Suchergebnisse

Garnett and Christidis (2017) [hereafter GC] recently proposed that the International Union of the Biological Sciences should centrally regulate the taxonomy of complex organisms. Their proposal was met with much criticism (e.g. Hołyński 2017; Thomson et al., 2018), and perhaps most extensively from Raposo et al. (2017) in this journal. The main target of this criticism was GC's call to, first, "restrict the freedom of taxonomic action", and, second, to let social, political and conservation values weigh in on species classification. Some commentators even went as far as to draw a comparison with the infamous Lysenko-case of state-controlled and heavily restricted science (Raposo et al. 2017, 181; Hołyński 2017, 12). This comment will argue, without thereby endorsing GC's position, that these two aspects of their views need not be as threatening as this comparison suggests, and indeed are very reasonable.

AbstractResearch institutions' research culture is increasingly recognized as a central driver of research integrity. Institutions are urged to develop research integrity promotion plans to foster a culture of research integrity. A host of guidelines and associated initiatives have been issued but specific, actionable recommendations for institutions are scattered across the scientific literature and generally not acknowledged and implemented (yet). Based on a broad literature review, in the current paper some practical advice for institutions is suggested, grouped into (1) policies, procedures, and processes; (2) dealing with breaches of research integrity; (3) education and training; and (4) monitoring and evaluation. With each section, we formulate specific recommendations.

A large part of governmental research funding is currently distributed through the peer review of project proposals. In this paper, we argue that such funding systems incentivize and even force researchers to violate five moral values, each of which is central to commonly used scientific codes of conduct. Our argument complements existing epistemic arguments against peer-review project funding systems and, accordingly, strengthens the mounting calls for reform of these systems.

A large part of governmental research funding is currently distributed through peer review of project proposals. In this paper, we argue that such funding systems incentivize and even force researchers to violate five moral values, each of which is central to commonly used scientific codes of conduct. Our argument complements existing epistemic arguments against peer-review project funding systems and, accordingly, adds ammunition to the mounting calls for reform of these systems.