Suchergebnisse

Molti liberali si sono opposti alle politiche pubbliche di nudging. Tuttavia, hanno trovato difficile individuare la vera fonte del loro disagio nei confronti di tali politiche. In questa sede si sostiene che la fonte del disagio dei liberali nei confronti del nudging non risiede nel loro attaccamento alla libertà o all'autonomia (che il nudging non mette ovviamente in discussione), ma nel loro attaccamento all'uguaglianza morale di base. L'affermazione dell'uguaglianza morale di base da parte dei liberali dipende dall'approvazione, a un livello ancora più elementare, di un tipo di rispetto per le persone che esclude la valutazione di alcune capacità agenziali di base delle persone. Il nudging, invece, è motivato proprio da questo tipo di valutazione. Questa fonte di disagio è più profonda e preoccupante dell'attaccamento ai diritti di libertà individuale. I sostenitori del nudging negano di fatto una parte essenziale della base normativa degli stessi diritti di libertà che si suppone vogliano rispettare.

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Abstract:In this essay I attempt to vindicate the "asymmetry thesis," according to which ownership of one's own body is intrinsically different from ownership of other objects, and the view that self-ownership, as libertarians normally understand the concept, enjoys a special "fact-insensitive" status as a fundamental right. In particular, I argue in favor of the following claims. First, the right of self-ownership is most plausibly understood as based on the more fundamental notion of respect for persons, where the concept of a person is in turn understood, along the lines set out by P. F. Strawson and P. M. S. Hacker, as referring to an entire biological organism with a certain set of mental and corporeal characteristics. If we restrict our attention to human persons, we can say on this basis that there is a special moral status attaching to the entire human body, and to no more than the human body. Second, self-ownership is not, as critics have sometimes supposed, based on a more fundamental right to equal freedom or autonomy. Criticisms of self-ownership as insufficiently justified on the basis of such rights are therefore off target. Rather, equal freedom and self-ownership are each based directly on the more fundamental notion of respect for persons. For left-libertarians, the asymmetry thesis serves to give priority to self-ownership when delineating a set of original property rights, given that there are many alternative ways of realizing equal freedom not all of which involve fully respecting people's property rights in themselves.

In 'Bureaucratic respectful equality', Christopher Nathan puts forward two challenges for the author's claim that basic equality can be grounded in a form of 'opacity respect' appropriately shown by the state towards citizens. According to the first challenge, this account is less powerful than the author supposed, inasmuch it does not rule out any equalizandum of distributive equality as long as that equality is pursued by individuals rather than by the state. According to the second challenge, the account is, alternatively, so powerful that it threatens absurdity, because it interprets individual egalitarian action as being carried out on behalf of the state and therefore rules out many of the normal, everyday assessments individuals make of each other's capacities. The article responds to each of these challenges in the light of a clarificatory distinction between two kinds of 'dualist' interpretation of basic equality: a 'state only' account that requires opacity respect only in relations between the state and citizens, and a 'twofold' account that requires individuals to show opacity respect for others' basic agential capacities and the state to show opacity respect also for certain non-basic agential capacities.

Résumé On peut dire d'une personne non seulement qu'elle est libre ou non libre de faire certaines actions spécifiques, mais aussi qu'elle a un certain degré de liberté en un sens global. Le degré de liberté globale représente un certain type d'agrégation des libertés et des non libertés d'une personne. Dans cet article, je rappelle succinctement quelques unes des raisons que j'ai avancées dans mes travaux antérieurs pour soutenir que l'intérêt pour les degrés de liberté globale des gens constitue une part importante du discours et de la théorie politique libérale. Je soutiens aussi, à la lumière de ces raisons, que la métrique utilisée pour déterminer les degrés de liberté doit être, en un sens important, neutre par rapport aux valeurs. En outre, cette approche sur la nature et sur l'importance éthique de la liberté globale, je la défends contre certaines critiques avancées par Peter Morriss, James Nickel, Robert Sugden et Matthew Kramer.

A person can be described not only as free or unfree to do certain specific things, but also as free to a certain degree, in an overall sense. A person's degree of overall freedom represents some kind of aggregation over her specific freedoms and unfreedoms. In this article I rehearse synthetically some of the reasons, put forward in my previous work, for holding that an interest in people's degrees of overall freedom is an important part of liberal political discourse and theorizing. I also claim that, in light of these reasons, the metric used to ascertain agents' degrees of overall freedom ought, in one important sense, to be 'value-neutral'. Furthermore, I defend this account of the nature and ethical importance of overall freedom in the face of some criticisms put forward by Peter Morriss, James Nickel, Robert Sugden and Matthew Kramer. Adapted from the source document.