Individual and Institutional Incentives for Party Development in the French Third Republic
In: APSA 2013 Annual Meeting Paper
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In: APSA 2013 Annual Meeting Paper
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In: Conflict management and peace science: the official journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 30, Heft 4, S. 309-334
ISSN: 1549-9219
Could trade sanctions improve environmental cooperation by reducing countries' incentives to free ride? While carbon tariffs are a widely debated environmental policy, their ability to facilitate climate cooperation remains unclear. We examine game-theoretic models of environmental cooperation with and without trade sanctions. While trade sanctions prevent free riders from obtaining unfair competitive advantages, we show that they can also impede environmental cooperation. Most importantly, since trade sanctions reduce the cost of unilateral policy, they prevent environmentally inclined countries from credibly threatening to suspend cooperation if other countries defect. We use these findings to illuminate outcomes in normatively important cases such as ozone depletion and overfishing, and discuss how they cast a shadow of doubt on the use of carbon tariffs to enforce climate cooperation.
In: Conflict management and peace science: CMPS ; journal of the Peace Science Society ; papers contributing to the scientific study of conflict and conflict analysis, Band 30, Heft 4, S. 309-334
ISSN: 0738-8942
World Affairs Online
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