Suchergebnisse

The paper deals with the transmission of monetary policy within the financial sector. The objective is to link an optimizing stochastic model of portfolio decisions by a representative financial institution with a number of features that this optimizing behavior implies for monetary transmission and credit conditions in a transitional economy. The main example is the intermediation performance of Czech financial sector in the years 1993 to 1999.

We discuss (dis)incentives for fair cooperation related to delegating macroprudential policy decisions to a supranational body, as well as their welfare implications. The question is studied by means of a signaling game of imperfect information between two national regulators. The model concentrates on informational frictions in an environment with otherwise fully aligned preferences. We show that even in the absence of evident conflicting goals, the non-transferrable nature of some regulatory information creates misreporting incentives. However, the major problem is not the reporting accuracy but the institutional arrangement focused on maximal multilateral satisfaction to the detriment of credible enforcement of rules. The main application is meant to be systemic risk management by the relevant EU institutions.