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Working paper
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 31, Heft 1, S. 35-45
ISSN: 1573-1502
In: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Band 88, Heft 2, S. 448-457
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In: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Band 88, Heft 4, S. 1078-1090
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There is significant resistance to vaccinations. Fewer than half of adults get a flu shot in the United States in a typical year, and a large minority of Americans say they will not get vaccinated against COVID-19. This resistance to vaccines creates challenges for both public health and the economy. The academic literature needs to consider potential policy solutions that might increase vaccination rates. In this study, we use experimental auctions to estimate how much university students need to be paid in exchange for agreeing to get a flu shot. These were real auctions where winners received compensation to get the flu shot. As found in prior research, the perceived stakes of such auctions incentivize participants to estimate the price at which they would engage in the auctioned behavior – in this instance, receiving a flu shot. We find that 50% require less than $1, and an additional 30% would get vaccinated for a payment of $20 or less. We also use a tobit regression to estimate bids as a function of participants' demographic characteristics. If low levels of compensation increase vaccination rates, this has significant public health implications. The government may be able to achieve higher vaccination rates at a relatively low cost, particularly in comparison with the economic harms caused by illness. This study demonstrates that experimental auctions may be useful for estimating how much a larger, more representative sample would need to be paid in exchange for agreeing to receive flu or COVID-19 vaccinations.
BASE
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 40, Heft 2, S. 285-298
ISSN: 1573-1502
In: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Band 98, Heft 2, S. 610-621
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In: Applied economic perspectives and policy, Band 37, Heft 3, S. 524-536
ISSN: 2040-5804
AbstractMany applied economics journals ban the use of deception in experiments, which contrasts with the policies in other academic disciplines. We examine the cases for and against deception, and describe the ways deception can be employed in applied economics experiments. We create a general ranking of harms from deception in experiments and present evidence from a survey (conducted in summer 2014) of agricultural and applied economists eliciting attitudes towards ten different deceptive practices. Survey respondents view inflicting physical or psychological harm on participants and not making promised payments as the most severe forms of deception. Less severe forms of deception include providing participants with incomplete product information and conducting an experiment using participants who are not aware they are part of an experiment. Finally, we provide recommendations for policies addressing deception in experiments.
In: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Band 94, Heft 1, S. 97-115
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In: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Band 91, Heft 3, S. 837-853
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