Suchergebnisse

The Gulf of Suez (GOS) is one of the most important waterways in the world. Furthermore, issues like maritime safety, avoidance of accidents and effective conduct of navigation, as well as protection of the marine environment in the GOS are always among the highest priorities of Egyptian legislators. As a result, maritime surveillance in the area under discussion is facilitated by a technologically advanced Vessel Traffic Management System (VTMS) that has been established by the competent authority as a cost-effective measure to reduce and mitigate risks in accordance with international standards and guidelines. The main aim of this paper is to discuss the status of the GOS VTMS and identify relevant opportunities for improvement. This effort utilizes qualitative primary and secondary data. Primary data was collected by employing in-depth, semi-structured interviews; secondary data was sourced from relevant national legislations, IMO, IALA and UK hydrographic office publications. Thus, the distinctive features of the GOS VTMS along with its degree of compliance with international standards and guidelines have been closely examined for a comprehensive assessment. A conclusion standing out is that GOS' VTMS is a very powerful tool for a more efficient conduct of navigation, with a positive contribution on maritime safety and the protection of the marine environment; however, certain gaps that must be addressed in the near future were identified. A portfolio of the necessary recommendations on how to improve the system's overall performance are also provided

The key characteristic of the contemporary world is the interconnectedness among societies and people across the national boundaries of nation-states. It is also necessary to note that nearly four fifths of international trade is being conducted by sea; only via the availability of commercial vessels, massive transport of goods in a society is made technically and financially possible. Among the several problems that can be encountered in short-distance navigation and in ocean-going navigation one must consider the potential for maritime accidents, sea and coastal pollution. Safety at sea is a key element of maritime transport policy with a view to protecting passengers, crew members, the marine environment and coastal regions. Given the global nature of maritime transport, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) develops uniform international standards. As a result of the pressure exerted by public opinion and the action taken by environmental organizations, the most important legislation and regulations of IMO were adopted following important maritime accidents. The primary international agreements include the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) and the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC 90). In addition, the International Safety Management Code (better known as ISM Code) is one of the most useful tools for the improvement of the safety of vessels and one of the pillars of the so called "quality navigation". While prompt amendment of EU law to incorporate these international law-based agreements is a major objective of the EU's maritime transport policy. EU participation in the development and improvement of the international agreements as well as the adoption of additional measures has been just as important. In recent years, European maritime transport administrations and the European shipping industry have made significant efforts to improve the environmental record of maritime transport. The EU regulatory framework has been strengthened and cooperation with Member States has been increased to tackle issues such as the prevention of accidents and incidents. Thus, European Union and its Member States have been at the forefront of improving maritime safety legislation and promoting high-quality standards. In the same context, the «Erika» and the «Prestige» accidents encouraged the Union to drastically reform its existing regime and to adopt new rules and standards for preventing accidents at sea, in particular those involving oil tankers. Looking ahead, the capacities of the EU's maritime transport system are and should be strengthened by putting in place an integrated information management system [Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) for the EU maritime domain]. This system, in its final stage, will enable the identification, monitoring, tracking and reporting of all vessels at sea and on inland waterways to and from European ports and in transit through or in close proximity to EU waters. It will further exploit, through integration process, the existing related systems and technologies, such as AIS (Automatic Identification System), SafeSeanet, LRIT (Long Range Identification and Tracking of Ships) and VTMIS (Vessel Traffic Management and Information System). On the other hand, with regard to the international law of the sea context, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) gives full priority to maritime environmental safety. With the aim to preserve the maritime ecosystem, UNCLOS promotes international cooperation, through which all individual actions of the stateparties are coordinated. Last, but not least, many initiatives and agreements have been put into place at regional level, with the example of the Mediterranean Sea states being characteristic through the Barcelona Declaration, the Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Response Centre for the Mediterranean Sea (REMPEC) and its related Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combating Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency. Obviously, cooperation of states – at global preferably or at least at a regional level - is a condition sine qua non for effective management of environmental problems, and especially those ones of the marine environment. This is because the oceans and seas of the world are not restricted by artificial human inventions, such as for example the political borders. ; https://commons.wmu.se/lib_books/1001/thumbnail.jpg

