Poverty persistence in Britain: A multivariate analysis using the BHPS, 1991–1997
In: Journal of economics, Volume 77, Issue S1, p. 307-340
ISSN: 1617-7134
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In: Journal of economics, Volume 77, Issue S1, p. 307-340
ISSN: 1617-7134
In: Applied Economics
There is growing interest in the analysis and measurement of social exclusion, to complement the static and dynamic literature on income poverty. On theoretical grounds, social exclusion and income poverty are seen as different processes, but with closely interrelated dynamics. However, our empirical understanding of the way these two processes dynamically interact at the individual level is still very limited. To shed some light on the issue, we use a dynamic bivariate probit model, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and Wooldridge (2005)-type initial conditions. Both first and second order Markov dynamics are examined. We estimate the model using the Italian sample of the ECHP, waves 1-8, and find a sizable extent of state dependence in both poverty and social exclusion. Moreover, there are dynamic cross-effects, implying that poverty and social exclusion are mutually reinforcing. Social policies aimed at eradicating poverty and avoiding individuals' social and economic marginalization should take these interaction effects explicitly into account.
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 7601
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In: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
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In: Bulletin of Economic Research, Volume 66, Issue 3, p. 246-278
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In: Bulletin of economic research, Volume 66, Issue 3, p. 246-278
ISSN: 1467-8586
ABSTRACTThis article estimates poverty persistence over an individual's lifetime, using two definitions: income poverty and a multidimensional index of lifestyle deprivation. We stress the ability of the two definitions to provide a generally consistent characterization of poverty persistence risks faced by various population subgroups, but also the additional insights to be gained by analysing the two definitions in parallel in a longitudinal context. The results of multiple‐spell hazard rate models highlight the weaknesses of the Italian labour market, the insufficiencies of the existing social security system, and the deep territorial dualism in generating persistent poverty for certain groups of the population.
It is widely believed that rent-sharing reduces the incentives for investment when long term contracts are infeasible because some of the returns to sunk capital are captured by workers. We propose a simple test for the degree of hold-up based on the fraction of capital costs that are deducted from the quasi-rent that determines negotiated wages. We implement the test using a data set that combines Social Security earnings records for workers in the Veneto region of Italy with detailed financial information for employers. We find strong evidence of rent-sharing, with an elasticity of wages with respect to current profitability of the firm of 3-7%, arising mainly from firms in concentrated industries. On the other hand we find little evidence that bargaining lowers the return on investment. Instead, firm-level bargaining appears to split the rents after deducting the full cost of capital.
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w16192
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In: Research on Economic Inequality; Studies in Applied Welfare Analysis: Papers from the Third ECINEQ Meeting, p. 79-106
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Volume 117, Issue 524, p. F530-F552
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 9410
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 9463
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 10293
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 6086
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