Suchergebnisse

A population‐averaged additive subdistribution hazards model is proposed to assess the marginal effects of covariates on the cumulative incidence function and to analyze correlated failure time data subject to competing risks. This approach extends the population‐averaged additive hazards model by accommodating potentially dependent censoring due to competing events other than the event of interest. Assuming an independent working correlation structure, an estimating equations approach is outlined to estimate the regression coefficients and a new sandwich variance estimator is proposed. The proposed sandwich variance estimator accounts for both the correlations between failure times and between the censoring times, and is robust to misspecification of the unknown dependency structure within each cluster. We further develop goodness‐of‐fit tests to assess the adequacy of the additive structure of the subdistribution hazards for the overall model and each covariate. Simulation studies are conducted to investigate the performance of the proposed methods in finite samples. We illustrate our methods using data from the STrategies to Reduce Injuries and Develop confidence in Elders trial.

ABSTRACT
As a requisite to issuing initial public offerings (IPOs), Chinese companies must obtain approval from the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Using a sample of Chinese firms that applied for IPOs between 2006 and 2011, we examine the influence of corporate governance on the IPO application process and firms' post-IPO performance. We find that firms with more outside directors, smaller boards, and more balanced ownership among large shareholders are more likely to pass the IPO screening. Along similar lines, controlling shareholder ownership is negatively related to the success of IPO screening. Further analyses show that effective corporate governance plays a more important role when firms engage in more complex operations, and it plays a less important role when firms are politically connected. Finally, we find that firms with better corporate governance enjoy better post-IPO performance, indicating that resource allocation is more efficient when the CSRC values firms' corporate governance.
JEL Classifications: G02; G14; M14.