In a strategic environment that is increasingly shaped by the forces of glo­balization, the navies need to be prepared for a wide range of contingencies. Many of these contingencies will arise from challenges that have little in common with traditional notions of security: cyber attacks can cause massive damage without a single shot being fired; terrorist attacks can have a psychological impact that far outweighs their immediate physical effect; the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction can lead to unpredict­able power shifts; and other threats to secured energy management. Energy is essential for virtually all aspects of modern life – a fact that makes it a truly strategic com­modity with numerous implications for international security. Indeed, the political, economic and security challenges surrounding energy are both numerous and profound: Europe's increas­ing dependency on oil and gas imports; the growing energy needs of rising powers such as China and India; political instability in many energy-producing and transit states; territorial disputes involving the quest for energy and other resources; terrorist attacks against refin­eries, pipelines and power plants; piracy along critical maritime choke points; and cyber attacks against smart power grids and control systems. Finally, there is also the energy chal­lenge of military operations: the logistical and financial burden is constantly increasing, thus making the introduction of energy efficiency measures a strategic imperative. This paper discusses existing international frameworks to protect the maritime transport of energy and provides specific recommendations to better enable the expeditious and safe flow of energy on the water.

This paper examines piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Mexico, under the framework of maritime security. The results indicate that piratic attacks are most likely underreported by the Government of Mexico. The research findings documented fourteen attacks on supply vessels and offshore platforms for the first half of 2020; only three relevant attacks were officially reported in the same period by the vessel´s (foreign) flag jurisdiction. However, the Maritime Authority of Mexico did not change the security level at any of the ports or territorial sea during the incidents. The maritime security level remained the same (level 1) during 2020, despite several alerts launched by the international maritime community. Recommendations by the respondents (shipmasters, SSO, CSO and PFSO) included that a permanent increased security level (level 2) should be implemented in the Southern part of the Gulf of Mexico until this specific problem is resolved. Participants suggested additional special measures to tackle the problem including the evaluation to class the area as a High Risk Area (HRA) and the establishment of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOU), for international cooperation and capacity building with the US Coastguard authorities to promote necessary collaboration towards effectively dealing with these security threats.

After 75 years of State oil monopoly, Mexico performed the first business oil round in 2015 involving the private sector. This auction-round offered 14 oil exploration fields located on the continental shelf to private companies. The development and exploitation of these hydrocarbon fields faces significant challenges regarding security. The economic loss for theft of hydrocarbons through illegal connections to pipelines is estimated to 973 million, 125 thousand U.S. dollar, only for the year of 2014. While productive research has been made, it has mainly focused on transportation systems and basically, pipelines. The development and establishment of policies prioritizing maritime security and protection of critical offshore infrastructure against theft of hydrocarbons, drugs organizations and terror attacks needs to be included in the national agenda to improve maritime security and mitigate potential security threats at sea, including damage to the marine environment. This could increase the trust of investors and stakeholders and would contribute to the faster development of new exploration and production fields. While the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) is the cornerstone for the construction of the port's security program and establishes the requirements of the Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP), including oil port facilities, it has not been fully implemented in several important Mexican ports. It is concluded that some important ports lack many of the core security processes, procedures and controls that should be included in any PFSP. This article briefly reviews the situation of the oil industry from a security perspective and discusses key elements of maritime security; addressing the necessity of the inclusion of maritime security and protection of critical oil infrastructure offshore in the national agenda that would provide for future research directions in the maritime security domain and contribute to the establishment of a national maritime security policy.

