Suchergebnisse

AbstractIn an economy with wage‐setting unions where the government has gains from redistribution, we analyse the incentive of incumbent politicians to implement monetary discipline (e.g. by joining a monetary union) against the adoption of fiscal reforms, or deregulation in product markets. We show that monetary discipline can be a 'substitute' both for better (i.e. less distortionary) fiscal policies and for deregulation in product markets.

In this paper it is shown that when employees have ex post bargaining power, the entrepreneur will try to avoid technologies that are based on a large number of complementary tasks. We demonstrate that the entrepreneur can shelter profit from the employees' rent‐seeking behaviour by raising debt. Moreover, the strategic use of debt financing can favour the adoption of technologies that rely on synergies. JEL Classification: G31, J30, L20 Dette stratégique en présence de technologies impliquant plusieurs tâches. Ce mémoire montre que quand les employés ont un pouvoir de négociation ex post, l'entrepreneur va tenter d'éviter les technologies qui sont basées sur un grand nombre de tâches complémentaires. On montre que l'entrepreneur peut protéger ses profits des activités de chasse aux rentes des employés en accroissant sa dette. De plus, l'utilisation stratégique du financement par la dette peut favoriser l'adoption de technologies qui dépendent de synergies.

OBJECTIVES AND MOTIVATION: This paper considers the impact of interactions between competitiveness, fiscal policy and monetary institutions in the presence of unionized labor markets on economic outcomes and welfare in the long run. Two main classes of questions are investigated. First, what is the impact of exogenously given labor taxes and unemployment benefits on the choice of monetary policy by the central bank, on the choice of nominal wages by unions, on the choice of prices by monopolistically competitive firms and through them on unemployment, inflation and welfare? A related question is, how does the level of competitiveness on goods? market affect the economy and welfare? Second, how are labor taxes and redistribution chosen by a (Stackelberg leader) fiscal authority whose objectives are a weighted average of social welfare and of catering to the interests of political supporters, and how does the general equilibrium induced by this choice affect welfare? The framework of the paper is motivated by the European scene in which the fraction of the labor force covered by collective agreements dominates wage setting in the labor market. 'PLAYERS' AND PAYOFFS: The model economy features labor unions that maximize the expected real income of union members over states of employment and of unemployment, a central bank that strives to minimize the combined costs of inflation and of unemployment, and a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms, each of which maximizes its profits. The last part of the paper also features a fiscal authority that sets taxes and redistribution so as to maximize a combination of social welfare and of benefits to particular constituencies. Utility from consumption is characterized by means of a CES, Dixit-Stiglitz, utility function and (as in Sidrauski type models) money appears in the utility function. METHODOLOGY AND 'PLAYERS' STRATEGIES: The first question is investigated within a three stage game in which labor unions move first and commit to nominal wages and the central bank moves second and chooses the money supply. In the third and last stage each of a large number of monopolistically competitive firms picks its price. To deal with the second class of questions the game is expanded to feature a preliminary stage in which government chooses labor taxes and redistribution anticipating the subsequent responses of the other players. General equilibrium is characterized and used to find the impact of various economic and institutional parameters.

AbstractMembers of a regional community may derive disutility from interacting with individuals of other regional groups. Such a "preference for similar people", also known as homophily, favours segregation across communities and possibly leads to political secession. In this paper, we balance the advantage of separation (which favours cultural identity in a homogeneous community) against its economic costs. Indeed, both the prominence of domestic markets when barriers to foreign exchanges are high, and the costs needed to administer a newly‐born nation can make secession very costly. We show that, when it occurs a substantial increase in openness to international exchanges—as has actually happened under the European common market—the costs of separation will fall and the bias for sameness will be likely to prevail, leading to secession.

AbstractThis paper reconsiders the nexus between the abundance of resources and the origins of Sicilian mafia by exploiting a new set of historical data at the municipal level on the Sicilian sulphur industry in the late nineteenth century, obtained from official reports of the Royal Corps of Mining Engineers. Our evidence confirms that sulphur favoured the rise of organized crime, as emphasized in the previous studies. However, we show that the impact of local production on mafia was smaller in the areas richest in sulphur. Moreover, mechanization in the extraction process was associated with lower incidence of mafia. Taken together, our findings suggest that larger lodes encouraged better and more orderly working conditions for the miners, possibly reducing physical and psychic strain and, consequently, their inclination to violence. In other words, the quality of working conditions affected the supply of violent individuals.

We examine the relationship between technological complexity and wage inequality, using an efficiency wage model that adopts Kremer's O‐ring production function. The model has two main implications: (i) when the production process becomes more complex, within‐task wage differences increase between plants, and (ii) between‐task wage differences increase within plants. We study these implications empirically using industry data providing quantified information on the complexity of the tasks. We find that wages increase in all the tasks with the complexity of the production process. Furthermore, the relationship between the complexity of the tasks and wages is steepest in the firms with more complex production processes.

The paper uses the consolidation of municipalities brought about by the Fascist dictatorship in Italy during the 1920s to gauge the role of the size of local jurisdictions for economic development. It finds that the consolidation was associated with relevant net welfare gains for the communities involved. In particular, the advantages related to the bigger economies of scale made possible in jurisdictions of larger size overwhelmed the costs owing to the higher heterogeneity.