Suchergebnisse

AbstractFew issues are more important yet less understood than outside interventions in intra-state conflicts. Under what circumstances do intervening states further their interests and when, contrarily, do they plunge into quagmires? France is a critical case. It is, statistically, the world's second intervenor and earned the sobriquet of Africa's gendarme through frequent interventions in African wars. The ability of such a medium-sized state to intervene with greater regularity and ostensible success than larger powers raises questions about how France manages its interventions. Do French interventions draw on the French Army's distinctive 'school' of population-centric counterinsurgency, which emphasises the need to militarise governance in pursuit of comprehensive victories? Or do the French Fifth Republic's civil-military institutions encourage policymakers to carefully regulate force's employment in pursuit of limited ends? This study draws on declassified archives to test which approach most characterises French interventions. To preview my conclusions, strategic satisficing – the use of minimal force for short durations to produce satisfactory outcomes – distinguishes the Fifth Republic's interventions from other powers' practices and prior French counterinsurgencies. This particular form of interventionism enables France to influence a large number of intra-state conflicts and maintain a network of security agreements with African states.

France's 1968–72 intervention in Chad constitutes a forgotten turning point in the Fifth Republic's foreign relations. Interconnected institutions and treaties gave France a disproportionate influence over its African ex-colonies. French security guarantees underscored this system, however, whereby francophone African leaders continued to accept French economic and political leadership. French leaders discovered in Chad, however, that they had fewer choices and needed to dedicate more resources to fulfilling these commitments than President Charles de Gaulle had intended. Prosperous ex-colonies' leaders judged French commitments' value according to how France responded to crises in its least-valued ex-colonies. Thus, although French analysts viewed intervening in Chad as irrational from a cost–benefit perspective, they found themselves pressured into it.

Nothing is more important to Europe's future as a security actor than supplying its armed forces with modern weaponry. Because individual states lack the research and development budgets and scale economies to remain autarkic, the survival of Europe's defence-industrial base depends on international cooperation. As in other areas of international affairs, the ability of states to cooperate 'under anarchy' is inextricably tied to the existence of international institutions. However, the nature of arms production renders the design of institutions particularly challenging. Problems lie in both the multiplicity of potential cooperative outcomes and the variety of policy tools available. Ultimately, the choice of policies and policy tools can generate friction between the key groups of actors involved in defence-industrial policymaking. This study systematically explores how variations in the structure of international armaments institutions have shaped both the influence of different groups of actors and the nature of collaborative weapons projects. To preview my conclusions, three broad trends can be observed in the evolution of armaments institutions. These are as follows: (1) the gradual incorporation of a larger number of actors into the arms cooperation process; (2) the incremental exclusion of military professionals from armaments institutions; and (3) the growing influence of corporate actors.

Culminating in the creation in 2004 of the European Defence Agency (EDA), the post-Cold War development of European armaments organizations has impressed social scientists and policymakers alike as a momentous development. However, their theoretical diversity, prior analyses of armaments organizations err in their focus on recent organizations of a European character. The narrow focus on institutions tied to the EU has led scholars to neglect the long-term and incremental dynamics driving the development of armaments organizations on both a transatlantic and European basis. In fact, European states' participation in international armaments organizations is neither a recent phenomenon nor one that has historically been distinctly rooted in broader processes of European integration. By examining the development of European and transatlantic armaments organizations prior to the EDA, this article sheds new light on how this domain of international organization emerged and is likely to develop. Abstracting from the prior evolution of armaments organizations, this field is likely to continue to evolve along polycentric lines, with intergovernmentalism, rather than 'Europeanization' and 'Brusselization' remaining the motive forces for future change.