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AbstractThrough what mechanism do interest groups shape public opinion on concrete policies? In this article, three hypotheses are proposed that distinguish between the effect of the arguments conveyed by interest groups and the effect of interest groups as source cues. Two survey experiments on the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TIPP) and the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change allow the testing of these hypotheses. The resulting evidence from several countries shows that, with respect to interest groups' attempts at shaping public opinion, arguments matter more than their sources. This is so even when accounting for people's trust in the interest groups that serve as source cues and for people's level of information about a policy. The finding that interest groups affect public opinion via arguments rather than as source cues has implications for the literature on elite influence on public opinion and the normative evaluation of interest group activities.

Through what mechanism do interest groups shape public opinion on concrete policies? In this article, three hypotheses are proposed that distinguish between the effect of the arguments conveyed by interest groups and the effect of interest groups as source cues. Two survey experiments on the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TIPP) and the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change allow the testing of these hypotheses. The resulting evidence from several countries shows that, with respect to interest groups attempts at shaping public opinion, arguments matter more than their sources. This is so even when accounting for people's trust in the interest groups that serve as source cues and for people's level of information about a policy. The finding that interest groups affect public opinion via arguments rather than as source cues has implications for the literature on elite influence on public opinion and the normative evaluation of interest group activities. ; I 576G16 ; (VLID)2786634

"Weltweit gesehen ist Rational Choice (RC) in der Politikwissenschaft derzeit das dominante Forschungsprogramm. Dieser Beitrag stellt dieses Forschungsprogramm kurz vor und setzt sich dann mit der Kritik an 1.) der empirischen Plausibilität der Rationalitätsannahme, 2.) den Resultaten der empirischen RC-Forschung und 3.) der vermeintlich mangelnden Fähigkeit von RC, handlungsanleitend zu sein, auseinander. Teilweise wird diese Kritik wiederlegt, teilweise wird argumentiert, dass die alternativen Ansätze, die von den Kritikern propagiert werden, in vielerlei Hinsicht problematisch sind. Der Beitrag endet mit einer kurzen Diskussion von vier Stärken des RC-Ansatzes, die zusammen erklären, warum sich RC als ein progressives Forschungsprogramm erwiesen hat, das in allen Bereichen der Politikwissenschaft wichtige Erkenntnisse liefert." (Autorenreferat)