Suchergebnisse

Almost all constitutions have a beginning and an end; enactment supposes its birth, while replacement entails its death. Like all living beings, written constitutions can pass away because of many causes. Among other factors, political, economic and social conditions, but also constitutional design features are called to be the leading causes of what is hereby denoted as constitutional replacement. Why do some written constitutions survive longer than others? To what extent are political, economic, and legal factors, the determinants of constitutional replacement? To answer these questions, this article presents an empirical study of risk and protective factors of constitutional mortality, among five South American countries, namely Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, in the period 1946 - 2016. This time period is especially interesting due to its variability. Previous literature insights are confirmed insofar evidence suggests that bicameralism tends to live longer, despite adverse political and economic conditions. ; Todas las constituciones tienen un inicio y un final. Nacen cuando son promulgadas y su reemplazo conlleva su muerte. Como todos los seres vivientes, las constituciones pueden morir debido a diversos factores. Entre los más importantes están los factores políticos, económicos, sociales y características sobre el diseño constitucional como las variables explicativas del reemplazo de las constituciones. ¿Por qué algunas constituciones sobreviven más tiempo que otras? ¿En qué medida diversos factores políticos, económicos, sociales y de diseño constitucional influyen en la reforma total de las constituciones? Para responder estas preguntas, este estudio presenta el análisis empírico de una base de datos original sobre los factores de prevención y riesgo de las constituciones promulgadas en Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú y Venezuela, entre 1946 y 2016. Este periodo resulta interesante debido a su variabilidad institucional. Los principales hallazgos del presente estudio refieren que aquellas constituciones que instituyen mecanismos de difusión de poder político, como asambleas bicamerales, perduran inclusive ante condiciones sociales y económicas desfavorables. ; Toda constituição política tem um início e um final. Nascem quando são promulgadas e a sua substituição acarreta a sua morte. Como todos os seres vivos, as constituições podem morrer devido a diversos fatores. Dentre os mais importantes, alguns trabalhos prévios analisam fatores políticos, econômicos, sociais e características sobre a forma constitucional como as variáveis explicativas da substituição das constituições. Por que algumas constituições sobrevivem mais do que outras? Em que medida diversos fatores políticos, econômicos, sociais e de forma constitucional influem na reforma total das constituições? Para responder estas perguntas, este estudo apresenta a análise empírica de uma base de dados original sobre os fatores de prevenção e risco das constituições promulgadas na Bolívia, Colômbia, Equador, Peru e Venezuela, entre 1946 e 2016. Este período resulta interessante devido a sua variabilidade institucional. As principais descobertas deste estudo indicam que aquelas constituições que instituem mecanismos de difusão de poder político, como assembleias bicamerais, perduram inclusive diante de condições sociais e econômicas desfavoráveis.

This working paper consists of an empirical analysis of the constitutional mechanism called "empty chair" – in Spanish: silla vacía. In a first step, the conceptual and normative foundations for the institutional configuration of this mechanism are presented which in turn are forming the basis for the demonstration of its functioning in the municipalities of the province Pichincha from 2010 to 2013. The goal is to evaluate the performance of this mechanism within a setting of participatory democracy. There is evidence that the "empty chair" does not necessarily strengthen the representation of civil society forces in local governments with dominant party majorities as well as in the ones where the "empty chair" is appointed in a closed, intransparent way.

Summary: Over the last decade, the governments of Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador and Bolivia launched constitutional reform processes aimed at establishing indefinite presidential re-election, allowing the same person to apply for the presidency without restrictions. This article analyses the institutional conditions in which this re-election formula was adopted. On the basis of the comparative analysis, we conclude that the introduction of indefinite presidential re-election is the result of an institutional crisis very marked by hyper presidencialism, the deterioration of judicial independence and the flexibility of constitutional change procedures. The fact that the countries that adopted indefinite re-election are currently characterised as semi democracies or authoritarisms is by no means a circumstantial factor. The adoption of indefinite re-election has in fact been a clear shortcut on the authoritarian and des-democratising path that these countries have transited over the last decade. ; Resumen: Durante la última década, los gobiernos de Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador y Bolivia activaron procesos de reforma constitucional orientados a instituir la reelección presidencial indefinida, permitiendo que una misma persona postule a la presidencia sin restricciones. Este artículo analiza cuáles fueron las condiciones institucionales que en las cuales se adoptó esta fórmula de reelección. A partir del análisis comparativo, concluimos que la introducción de la reelección presidencial indefinida es el resultado de una crisis institucional muy marcada por el híper presidencialismo, el deterioro de la independencia judicial y la flexibilidad de los procedimientos de cambio constitucional. El hecho de que los países que adoptaron la reelección indefinida actualmente sean caracterizados como semi democracias o autoritarismos no es un de ninguna manera un dato circunstancial. La adopción de la reelección indefinida, de hecho, ha constituido un claro atajo en el camino autoritario y des-democratizador que estos países ...

In this article, we test the extent to which decisions by the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court (ECC) are predicted by non-legal variables. Our theoretical argument proposes that not only the presence of public actors as plaintiffs—especially those working for the executive branch—but also political salience, i.e., the degree of importance attributed to a case by the government and public opinion, plays a crucial role in explaining the outcome of judicial decisions. Original data on all abstract review decisions issued by the ECC (2008–2016) is used to test our argument. We control for possible selection effects, incorporating a novel measure of the overall quality of argumentation and strength of cases brought before the ECC by both public and private parties, in the form of an expert survey. Consistent with our argument, the results show that even when controlling for a wide range of potential confounders, norms are more likely to be struck down by the ECC when (1) public officials claim unconstitutionality than when non-public parties do, and (2) cases are reported by media. In the light of the Ecuadorian case, we conclude that the formally powerful ECC is quite sensitive to governmental influence, even under an improved situation of de jure judicial protections.

Students of European Union judicial politics have debated the credibility of legislative override as constraint on the behaviour of the European Court of Justice. Yet because of the high political hurdles for the passage of treaty amendments, treaty revision has been dismissed as the 'nuclear option', exceedingly effective but difficult to use. However, when treaties are being renegotiated, the ability of member state governments to pass treaty amendments to either punish or reward the Court is greater. We argue that this may induce the Court of Justice to display more leniency towards member states in cases coinciding with ongoing treaty negotiations. To test this hypothesis, we examine the outcome of all infringement cases adjudicated between 1961 and 2016. We find that the European Court of Justice is significantly less likely to render adverse rulings in cases concomitant with the final, most salient stage of treaty negotiations. Our analysis suggests that the relationship between treaty revision and judicial behaviour may be more nuanced than commonly assumed in the literature.