Suchergebnisse

Since its conception, some within the European Union have expressed concerns over the ability of multinationals to avoid taxation by undertaking transfer pricing to shift profits towards low tax locations. These concerns have been growing, leading to a renewed call for a common consolidated corporate tax base wherein profits are allocated to nations according to a formula rather than firms' internal prices. This paper analyzes the merits of such a shift in taxation. In particular, it is shown that, given tax rates, implementing formula apportionment can result in greater tax revenues and less intense tax competition particularly for lower trade barriers. However, this is not always the case and depends on parameter values, including those describing the extent of economic integration.

An increasing number of international agreements require nondiscrimination from their participants, i.e. the government of one country cannot treat foreign firms differently from domestic firms. This is at odds with a government's desire to benefit its own citizens rather than foreign citizens. I show that the use of red tape - a wasteful application process - can achieve de-facto discrimination. Key to this result is firm heterogeneity since, although the red tape cost is constant across firms, only those sufficiently benefiting from an incentive program will find it worth the cost of applying. If the benefits of targeting subsidies outweigh the burden of red tape on domestic firms, red tape will be used.

Trade-weighted coverage ratios are commonly used when estimating the effect of non-tariff measures on trade flows and other outcomes. Because they weight by import shares, for a given sector they can vary across countries even when actual policies are the same. While trade shares can depend on several factors, we link them to income distribution when preferences are non-homothetic. Further, the correlation between coverage ratios and income distribution measures can provide an indication of whether NTMs are more geared towards luxuries (consumed by primarily the wealthy) or necessities (which are consumed by all). Using data on coverage ratios during 2008- 2014 in the European Union, our estimates suggest not only that the variation in coverage ratios are linked to income inequality, but that the relationship is consistent with NTMs primarily on luxuries. Finally, as other studies have shown that income distribution can itself have a direct impact on trade, our results suggest the potential for biased estimates when using NTM coverage ratios but not accounting for inequality

AbstractOutbound FDI is often accused of increasing income inequality in developed countries by shifting labour demand from low‐skilled towards high‐skilled workers (wage polarization). In response, we employ data on greenfield FDI that, in contrast to M&As, may be more clearly linked to skill upgrading. Our data also delineate greenfield FDI by sector, function and destination, allowing us to control for different motives and skill intensities for 17 developed countries for 2003–2005. We find that greenfield FDI in support services, e.g., back and front office services, induces polarized skill upgrading, benefitting high‐skilled workers at the expense of medium‐skilled workers, thereby polarizing wages.

Using data from 1988 to 2007, we examine to what extent bilateral aid flows of an individual donor to a country depend on aid flows from all other bilateral and multilateral donors to that country in that year. We thereby want to assess to what extent donor coordination, free-riding, selectivity, specialization, and common donor motivations drive bilateral aid allocation as these determinants would point to different dependence structures. Using approaches from spatial econometrics and controlling for endogeneity, we find that other bilateral flows lead to a significant increase in aid flows from a particular donor. The effects are particularly pronounced for recipients in Africa and the Middle East and so-called donor "orphans" who seem to be collectively shunned by bilateral aid donors. The positive dependence also seems to be related to donors following the lead of the largest donors. Over time, the positive dependence has become smaller. Overall the results suggest that donor coordination and free-riding are quantitatively less important than common donor interests and selectivity.