After 75 years of State oil monopoly, Mexico performed the first business oil round in 2015 involving the private sector. This auction-round offered 14 oil exploration fields located on the continental shelf to private companies. The development and exploitation of these hydrocarbon fields faces significant challenges regarding security. The economic loss for theft of hydrocarbons through illegal connections to pipelines is estimated to 973 million, 125 thousand U.S. dollar, only for the year of 2014. While productive research has been made, it has mainly focused on transportation systems and basically, pipelines. The development and establishment of policies prioritizing maritime security and protection of critical offshore infrastructure against theft of hydrocarbons, drugs organizations and terror attacks needs to be included in the national agenda to improve maritime security and mitigate potential security threats at sea, including damage to the marine environment. This could increase the trust of investors and stakeholders and would contribute to the faster development of new exploration and production fields. While the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) is the cornerstone for the construction of the port's security program and establishes the requirements of the Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP), including oil port facilities, it has not been fully implemented in several important Mexican ports. It is concluded that some important ports lack many of the core security processes, procedures and controls that should be included in any PFSP. This article briefly reviews the situation of the oil industry from a security perspective and discusses key elements of maritime security; addressing the necessity of the inclusion of maritime security and protection of critical oil infrastructure offshore in the national agenda that would provide for future research directions in the maritime security domain and contribute to the establishment of a national maritime security policy.

The current analysis examines three different solutions that Mexico implemented within its ports and offshore installations in order to improve the country's maritime security framework, as well as ensuring compliance with the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code): privatisation, militarisation and, finally, their combination. The findings of an on-going research effort include inconsistencies within the data of the necessary security incident records, or even their total absence. Inadequate competence and training among the Port Facility Security Officers (PFSO) also stands out. Another important issue was the use of different procedures among the ports under investigation for dealing with exactly the same security incidents. The clear conclusion is that after twelve years of the ISPS Code implementation, Mexico, which is leading the Interamerican Port's Commission of the Organisation of American States (OAS), does not comply with the requirements of the ISPS Code at an acceptable level; the lack of a national maritime security policy has resulted in a poor (maritime) security culture, despite the severe (security) challenges that this nation is facing. It is also true that the country under discussion is currently reorganising its maritime security apparatus, with some positive results; tools and recommendations for enhancing the Mexican maritime security operating framework are therefore provided, along with areas of potential future research

International audience ; The current analysis examines three different solutions that Mexico implemented within its ports and offshore installations in order to improve the country's maritime security framework, as well as ensuring compliance with the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code): privatisation, militarisation and, finally, their combination. The findings of an on-going research effort include inconsistencies within the data of the necessary security incident records, or even their total absence. Inadequate competence and training among the Port Facility Security Officers (PFSO) also stands out. Another important issue was the use of different procedures among the ports under investigation for dealing with exactly the same security incidents. The clear conclusion is that after twelve years of the ISPS Code implementation, Mexico, which is leading the Interamerican Port's Commission of the Organisation of American States (OAS), does not comply with the requirements of the ISPS Code at an acceptable level; the lack of a national maritime security policy has resulted in a poor (maritime) security culture, despite the severe (security) challenges that this nation is facing. It is also true that the country under discussion is currently reorganising its maritime security apparatus, with some positive results; tools and recommendations for enhancing the Mexican maritime security operating framework are therefore provided, along with areas of potential future research. ; La présente analyse examine trois options / solutions différentes que le Mexique a mis en oeuvre dans ses ports et ses installations offshore afin d'améliorer le cadre de sécurité maritime du pays et d'assurer le respect du Code international de la sécurité des navires et des installations portuaires (ISPS), privatisation, militarisation et enfin leur combinaison. Les conclusions d'un travail de recherche en cours incluent des incohérences dans les données des dossiers d'incidents de sécurité nécessaires ou même leur ...

