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AbstractHow free should the movement of people be compared to the movement of capital? Unlike those who defend a presumption in favour of symmetrical treatment, I suggest that the presumption in favour of free human movement is much stronger than the same presumption in favour of the free movement of capital. Against those who claim that capital ought to be freer to move than people, I argue that states have much stronger reasons, both of distributive justice and cultural integrity, to constrain capital movement than they have to restrict human movement. Further, the case for restricting skilled workers' right to exit their country in the case of brain drain is much weaker than the parallel case for restricting investors' right to exit from a country that faces a threat of capital flight. Overall, my argument supports the 'reversed asymmetry thesis': People should be much freer to move than capital.

In response to growing economic and political interdependence at the international level, contemporary theories of justice have debated whether the demands of distributive justice extend beyond the nation-state. This article addresses the reverse question: whether and how the demands of justice arise below the state, at the level of civil society associations. This question becomes pressing in light of the increasing fragmentation of national governance, and the resulting institutional interdependence between political institutions and private associations. The article argues that the extent to which these associations are directly bound by egalitarian principles depends on a complex set of factors, including their structure and size, their role in the social provision of important goods, and their institutional relation with political institutions.

Friendship distributes critical benefits across society and does so unequally. Income, levels of education and health vary dramatically according to the quality of individuals' friendships. Further, friendships shape the motivations and aspirations of their participants. In light of these facts, this article questions whether and how egalitarian requirements should apply to personal friendship. I first show that existing theories of distributive justice, whether they are 'outcomes centred' or 'institutionalist', have reasons to consider personal friendship as a direct subject of justice. However, both fail to provide reasonable guidelines for how to apply the requirements of justice to friendship. I thus argue that principles of justice, in particular fair equality of opportunity, ought to assess and govern that part of the social structure that controls the production and distribution of friendship bonds across society. I theorise a 'relational distributive structure', mainly constituted by civil society associations, as the appropriate subject of justice. Adapted from the source document.

In this article, I defend the novel claim that the just distribution of relational resources-resources that either distinctively exist within interpersonal relationships or are themselves constitutive of such relationships-across society should be regarded as a legitimate concern of resourcist theories of distributive justice, no different from the distribution of economic resources. However, since relational resources, unlike economic resources, cannot be directly distributed or redistributed, and since these resources are generally attached to relationships which individuals should not be forced to enter against their will, I will propose that we regard opportunities for relational resources as the appropriate object of distribution (distribuenda). Adapted from the source document.