Alpha- and beta-characteristic functions in cooperative non-sidepayment games: An experimental test
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 3, Heft 4, S. 441-492
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In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 3, Heft 4, S. 441-492
In: European journal of political economy, Band 3, Heft 4, S. 441-492
ISSN: 0176-2680
An investigation of theories of payoff allocation in cooperative non-side-payment games -- ie, games where players can form coalitions & coordinate strategies but cannot redistribute payoffs via side-payments. A laboratory experiment consisting of 4-person, 3-strategy games (N = 128 Coll students) was used to ascertain which characteristic function, Va(S) or Vb(S), provides the more accurate basis for payoff predictions from solution concepts. Predictions from each of 3 solution concepts (core, stable set, imputation set) were computed on the basis of both functions, making a total of 6 theories under test. Results show that, for each of the 3 solutions, the prediction computed on the basis of Vb(S) was more accurate than the prediction computed from Va(S), & the b-core was the most accurate of the six theories tested. 15 Tables, 1 Appendix, 29 References. Modified HA
In: The journal of mathematical sociology, Band 11, Heft 4, S. 307-330
ISSN: 1545-5874