Suchergebnisse

Abstract
The expansion of EU regulatory governance in the financial sector since the end of the global financial crisis 2008 has given rise to the need to examine regulatory consistency in the volumes of financial regulation that may have cross-cutting implications. In this light, this article examines the effectiveness of the Regulation of ESG infomediaries through the lens of "functional regulatory consistency" with other infomediary regulations, for credit rating agencies and stock market benchmarks. It argues that this lens most aptly reveals the three key weaknesses of the regulatory regime for ESG infomediaries. These relate to sub-optimal coverage of scope, over-inclusiveness in the application of regulatory standards and under-inclusiveness where appropriate governance is not provided. the sub-optimal coverage of scope raises the question of whether ESG stock market index providers should indeed be regulated as ESG infomediaries or as stock market benchmarks more generally falling within the Benchmarks Regulation 2016. Over-inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness in the regulatory provision reflects blind spots in applying functional regulatory consistency, where it is inappropriate due to distinguishing features in business models, market structures or market relations.

The EU has yet to develop definitive policies for the crypto-economy, and this article argues that policy development should follow a "systemic" and not "sectoral" approach. This is because the crypto-economy is not merely a financialised space and new productive activity is occurring that would benefit from more holistic policy development than regulation focused on securities and investments. This article proposes that the EU should develop policy for the crypto-economy based more broadly on innovation policy and perhaps feed into the Single Market project.

The regulation of corporate behavior has persisted in spite of peaks of neo-liberalism in many developed jurisdictions of the world, including the U.K. This paradox is described as "regulatory capitalism" by a number of scholars. Of particular note is the proliferation of corporate regulation to govern "socially responsible" behavior in recent legislative reforms in the EU and U.K. In seeking to answer the broader question of whether corporate regulation indeed effectively governs and moderates corporate behavior, this paper focuses on the nature of corporate regulation. Although different pieces of corporate regulation purport to achieve different objectives and impose different types of obligations, this paper offers an institutional account of corporate regulation, specifically in relation to the U.K.'s regulatory capitalism, as the U.K. is typically held up as having a liberal market economy (which is broadly similar to the U.S.). In this article, I argue that the nature and effectiveness of corporate regulation crucially depends on the nature of regulatory capitalism in the type of economic order under discussion. Hence the study of the U.K.'s economic order and its efforts in introducing corporate regulation to change corporate behavior holds lessons more generally for corporate regulation in economies that share similar features. The examination in this article provides an overarching framework for distilling the achievements and limitations of corporate regulation in such economic contexts. First, the paper clarifies that regulatory capitalism in the U.K. is characterized by three key tenets that reflect the spirit of the liberal market economy embraced here. Over time, gaps have been revealed in the achievements of these tenets of regulatory capitalism, particularly in relation to social expectations of the regulation of corporate behavior. These gaps have become the subject of debates in the realm of "corporate social responsibility" (CSR), where business, civil society, and the state frame the ...

AbstractModern financial regulation has predominantly been economically-driven,1progressing from addressing market failures to making markets more competitive and workbetter.2The UK Financial Conduct Authority is expressly mandated to pursue regulatory objectives that maintain market integrity and protect consumers (addressing market failures) and to promote competition (making markets workbetter).3Both the FCA and its sister regulator, the Prudential Regulation Authority (for banks), have recently adopted innovative regulatory initiatives to promote technologically-driven innovation, aimed at making markets work better. These initiatives are also a response to the recent explosion of technologically-led financial innovation outside of the regulatory perimeter.In promoting financial innovation, we argue that the regulators have insufficiently focused on the need to govern financial innovation more generally. Although this concern may seem premature, the regulatory innovations are increasingly extending the perimeter for regulatory oversight of financial innovations. As the regulatory innovations have the potential to develop into more mature regulatory frameworks for governing financial innovation, we argue that regulators should manage the risks of their current approach and develop a regulatory strategy framework for balancing regulatory objectives and developing regulatory policy. We propose a framework anchored in rationality, consistency and accountability in governing financial innovation.