experimental philosophy. That means: to qualify as perception, something has to be shown to be contrivable, to be construable. This constructiveness of the active subject does not only shape processes of knowledge and perception, but also changes our environment through revolutionary processes in politics and society. Reason in revolutions becomes evident in constituting the legal practice of civil and human rights (Bill of Rights und Code civil). ; Kant used Copernicus' upheaval in thinking on astronomy to illustrate the profoundness of his critique of traditional metaphysics as 'system of pure reason'. The consequence for philosophy is the following: the perspective of an eternally valid pure reason as a means of gaining knowledge of the world is abandoned – because this approach results not in knowledge, but only in dogmas. Instead, we engage with Kant in a change of perspective. It is grasped how the operative subject manages perception in a changing, agitated world. Instead of understanding perception merely as a mirroring, mimetic achievement, Kant moves to understanding perception as poiesis, as construction, as experimental philosophy. That means: to qualify as perception, something has to be shown to be contrivable, to be construable. This constructiveness of the active subject does not only shape processes of knowledge and perception, but also changes our environment through revolutionary processes in politics and society. Reason in revolutions becomes evident in constituting the legal practice of civil and human rights (Bill of Rights und Code civil).

Kant used Copernicus' upheaval in thinking on astronomy to illustrate the profoundness of his critique of traditional metaphysics as 'system of pure reason'. The consequence for philosophy is the following: the perspective of an eternally valid pure reason as a means of gaining knowledge of the world is abandoned – because this approach results not in knowledge, but only in dogmas. Instead, we engage with Kant in a change of perspective. It is grasped how the operative subject manages perception in a changing, agitated world. Instead of understanding perception merely as a mirroring, mimetic achievement, Kant moves to understanding perception as poiesis, as construction, as experimental philosophy. That means: to qualify as perception, something has to be shown to be contrivable, to be construable. This constructiveness of the active subject does not only shape processes of knowledge and perception, but also changes our environment through revolutionary processes in politics and society. Reason in revolutions becomes evident in constituting the legal practice of civil and human rights (Bill of Rights und Code civil). ; Kant used Copernicus' upheaval in thinking on astronomy to illustrate the profoundness of his critique of traditional metaphysics as 'system of pure reason'. The consequence for philosophy is the following: the perspective of an eternally valid pure reason as a means of gaining knowledge of the world is abandoned – because this approach results not in knowledge, but only in dogmas. Instead, we engage with Kant in a change of perspective. It is grasped how the operative subject manages perception in a changing, agitated world. Instead of understanding perception merely as a mirroring, mimetic achievement, Kant moves to understanding perception as poiesis, as construction, as experimental philosophy. That means: to qualify as perception, something has to be shown to be contrivable, to be construable. This constructiveness of the active subject does not only shape processes of knowledge and perception, but also changes our environment through revolutionary processes in politics and society. Reason in revolutions becomes evident in constituting the legal practice of civil and human rights (Bill of Rights und Code civil).

Lies occupy a surprisingly favorable place within our daily life. As the Polish aphorist Stanisław Jerzy Lec once remarked: if you want to see the lie you need to face the obvious truth. With lies, we do not simply stigmatize the dark part or the "backside" of the humankind. To lie, meaning the ability to deceive, with or without words, even to deceive with the truth (for example in statistics), is one of the intellectual modalities of human existence, as well as an expression of misery. This leads to the paradox: One cannot live with lies or, at the same time, live without them. Lies thus reveal their double nature; they attempt to maintain vivid things, just as they generally tend to destroy them. This double nature of lies makes it impossible to condemn them by means of "ethical conviction", as Max Weber would put it, or with the words of another famous French philosopher of our present time, Vladimir Jankélévitch, who says that consciousness is already provided with an inner disposi-tion to lie, as a litmus test of its noble and mean sides.