Greece, located at the eastern portion of the Mediterranean Sea (Med) and a country with an enormous number of islands, is a shipping superpower. The Med is amongst the world's busiest waterways. It provides access to the Black Sea and quite often it is characterized as the most important element of the transport chain between Asia and Europe. The Greek Prime-Minister himself has openly declared his strategic vision to transform the country into a major hub for Europe's commerce; numbers of port-visits in the country under discussion are extremely high and expectations are that with the upcoming recovery of the Greek economy they will further increase. However, the current infrastructures -especially those of Piraeus and Thessaloniki (the largest and busiest ports of the Hellenic Republic)- are clearly in need of expansion. This paper briefly examines the framework of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) and suggests that the specific methodology can provide a solution to overcome the need of financing for the various urgently needed projects that will allow the introduction of new and improved services towards various types of ships. The obvious conclusion is that with the Greek economy still in recession, the necessary framework that will allow the commencing of the technical works, such as the expansion of berths and storage facilities and the interconnections with highways and rail-lines, can be found only through partnerships of the government controlled port-authorities and large in size constructing companies of the private sector. These partnerships should be considered as a win-win situation for all parties involved. They provide an ideal opportunity for expanding infrastructures and/or services towards shipping without adding more to the already enormous government-guaranteed debt.

Taking advantage of the benefits associated with digital means has become a main priority for ports globally. The effective and smooth integration of Information Technology (IT) applications and those systems that support the conduct of operations (Operational Technology (OT) systems), along with the accurate "adjustment" of the human factor elements should be viewed as a very critical pillar for optimized safe and efficient operations in ports. The afore mentioned assimilation characterizes cyber-physical systems and entails an extended number of IT and OT modules, systems and tasks involving various data transmission routes that are advancing in a technological and operational level alongside plausible cybersecurity threats. These cybersecurity risks, threats and vulnerabilities are depicted in this article to emphasize the progression of cyber- physical systems in the wider maritime industry and port domains, along with their rising cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Existing and applicable industry and government standards and mandates associated with cybersecurity attempt to impose regulatory compliance and increase asset cybersecurity integrity with reduced emphasis however, in the existing OT (Operational Technology) components and systems. The use of security risk assessment tools and processes that are used in other industrial sectors, such as the Security Risk Assessment (SRA) and the Bow Tie Analysis methods, can support the evaluation of IT/OT infrastructure for cyber-physical security susceptibilities and then assign suitable reactive measures. The implementation of cybersecurity safeguards that arise through the implementation of the MITRE ATT&CK Threat Model can enhance the cybersecurity posture of those assets that support the logistics chain, assuming that they are intermittently adapted following evaluations for their effectiveness and suitability. Finally, the improvement of stakeholder communication and cyber-awareness along with the increase in cyber- physical security resiliency can further be aided by the effective convergence of the segregated cyber and physical security elements of waterside or landside-based IT/OT infrastructure.

With water covering almost three-quarters of the Earth's surface and by factoring in that the maritime transport industry is holding a comparative advantage in relation to all other means, activities associated with the seas and oceans of our planet are extremely vital for a normal functioning of global trade. Furthermore, evaluating the opportunities of the so-called "Blue Economy" and possibilities for further growth should be at the epicentre of future development plans. Indicative examples - apart from various endeavours of maritime transport - include other sectors, like shipbuilding and repairs, fishing activities and related processes, as well as oil and gas exploration. All these provide a significant economic output and facilitate job creation. It is true that the shipping industry contributes to the carriage of vast quantities of cargo and maintains a crucial role in global trade; however, the specific industry is also responsible for significant quantities of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. IMO (MEPC) in 2018 adopted an initial strategy on the reduction of GHG emissions from ships. This plan envisages a reduction of CO2 emissions per transport work, at least 40% by 2030, pursuing efforts towards an even further reduction by 2050, compared to the 2008 levels. It is imperative for shipping and related industries to investigate and introduce more environmentally friendly ("cleaner") ways of operation. In the search for these cleaner fuels, it is the responsibility of maritime stakeholders to make available (economically viable) fuel alternatives worldwide. In view of an increasing trend in using Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) as a marine fuel, setting up regulations and amend national legislation to allow the provision of LNG as a ship fuel in a safe manner, is a first stage which potential service providing countries have to successfully fulfil. The current analysis is focusing on the small island state of Malta, which, apart from certain international aspects introduced by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), it has to abide under European Union's (EU) regulations, making LNG as a marine fuel available until 2025. Its main aim is to provide ways to cover the identified regulatory gap of the Maltese legislation, relating to ports, ship fuel bunkering, and the local gas market.