Suchergebnisse

Drawing on classical realism, the article investigates whether the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), just like the other subregional projects that Romania took part in since joining NATO in 2004, has been part of Romania's external balancing towards Russia. In contrast to the 1990s, when the Black Sea area had not been mentioned in Romania's strategic documents, Bucharest came up with a grand principle (the internationalisation of the Black Sea area) and a grand behaviour (external balancing) once it joined NATO. Considering that the Black Sea area has played a central role in all major strategic documents issued by Romania since 2005, one could draw the conclusion that, at least formally, Romania has devised a grand strategy for the region. The article examines whether 3SI, with its apparent emphasis on desecuritisation, marks a turn in Romania's grand behaviour in the region, as Bucharest's previous subregional initiatives have been guided by securitised multilateralism. By bringing into analysis the main differences among 3SI and Romania's prior strategic initiatives in the area, i.e. the Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership, Black Sea Synergy, Black Sea Flotilla and Bucharest 9, the article pays heed to the question of change and continuity in Romania's grand behaviour in the Black Sea area. The article concludes that 3SI is in line with securitised multilateralism, which is the common denominator of all Romania's subregional projects in the region.

The article sets out to explore how Romanian authorities have struggled to get rid of the border country syndrome through subregional initiatives in the Black Sea area once Romania joined the Euro-Atlantic community. The article examines how such subregional policies have performatively constituted Romania's strategic identity in the area. Formally, all the subregional initiatives that the article addresses have drawn on an institutional logic of security. Informally, though, they promoted a geopolitical vision of security. Such a logic has sharply conflicted with the underlying security philosophy of both the European Union and other successful subregional initiatives in the area. Thus, instead of improving Romania's level of regionness, these subregional policies have ended up creating more dividing lines in an already strained security environment. The article draws on David Campbell's political criticism and shows how Romania's security practices in the Black Sea area, instead of instilling Europeanness into the country's strategic identity, have ended up reinforcing its "Eastness."