Suchergebnisse

The digital pdf of Chapter 9 is available Open Access under CC-BY-NC-ND licence.
This collection brings together leading figures in the study of international relations to explore praxis as a perspective on international politics and law. With its focus on competent judgments, the praxis approach holds the promise to overcome the divide between knowing and acting that marks positivist international relations theory.
Building on the transdisciplinary work of Friedrich Kratochwil, this book reveals the scope, limits and blind spots of praxis theorizing.

Conventional wisdom dictates that the conditions of international politics require states to pursue "tough" strategies based on threats, ruling out "soft" strategies such as reassurances or appeasement. In Threats and Promises, James W. Davis, Jr., works toward a theory of influence in international politics that recognizes the power of promises and assurances as tools of statecraft.Davis offers an analytic treatment of promises and assurances, drawing on relevant strands of international relations theory and deterrence theory, as well as cognitive and social psychology. Building on prospect theory (from cognitive psychology), he develops a testable theory of influence that suggests promises are most effective when potential aggressors are motivated by a desire to avoid loss. Davis then considers a series of case studies drawn principally from German diplomatic relations in the later nineteenth and early twentieth century. From the case studies -- which focus on such issues as European stability, colonial competition, and the outbreak of the First World War -- Davis shows how a blending of threats and promises according to reasoned principles can lead to a new system of more creative statecraft.While many critical analyses exist on the use of threats, there are relatively few on the use of promises. Davis argues that promises have been central to outcomes that were previously attributed to the successful use of deterrent threats, as well as the resolution of many crises where threats failed to deter aggression. Threats and Promises challenges the conventional wisdom, and is an original contribution to the field of international politics.

Abstract
Challenging the Realist claim that international anarchy produces an amoral sphere of political action, Brian C. Rathbun argues that anarchy has selected for individuals with a particular moral sense. Flipping Realist arguments around, he claims that individuals would have never survived the hardships of anarchy if they were completely amoral. Rather, morality is a precondition for survival in anarchy. But unlike Constructivists, who maintain that socially constructed norms over time have civilized international politics, Rathbun claims that a morality is part of our human nature, and thus, a material feature of the world. To substantiate his claims, Rathbun adeptly applies insights from multiple disciplines, marshalling empirical evidence generated through a variety of natural and social scientific methods.

Behavioral IR is enjoying newfound popularity. Nonetheless, attempts to integrate behavioral research into the larger project of IR theory have proven controversial. Many scholars treat behavioral findings as a trove of plausible ad hoc modifications to rational choice models, thereby lending credence to arguments that behavioral IR is merely residual, empirical, and hence not theoretical. Others limit their research to cataloging outcomes consistent with the basic tenets of behavioral models. Although this expands the empirical base, it is insufficient for theoretical progress. In this article, I explore various answers to the question of when rational choice or behavioral assumptions should guide efforts to build IR theory. I argue that no single answer trumps all others. Examining the various conditions under which actors reason highlights the importance of macrofoundations. Macrofoundations condition the effects of microprocesses and help identify relevant scope conditions for both rational choice and behavioral models of decision-making. Examining the various purposes of IR theory also provides answers to the question of when rational or behavioral assumptions are likely to be most useful. Although many behavioral scholars premise the relevance of their findings on claims of empirical realism, I argue that under certain conditions, deductive theorizing on the basis of as-if behavioral assumptions can lead to powerful theories that improve our understanding of IR and may help decision-makers promote desired ends.

Abstract:  This article suggests that various dimensions of the larger project of global governance are incoherent and illegitimate. Three dimensions of global governance – the provision of global public goods; processes of transnational regulation; and efforts to spread universal human rights – are examined and found to be deficient in terms of the ability of affected populations to participate in decisions over value trade‐offs. Citizens' rights to participation in democratic processes often have been diminished as the locus of political decision making has shifted: on the one hand, to institutions beyond the territorial borders of the nation state; on the other, away from political institutions and towards "global civil society," which seems oddly intolerant of diversity. But if global governance is anti‐pluralist and disenfranchising, it risks devolving into an imperial project. Hence, the paper concludes with a plea for a return to international politics as a control on the threat of empire.