Suchergebnisse

Este artigo aproveita-se do profícuo debate interdisciplinar sobre regulação para poder analisar, comparativamente, como Direito e Economia, as duas áreas do conhecimento de maior impacto nesse estudo, posicionam-se acerca de uma questão específica: as peculiaridades da regulação em contextos de desenvolvimento, particularmente em economias em transição, como o Brasil. É sabido que acadêmicos do Direito e da Economia, em conjunto, desenvolveram ferramentas interdisciplinares sofisticadas nas últimas décadas, aplicáveis a objetivos de pesquisa que resultariam incompletos se aprisionados a disciplinas isoladas e isso torna relevante a compreensão de como esse problema é – ou pode ser – interpretado por meio dessas duas diferentes visões. Para tanto, parte-se dos principais tratamentos teóricos tradicionalmente empregados à regulação, do exame do caráter e abrangência das reformas regulatórias do final do século XX e da descrição das três principais "lentes interpretativas" em Direito e Economia com o objetivo de teorizar acerca da conciliação entre elas. Como conclusão, entende-se que está em plena construção uma veia interpretativa que ofereça uma moldura analítica que aporte à regulação tanto objetivos inescapáveis de eficiência econômica e estabilidade institucional quanto a necessária flexibilidade que processos de desenvolvimento requerem.

AbstractA considerable amount of work has focused on "regulatory innovation" in the social sciences. This scholarship has conceptually defined certain types of regulatory changes as innovations and explored how regulation, as a policy instrument, alters the pace of technological innovation. More recently, a renewed interest for policy mixes and more dynamism in industrial innovation policies around the world has increased the demand for advanced knowledge in this area. In this article, we systematically review the literature on the innovation‐regulation interplay, documenting its evolution, the prevailing thematic areas, and overlooked topics. While the orthodox regulatory stance, modeled on economic efficiency principles, is by far the main thrust, heterodox accounts, premised on systemic and evolutionary thinking, appear as important variations. The latter have recently burgeoned with new theoretical developments promoting the idea of regulation that not only allows for, but intentionally directs innovation.

Abstract'New Public Management' (NPM) ideas gained widespread acceptance all over the world in the 1980s and 1990s. In developing countries, notable examples of its influence include the Brazilian 'Master Plan for Reforming Public Administration', launched in 1995 by president Cardoso, and the Mexican 'Federal Public Administration Modernisation Programme' created in the same year by president Zedillo. Both reflected NPM doctrine and advanced changes for the organisation of the Executive. This article explores the evolution of these two countries' managerial reforms and the extent to which they eventually continued converging (or not) around similar principles, such as those often referred to as 'Post‐New Public Management' (Post‐NPM). By applying quantitative textual analysis of official documents and an analysis of self‐reported institutional changes, the article concludes that despite their governing parties' strong political differences Mexico and Brazil did converge during the 2000s, improving controls from the centre, and prioritising the adoption of transparency and participation tools. The comparison of the trajectories of the administrative reforms of these countries between 1995 and 2016 contributes to international debates on policy convergence and Post‐NPM reforms.

The paper is an exploratory historical analysis, based on documentary research and literature review, which focuses on the formation of the bureaucratic apparatus in the area of economic infrastructure, analyzed from the perspective of the construction of the Brazilian State and its technical, administrative and political capacities. The work explores the links between successive institutional arrangements and the construction of state capabilities of a technical and political nature. The trajectory of the institutional arrangements is analyzed based on a periodization that considers the inflections in the recent trajectory of the structuring of State functions, correspondingly, the organization of the public administration, its legal frameworks and institutional arrangements in each period. The periodization distinguishes the following moments: the beginnings of developmentalism (1930-1945); the parallel administration and developmental initiatives (1946-1963); state enterprises and the developmental State (1964-1988); and the emergence of the regulatory State and the resurgence of state activism (1988-2016). In the end, the conclusion is that it is dominant during most of the period analyzed the persistence of a vector of construction of the State apparatus that dislocates the formation of the bureaucracy away from the central administration.

Corruption crimes demand highly coordinated actions among criminal agents to succeed. But research dedicated to corruption networks is still in its infancy and indeed little is known about the properties of these networks. Here we present a comprehensive investigation of corruption networks related to political scandals in Spain and Brazil over nearly three decades. We show that corruption networks of both countries share universal structural and dynamical properties, including similar degree distributions, clustering and assortativity coefcients, modular structure, and a growth process that is marked by the coalescence of network components due to a few recidivist criminals. We propose a simple model that not only reproduces these empirical properties but reveals also that corruption networks operate near a critical recidivism rate below which the network is entirely fragmented and above which it is overly connected. Our research thus indicates that actions focused on decreasing corruption recidivism may substantially mitigate this type of organized crime.

Corruption crimes demand highly coordinated actions among criminal agents to succeed. But research dedicated to corruption networks is still in its infancy and indeed little is known about the properties of these networks. Here we present a comprehensive investigation of corruption networks related to political scandals in Spain and Brazil over nearly three decades. We show that corruption networks of both countries share universal structural and dynamical properties, including similar degree distributions, clustering and assortativity coefficients, modular structure, and a growth process that is marked by the coalescence of network components due to a few recidivist criminals. We propose a simple model that not only reproduces these empirical properties but reveals also that corruption networks operate near a critical recidivism rate below which the network is entirely fragmented and above which it is overly connected. Our research thus indicates that actions focused on decreasing corruption recidivism may substantially mitigate this type of organized crime.