Applied Darwinism. Lessons from the History of Applied Psychoanalysis
In: Culture and organization: the official journal of SCOS, Band 12, Heft 4, S. 293-305
ISSN: 1477-2760
5 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Culture and organization: the official journal of SCOS, Band 12, Heft 4, S. 293-305
ISSN: 1477-2760
In: The Journal of sex research, Band 50, Heft 3-4, S. 276-298
ISSN: 1559-8519
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 42, Heft 4, S. 459-488
ISSN: 1552-7441
Evolutionary psychology and human sociobiology often reject the mere possibility of symbolic causality. Conversely, theories in which symbolic causality plays a central role tend to be both anti-nativist and anti-evolutionary. This article sketches how these apparent scientific rivals can be reconciled in the study of disgust. First, we argue that there are no good philosophical or evolutionary reasons to assume that symbolic causality is impossible. Then, we examine to what extent symbolic causality can be part of the theoretical toolbox of the evolutionary social sciences. This examination leads to the conclusion that it is possible to make evolutionary sense of Mary Douglas's theory of disgust, and that her view of symbolic causality can and should inform evolutionary theories of (sociocultural) disgust.
In: Conix , S , De Block , A & Vaesen , K 2021 , ' Grant writing and grant peer review as questionable research practices ' , F1000Research , vol. 10 , 1126 . https://doi.org/10.12688/f1000research.73893.1
A large part of governmental research funding is currently distributed through the peer review of project proposals. In this paper, we argue that such funding systems incentivize and even force researchers to violate five moral values, each of which is central to commonly used scientific codes of conduct. Our argument complements existing epistemic arguments against peer-review project funding systems and, accordingly, strengthens the mounting calls for reform of these systems.
BASE
A large part of governmental research funding is currently distributed through peer review of project proposals. In this paper, we argue that such funding systems incentivize and even force researchers to violate five moral values, each of which is central to commonly used scientific codes of conduct. Our argument complements existing epistemic arguments against peer-review project funding systems and, accordingly, adds ammunition to the mounting calls for reform of these systems.
BASE