Suchergebnisse

In this article we break new ground by investigating cooperative agreements in urban development services, which include urban development, housing and sanitation for small local governments in Brazil (i.e., those with fewer than 20,000 residents in 2013–15). We find that public expenditure on urban development can be explained by both horizontal (intermunicipal cooperation) and vertical (public–public partnerships) cooperation. Regarding the impact of public sector cooperation on public expenditure, our results show that housing and sanitation services are less costly under intermunicipal cooperation. By contrast, urban development services are less costly when local authorities do not cooperate with other public entities. For public–public partnerships (with the state or federal government) cooperation leads to an increase in public funding, which implies that cooperative agreements might not lead to lower public expenditure. The findings in this article provide useful empirical insights into the administrative reorganization of Brazilian local government.

AbstractThis paper examines institutional collective action and transaction cost (TC) dilemmas in a self‐organizing policy network involving federal, state, and municipal agencies for waste services in a port and industrial park. A thematic analysis revealed dilemmas in: (a) vertical levels, which lack leadership in industrial waste management due to unclear responsibility delegation across government levels; (b) horizontal levels, reluctant to take responsibilities and define jurisdiction boundaries for efficient waste services; and (c) functional levels, which exhibit fragmented and unaligned action scopes. Transaction costs, stemming from a deficiency in expertise, infrastructure, and organized information regarding companies' waste management, hinder effective programs and policies. Without tackling these challenges and TCs through a governance framework that includes implementation strategies, monitoring, and institutional controls, the self‐organizing policy network is likely to remain stuck in collective institutional inertia.