Suchergebnisse

In North America, public-private partnerships (P3s) are increasingly using pre-development agreements to enhance collaboration between the public and private sectors. Known colloquially as "progressive P3s", these agreements allow the private sector to help scope and shape the structure of projects at the front end. However, concerns about their efficacy persist. Our Commentary contextualizes this ongoing debate by outlining the potential benefits and pitfalls of this new approach to P3s. We conclude that both practitioners and academics have a crucial role to play in our experience with and understanding of the progressive P3 experiment.

Asset recycling (AR) has gained attention in the United States as a way of improving life cycle asset maintenance and realizing maximum value from existing public infrastructure. In an AR program, proceeds from leases or sales of mature, underutilized public assets are reinvested in much-needed infrastructure improvements. Although the benefits of AR are often noted in both academic and policy circles, the academic literature on AR has not yet explored AR's application to social infrastructure. To address this gap, we explore the concept of AR and its relevance for U.S. social infrastructure. We first examine the steps and conceptual features of a "fix-it-first" AR approach to social infrastructure. We then use Infrastructure Ontario's Capital Planning Program as a case study to highlight the potential viability of such programs. Finally, we conclude by discussing the benefits and challenges of adopting AR policies in the United States.

The success of public-private partnerships (PPPs) often depends on the duration of a project's concession period. Although experts have invested considerable efforts into optimizing these periods, few have examined the complex, interactive effects of project-specific risks and bankability criteria on concession durations. To overcome this gap, this study develops a System Dynamics (SD) model that allows decision-makers to estimate the optimal concession period terms based on causal interactions between a project's main risks and bankability. The model is applied using data from recent PPPs in Italy. The results show variable interest rates, inflation, operational expenditures (OPEX), and debt repayment mechanisms all uniquely impact the concession period.

AbstractAdministrative burden is experienced by both individuals and businesses when dealing with government entities. While previous literature suggests administrative burden arises from the deliberate choices of political actors, this study highlights how bureaucratic redundancies also lead to administrative burden. Using a dataset of public‐private partnerships (PPPs) in China, this study explored the influence of bureaucratic redundancy on administrative burden, in particular contractors' compliance costs caused by PPP regulations. The analysis found that bureaucratic redundancy has a positive and curvilinear relationship with compliance costs, which in turn has a positive relationship with the likelihood of PPP contract termination. These results hold even after controlling for political and economic factors. Nevertheless, such effects can be mitigated through government reforms, such as jurisdictional reduction and legislative centralization.

AbstractThe study investigates how contractual and relational governance influence partner behaviors and promote sustainability performance of infrastructure public‐private partnerships (PPPs). Survey data from 217 Chinese PPP projects were analyzed using partial least squares structural equation modeling. This study found that both contractual and relational governance have positive effects on PPP sustainability, with contractual governance having a stronger impact. Contractual governance complements relational governance in promoting cooperative behavior, but relational governance does not amplify the effect of contractual governance on opportunistic behavior. The findings highlight the role of contracts in curbing opportunism and promoting collaboration via multiple functions of control, coordination, and adaption, while also revealing the limitations of relational approaches in the context of government‐business relationships and performance ambiguity. This study contributes to the PPP governance literature by uncovering the individual and interactive effects of contractual and relational governance on the economic, social, and environmental aspects of PPP sustainability.

In risky public-private partnership (PPP) projects, governments and public institutions tend to offer private investors certain guarantees for their participation. However, when public sector capacity and institutions are weak, these guarantees can generate moral hazard in the bidding process and lead to contractual renegotiations, resulting in a loss for taxpayers. Drawing on a sophisticated, agent-based model that recreates the complex dynamics of the PPP procurement process, this paper demonstrates public sector competency is crucial for limiting moral hazard when guarantees are offered in PPP projects.