Suchergebnisse

The European Employment Strategy is now seven years old. Whilst its contribution to improving labour market performance has been evaluated, less attention has been paid to the manner in which the EES has worked, in particular the ways in which policy has been formulated and implemented. In particular, there has been little investigation of the extent to which one of the stated objectives of the strategy – the improved involvement of the social partners in the formulation and imple-mentation of policy – has been achieved. This paper argues that in many respects this objective has not been met. Even in countries where social partnership structures appear relatively well developed, the Luxembourg process has added little – in part because it is seen to be concerned with technical matters. Employment policy is 'settled' elsewhere. In addition, realisation of those elements of the strategy where social partner participation is most critical has often been frustrated by the lack of mechanisms to implement commitments made at the centre at places of work. Moreover, by subscribing to the strategy, social partners were also subscribing to a wider approach to economic policy – an approach that was scarcely compatible with the approach advocated by trade unions. Accordingly, the conclusion has to be that the Luxembourg process failed to develop social partnership. An exception might be the closer working together of the European-level social partner associations. However, their involvement in the strategy has been little noticed by their constituents, and it might even be argued to have encouraged elitism rather than to have promoted greater participation in policy-making.

"Die Europäische Beschäftigungsstrategie ist inzwischen sieben Jahre alt. Ihr Beitrag zur Steigerung der Arbeitsmarktleistung ist bewertet worden, aber nur wenige Untersuchungen befassen sich mit der Art und Weise, wie die EBS funktioniert, und insbesondere mit der Frage, wie die Politik gestaltet und umgesetzt wurde. Dabei wurde besonders wenig erforscht, inwiefern eines der erklärten Ziele der Strategie - nämlich eine bessere Einbeziehung der Sozialpartner in die Gestaltung und Durchführung der Politik - erreicht wurde. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird argumentiert, dass dieses Ziel in vielerlei Hinsicht nicht erreicht wurde. Selbst in Ländern, in denen die Strukturen der sozialen Partnerschaft relativ gut entwickelt zu sein scheinen, hat der Luxemburg-Prozess nur wenig dazu beigetragen - zum Teil deswegen, weil er als Prozess wahrgenommen wird, der sich mit technischen Aspekten befasst. Die Beschäftigungspolitik wird anderswo 'erledigt'. Hinzu kommt, dass die Verwirklichung der Elemente der Strategie, bei denen die Beteiligung der Sozialpartner besonders wichtig ist, oftmals dadurch verhindert wurde, dass es an Mechanismen fehlt, um die vor Ort in den Betrieben eingegangenen Verpflichtungen umzusetzen. Indem sie sich der Europäischen Beschäftigungsstrategie angeschlossen haben, haben sich die Sozialpartner im übrigen auch einer weiter gefassten Vorgehensweise im Bereich der Wirtschaftspolitik angeschlossen - die kaum mit dem Ansatz vereinbar ist, der von den Gewerkschaften befürwortet wird. Demnach muss das Fazit lauten, dass es dem Luxemburg-Prozess - abgesehen von einer engeren Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Verbänden der Sozialpartner auf europäischer Ebene - nicht gelungen ist, eine soziale Partnerschaft zu entwickeln. Die Mitgliedsorganisationen dieser Verbände haben jedoch von ihrer Beteiligung an der Strategie kaum Notiz genommen, und es ließe sich sogar einwenden, dass dies eher zu mehr Elitismus als zu einer stärkeren Beteiligung an der Politikgestaltung beigetragen hat." (Autorenreferat, IAB-Doku)

Pension privatisation requires that people exercise choice. They might have to choose whether to opt out of a public scheme into a private scheme, or whether to supplement public pension contributions with private pension contributions. If they do choose to participate in a private scheme, they are likely to have to choose how their savings are to be invested. This paper looks at whether people are happy to opt for private solutions, and particularly, how well disposed they are to saving for old age in private, equity-based, funds. It suggests that the experience of poor stock market performance, provider failure, counter-intuitive decisions by regulators and the working of means-testing rules frighten people off voluntary participation in private pension schemes. Whether justified or not, negative experiences can be contagious. Evidence from the USA, Germany, Sweden and the UK is offered to support this assertion.

Ageing produces not only financial dependency but also physical dependency. The projected fiscal costs of increased long-term care provision can be higher than those of increased pension provision. Cost projections can be questioned for failing to take account of increased demands for formal care as female labour force participation rises and as social constrains and household structures supportive of informal caring disappear. New ways are needed to pay for care, and conventional methods have not proved successful. Voluntary saving is unlikely to suffice, equity release schemes are inefficient, and mandatory care insurance schemes add burdens to wage costs in the same way as mandatory pension schemes do. The paper proposes the recouping of care costs from bequests as a way of increasing economic efficiency, of increasing choice and provision, and of reinforcing traditional intra-familial responsibilities. However, some redistribution to the less well-off elderly is inevitable. Evidence and examples of care technologies, of care costs, and of care financing systems are drawn from across the OECD area.