Suchergebnisse

Utilizing evidence from a United Kingdom (UK) road case study Private Finance Initiative (PFI) project, this article considers how the UK central government's infrastructure strategy is operationalized through accounting‐based performance measures and incentive systems, and articulates how the adoption of such systems is moderated by trust practices. The findings indicate that initial government policy objectives, translated as performance indicators in the case study, failed to offer adequate incentives for contractors and created tensions. However, controls were later developed through inter‐party trust practices for managing performance and relational risk. These findings have important implications for PFI policy and practice, including that negotiation can: (i) lead to pragmatic controls being introduced to foster cooperation and trust‐building; and (ii) provide opportunities for adapting the monitoring and incentive mechanisms. This study also contributes to the previous literature where PFI control systems were largely regarded as inadequate for dealing with unforeseen conflicts between parties.

Responses to a questionnaire survey received from PFI financiers, and interviews with senior managers, show that as the credit crunch took hold banks became more risk averse. The prediction of Toms et al. that collusion between the state and the private sector might cease in the face of austerity does not appear to have occurred. Rather the state has intervened to benefit the private sector. We argue that two successive UK Governments intervened in the market to protect the role of private finance in PFIs but whether such interventions represent value for taxpayers' money is a question for future research.

This study is based on three Irish operational toll road public private partnership (PPP) case studies, including interviews with 38 key stakeholders. Our findings show that the Irish Government's treatment of risk and its transfer to the private partner in PPPs are changing over time. Regulatory changes, which have led to increased finance costs, coupled with a severe global economic crisis, have exacerbated the difficulties in funding PPPs. The goalposts in Irish PPPs appear to be changing in favour of the private partner at the expense of the taxpayers, who are the losers in the PPP game. The Government are also suggesting that they may potentially step in, if projects experienced financial difficulty and the special purpose vehicle (SPV) may require specific guarantees in order to participate in future PPP projects. Pricing of demand risk also differs from the Government's rhetoric that it is being priced realistically. In practice, we find that it is priced aggressively by the SPV in order to win PPP contracts. The paper discusses the possible implications of these findings for value for money (VFM) and, ultimately, taxpayers.

The purpose of this paper is to document the prevalent ownership concentration, structure and control in the top 100 companies listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. The results are discussed in the context of emerging corporate governance trends in Turkey. Where appropriate, comparisons with other countries are provided.The results of the study indicate that ownership of Turkish companies is highly concentrated, families being the dominant shareholders. The separation of ownership and control among Turkish companies is mainly achieved through pyramidal ownership structures and the presence of big business groups. However, the cash flow and voting rights in Turkish companies are relatively more aligned compared to other family–ownership–dominated insider–system countries.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore how localized (organization-level) actors of policy initiatives that are inspired by neoliberal ideologies use management accounting and control practices. Specifically, it addresses the operational stages of a case study Private Finance Initiative (PFI) contract within the United Kingdom's (UK's) transport sector of roads for embedding government objectives in the underlying project road. Design/methodology/approach This paper adopts Dean's (2010) analytics of government to unpack the accounting-based control practices within the case study contract in order to articulate how, at the micro level, the government's objective of improving road-users' safety is enacted, modified and maintained through such regimes. Findings Drawing on a content-based analysis of UK government PFI policy and extensive case study-specific documents, together with interviews and observations, this research provides theoretical insights about how control practices, at a distance without direct intervention, function as forms of power for government for shaping the performance of the PFI contractor. The authors find that the public sector's accounting control regimes in the case study project have a constraining effect on "real partnership working" between the government and private contractors and on the private sector's incentive to innovate. Research limitations/implications By analyzing a single road case study PFI contract, the findings may not be generalizable. Originality/value This paper provides significant theoretically informed insights about how public service delivery that is outsourced to private contractors is controlled by government at a distance within complex organizational arrangements (e.g. PFI).

Purpose: Using Dean's (2010) analytics of government, this research explores how regimes of governing practices are linked to the underlying policy rationalities in dealing with the UK government's COVID-19 testing policies as a strategy for governing at a distance, including how targets were set and operationalized. Design/methodology/approach: This paper draws on the UK government's policy documents, other official publications (plans) and parliamentary discourse, together with publicly available media information related to its COVID-19 policies. Findings: This research reveals that, with respect to the governance of COVID-19 in the UK, testing has the dual role of inscription for the government's performance and classification for the pandemic risks. The analysis illustrates that the central role of testing is as a technology for classification for identifying and monitoring the virus-related risks. Moreover, our discourse analysis suggests that initially COVID-19 testing was used by the UK government more for performance communication, with the classificatory role of testing and its performativity as a strategic device evolving and only being acknowledged by government gradually as the underlying testing infrastructure was developed. Research limitations/implications: This paper is based upon publicly available reports and other information of a single country's attempts to control COVID-19 over a relatively short period of time. Originality/value: This paper provides a critical understanding of the role of (accounting) numbers in developing an effective government policy for governing COVID-19.

Utilizing evidence from a United Kingdom (UK) road case study Private Finance Initiative (PFI) project, this article considers how the UK central government's infrastructure strategy is operationalized through accounting‐based performance measures and incentive systems, and articulates how the adoption of such systems is moderated by trust practices. The findings indicate that initial government policy objectives, translated as performance indicators in the case study, failed to offer adequate incentives for contractors and created tensions. However, controls were later developed through inter‐party trust practices for managing performance and relational risk. These findings have important implications for PFI policy and practice, including that negotiation can: (i) lead to pragmatic controls being introduced to foster cooperation and trust‐building; and (ii) provide opportunities for adapting the monitoring and incentive mechanisms. This study also contributes to the previous literature where PFI control systems were largely regarded as inadequate for dealing with unforeseen conflicts between parties.

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to explore how localized (organization-level) actors of policy initiatives that are inspired by neoliberal ideologies use management accounting and control practices. Specifically, it addresses the operational stages of a case study Private Finance Initiative (PFI) contract within the United Kingdom's (UK's) transport sector of roads for embedding government objectives in the underlying project road. Design/methodology/approach: This paper adopts Dean's (2010) analytics of government to unpack the accounting-based control practices within the case study contract in order to articulate how, at the micro level, the government's objective of improving road-users' safety is enacted, modified and maintained through such regimes. Findings: Drawing on a content-based analysis of UK government PFI policy and extensive case study-specific documents, together with interviews and observations, this research provides theoretical insights about how control practices, at a distance without direct intervention, function as forms of power for government for shaping the performance of the PFI contractor. The authors find that the public sector's accounting control regimes in the case study project have a constraining effect on "real partnership working" between the government and private contractors and on the private sector's incentive to innovate. Research limitations/implications: By analyzing a single road case study PFI contract, the findings may not be generalizable. Originality/value: This paper provides significant theoretically informed insights about how public service delivery that is outsourced to private contractors is controlled by government at a distance within complex organizational arrangements (e.g. PFI).