Suchergebnisse

AbstractConditional Cash Transfer Programs (CCTPs) show a remarkable flexibility. Based on that property, CCTPs might be extended to provide a more comprehensive and cohesive social protection umbrella. These programs might widen their scope by facilitating sector specific reforms and providing protection to large‐scale contingencies. By mobilising assets other than human capital and targeting more selectively population groups in changing circumstances, these programs might well become effective instruments to crack permanent poverty. This note discusses enabling changes to achieve such ambitious goals. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

AbstractEmpirical evidence questions the unitary allocation model of the household that underpins the standard measurement of monetary poverty and inequality. Intra‐household gender discrimination has been widely shown to shape expenditure decisions, nutrition status, and human capital accumulation of household members. However, conventional poverty and inequality analyses are conducted for the household as a whole, which might lead to different conclusions compared with studies based on individuals. Using recent developments in intra‐household bargaining modelling, this paper constructs non‐cooperative allocation rules dominated by gender discrimination among household members. Estimates for Chile show a substantial worsening of poverty and inequality under such allocation rules. This suggests that intra‐household discrimination deserves some of the attention typically directed to extra‐household discrimination in labour markets, access to public services or political participation. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The effects of social transfers on individual participation and working hours are theoretically shown to differ for unitary and bargaining intra-household allocation models. This result is attributed to both the non-transferability of in-kind social transfers and differences in control of these transfers among household members. Using elasticities of social transfers on work effort (estimated through sample selection corrected participation probits and working hour OLS), new tests on intra-household allocation are developed for Chile. These tests strongly reject the unitary model and exogenous bargaining, accepting endogenous bargaining only among non-poor households. Poor households may use social incomes as investments for the future rather than for short-term strategic power relations.