Suchergebnisse

Monetary policy measures in reaction to the Global Financial Crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic have resulted in unprecedented (re)distributional effects. In addition, Central Bank (CB) interventions have been conceptualized as targeted measures favouring certain market participants compared to others. Against this background, discussions about CBs and inequality have sparked in the economic and legal literature. The article takes up this discourse and sheds light on the different aspects of equality within monetary policy: equality as an objective of monetary policy, equality and inequality considerations with regard to the design of monetary policy measures, and equality and inequality as side effects of monetary policy and the interaction between inequality and the monetary policy transmission. The aim is to provide a structural analysis of how the notion of equality is embedded in the mandate of the ECB and how it translates into legal requirements with regard to the implementation of monetary policy measures.
Central Banks, inequality, ECB, monetary policy, global financial crisis, COVID-19

Confronted with the challenges of climate change, the ECB adopted a Climate Change Action Plan in July 2021 and thereby joined forces with Member States and EU institutions to support Europe's green transition to a CO2-neutral environment. The measures in the Action Plan aim to internalize climate risks, integrating sustainability-linked bonds into the monetary policy framework and hint at an even more active climate policy by way of preferential green bond purchases. This article analyses to what extent the mandate of the ECB allows for such a green monetary policy, focusing on the admissibility of monetary policy measures containing a "green bias" that discriminate against environmentally unsustainable or carbon-intensive economic activities. The ECB uses the principle of market efficiency to defend preferential green bond purchases. According to the ECB, as long as market participants do not yet adequately price in the costs of climate change and unsustainable economic activities, the ECB should step in and correct these market dysfunctionalities to ensure an efficient allocation of resources.This is a contested novelty in euro area monetary policy, since the ECB has so far adhered to the principle of market neutrality with regard to the allocation of its bond purchases.
ECB, central banking, mandate, monetary policy, climate change, institutional balance, sustainable finance

The latest financial crises in Europe and the United States have reminded us of the importance of the role of central banks as Lender of Last Resort. This article examines the current legal framework in the European Union with regard to the allocation of Lender of Last Resort competence, which until now has been exercised by the national central banks in the Eurozone. The new Emergency Liquidity Assistance Agreement 2017 sustains this institutional design, leaves the Emergency Liquidity Assistance competence with the national central banks and specifies the cooperation between the European Central Bank and the national central banks with regard to the veto-option of the European Central Bank to national Emergency Liquidity Assistance operations. Against this background, the paper discusses whether the current legal competence structure of the European and Monetary Union would also allow for more authority of the European Central Bank with regard to Emergency Liquidity Assistance powers. The paper concludes there is a sufficient legal basis in the monetary policy and financial stability mandate of the European Central Bank to allow it to grant Emergency Liquidity Assistance at least with regard to 'significant' banks, as defined under the current European Banking Supervision regime.

Greening the European Central Bank (ECB) has been a highly debated subject in the Eurozone/EU, featuring in the ECB monetary policy strategy review and the ECB Climate Change Action Plan. This is part of a worldwide trend towards 'sustainable central banking'. This article focuses on the accountability of the ECB as a European institution, which enjoys a very special position in the EU legal framework, with a defined mandate conferred onto it by the Treaties (TEU and TFEU). The question at heart is, first, whether the existing normative framework allows an interpretation and understanding of the ECB's mandate to incorporate sustainability goals, and second, how sustainability objectives can be operationalized in the actual conduct of monetary policy. Whether and to what extent the ECB objectives and tasks can be 'greened' depends also on the possibility of integrating such an augmented mandate with adequate accountability requirements. Building on the concept of accountability and the framework of 'accountable independence' of the ECB, the article considers the relationship between accountability and greening the ECB, with an emphasis on the monetary policy responsibilities.