Suchergebnisse

Neither Duterte's pivot to China policy nor Marcos's transparency initiative is changing China's behavior.

For the Philippines, China's actions in the contested maritime region are alarming, and the costs of not doing anything—or not doing enough—come with a high price.

The debate surrounding the United States' hub‐and‐spokes alliance model in the Asia‐Pacific, that is, whether its endurance is a testament to its durability or whether its inability to face up to contemporary challenges reflects its failure—is best captured by recent norm research in International Relations. It can be argued that the U.S. hub‐and‐spokes model in Southeast Asia is not failing but is simply showing signs of contestation. The evolution of this network of regional security arrangements from U.S. alliances in Southeast Asia (with the Philippines and Thailand) to American security partnerships in that subregion (strategic partnership with Singapore and comprehensive partnership with Vietnam) reflects applicatory contestation. At the same time, the China factor and Washington's evolving Asia strategy, which competes with the Middle East and with the "America First" instincts of the Trump administration, challenge the core of the San Francisco System's validity. Hence, while the hub‐and‐spokes model is merely showing signs of contestation, the fact that it is undergoing validity contestation serves as a cautionary tale. Those U.S. policymakers supporting it will need to implement steps to avoid its complete erosion.

The challenges of a polycentric world necessitate new ways of addressing global problems. Of late, strategic partnerships have become prominent features in the foreign profiles of international actors. They can be seen as a practice of cooperation, and can be further broken down to patterned actions, such as diplomacy and summitry. These practices feature prominently in the ASEAN-China strategic partnership for two reasons. First, diplomacy has proven to be pivotal in both the securitization and the desecuritization of the South China Sea maritime dispute. Second, summitry is the foundation of the ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations, which was formally established in 1996, and on which the strategic partnership is built. Looking at the ASEAN-China strategic partnership from the perspective of practice theory can then identify the constitutive effects of practices on regional cooperation. This effectively moves the discussion about strategic partnerships from what they are to how they operate in international relations. The practices of diplomacy and summitry in ASEAN-China relations can then be argued as the key forces behind regional cooperation.

Book review on: Francois Debrix and Alexander D. Barder. Beyond Biopolitics: Theory, Violence, and Horror in World Politics. London and New York: Routledge, 2012. Vivienne Jabri. The Postcolonial Subject: Claiming Politics/Governing Others in Late Modernity. London and New York: Routledge, 2013. Daniel Rothbart, Karina V. Korostelina, and Mohammed D. Cherkaoui, eds. Civilians and Modern War: Armed Conflict and the Ideology of Violence. London and New York: Routledge, 2012.

What are the prospects for the Belt and Road (BRI) in the Philippines? How will Marcos' foreign policy impact BRI projects in the country? The authors argue that the BRI's prospects are less optimistic now because (i) the Philippines' experience with Chinese infrastructure projects during Duterte's time was not overwhelmingly positive and (ii) China continues to occupy the West Philippine Sea. China's BRI missed its chance of capitalising on the political climate during the Duterte administration.

Given the reality of power asymmetries, we ask how small powers navigate their way in the international system. We look at the case of the Philippines because of its unique positioning in a region where two great powers compete for influence. We argue that when faced with a crisis, small powers implement an interim solution by internationalizing an issue to protect itself and garner sympathy and support from partners and allies. Using securitization theory, we demonstrate that the Philippines generally pursued the following strategies: improving its bilateral relations with China and reinvigorating its alliance with the United States, urging asean to take a more active and assertive role in the South China Sea (scs) disputes, and using formal arbitration to engage the international community. We find, however, that a lasting solution remains elusive because the country lacks consistent follow-through and policy convergence. Hence, the Philippine experience in securitizing the scs and its simultaneous inability to implement a lasting solution is symptomatic of the tragedy that small powers face.

Over the past three years, Southeast Asia has witnessed a series of important leadership transitions. How will these new leaders approach China and how will they differ from their predecessors?