Suchergebnisse

Buenos Aires and Chicago grew during the nineteenth century for remarkably similar reasons. Both cities were conduits for moving meat and grain from fertile hinterlands to eastern markets. However, despite their initial similarities, Chicago was vastly more prosperous for most of the twentieth century. Can the differences between the cities after 1930 be explained by differences in the cities before that date? We highlight four major differences between Buenos Aires and Chicago in 1914. Chicago was slightly richer, and significantly better educated. Chicago was more industrially developed, with about 2.25 times more capital per worker. Finally, Chicago's political situation was far more stable and it was not a political capital. Human capital seems to explain the lion's share of the divergent path of the two cities and their countries, both because of its direct effect and because of the connection between education and political instability.

We show that isolated capital cities are robustly associated with greater levels of corruption across US states, in line with the view that this isolation reduces accountability. We then provide direct evidence that the spatial distribution of population relative to the capital affects different accountability mechanisms: newspapers cover state politics more when readers are closer to the capital, voters who live far from the capital are less knowledgeable and interested in state politics, and they turn out less in state elections. We also find that isolated capitals are associated with more money in state-level campaigns, and worse public good provision.

We show that isolated capital cities are robustly associated with greater levels of corruption across US states, in line with the view that this isolation reduces accountability. We then provide direct evidence that the spatial distribution of population relative to the capital affects different accountability mechanisms: newspapers cover state politics more when readers are closer to the capital, voters who live far from the capital are less knowledgeable and interested in state politics, and they turn out less in state elections. We also find that isolated capitals are associated with more money in state-level campaigns, and worse public good provision.

We provide evidence that economic circumstances are a key intermediating variable for understanding the relationship between schooling and political protest. Using the World Values Survey, we find that individuals with higher levels of schooling, but whose income outcomes fall short of that predicted by their biographical characteristics, in turn display a greater propensity to engage in protest activities. We discuss a number of interpretations that are consistent with this finding, including the idea that economic conditions can affect how individuals trade off the use of their human capital between production and political activities. Our results could also reflect a link between education, ''grievance'', and political protest, although we argue that this is unlikely to be the sole explanation. Separately, we show that the interaction between schooling and economic conditions matters too at the country level: Rising education levels coupled with macroeconomic weakness are associated with increased incumbent turnover, as well as subsequent pressures toward democratization.

We show that isolated capital cities are robustly associated with greater levels of corruption across US states, in line with the view that this isolation reduces accountability. We then provide direct evidence that the spatial distribution of population relative to the capital affects different accountability mechanisms: newspapers cover state politics more when readers are closer to the capital, voters who live far from the capital are less knowledgeable and interested in state politics, and they turn out less in state elections. We also find that isolated capitals are associated with more money in state-level campaigns, and worse public good provision.

We show that isolated capital cities are robustly associated with greater levels of corruption acrossUS states, in line with the view that spatial distance between citizens and the seat of political powerreduces accountability, and in contrast with the alternative hypothesis that keeping distance betweenthe capital and major economic interests might decrease the risk of political capture. In particular,this stylized fact holds when we use the location of a state's centroid and the spatial distribution ofland suitability as sources of exogenous variation for the isolation of the capital city. We then showdirect evidence that different mechanisms for holding state politicians accountable are indeed affectedby the spatial distribution of population: newspapers provide greater coverage of state politics whentheir audiences are more concentrated around the capital, voters are less knowledgeable and interestedin state politics when they are far from the capital, and voter turnout in state elections is greater inplaces that are closer to the capital. We find that the role of media accountability seems particularlyimportant in explaining the connection between isolated capitals and corruption. We also find evidencethat there is more money in state-level political campaigns in those states with isolated capitals,again contrary to the capture hypothesis. Finally, we provide some evidence that these patterns areassociated with lower levels of public good spending and outcomes.

We show that isolated capital cities are robustly associated with greater levels of corruption across US states, in line with the view that this isolation reduces accountability, and in contrast with the alternative hypothesis that it might forestall political capture. We then provide direct evidence that the spatial distribution of population relative to the capital affects different accountability mechanisms over state politics: newspaper coverage, voter knowledge and information, and turnout. We also find evidence against the capture hypothesis: isolated capitals are associated with more money in state-level campaigns. Finally, we show that isolation is linked with worse public good provision.

We show that isolated capital cities are robustly associated with greater levels of corruption acrossUS states, in line with the view that spatial distance between citizens and the seat of political powerreduces accountability, and in contrast with the alternative hypothesis that keeping distance betweenthe capital and major economic interests might decrease the risk of political capture. In particular,this stylized fact holds when we use the location of a state's centroid and the spatial distribution ofland suitability as sources of exogenous variation for the isolation of the capital city. We then showdirect evidence that different mechanisms for holding state politicians accountable are indeed affectedby the spatial distribution of population: newspapers provide greater coverage of state politics whentheir audiences are more concentrated around the capital, voters are less knowledgeable and interestedin state politics when they are far from the capital, and voter turnout in state elections is greater inplaces that are closer to the capital. We find that the role of media accountability seems particularlyimportant in explaining the connection between isolated capitals and corruption. We also find evidencethat there is more money in state-level political campaigns in those states with isolated capitals,again contrary to the capture hypothesis. Finally, we provide some evidence that these patterns areassociated with lower levels of public good spending and outcomes.

We show that isolated capital cities are robustly associated with greater levels of corruption across US states, in line with the view that this isolation reduces accountability, and in contrast with the alternative hypothesis that it might forestall political capture. We then provide direct evidence that the spatial distribution of population relative to the capital affects different accountability mechanisms over state politics: newspaper coverage, voter knowledge and information, and turnout. We also find evidence against the capture hypothesis: isolated capitals are associated with more money in state-level campaigns. Finally, we show that isolation is linked with worse public good provision.

We investigate how the link between individual schooling and political participation is a ected by country characteristics. Using individual survey data, we nd that political participation is more responsive to schooling in land-abundant countries, and less responsive in human capital-abundant countries, even while controlling for country political institutions and cultural attitudes. We propose an explanation that centers on how individuals allocate the use of their human capital. A relative abundance of land (used primarily in the least skill-intensive sector) or a scarcity of aggregate hu- man capital increases both the level of political participation and its responsiveness to schooling, by lowering the opportunity cost of production income foregone. We nd related evidence that political participation is less responsive to schooling in countries with a higher skill premium, as well as within countries for individuals engaged in skilled occupations, suggesting that these patterns are indeed in uenced by the opportunity cost of engaging in political rather than production activities. We ar- gue that this framework can provide a joint explanation for patterns of political participation at the individual level and di erences in public investment in education at the country level.

The recent uprisings in the Arab World carry a broader lesson, highlighting the importance of sustaining an economy that provides sufficient job opportunities for an increasingly educated and skilled middle class.

We provide evidence that economic circumstances are a key intermediating variable for understanding the relationship between schooling and political protest. Using the World Values Survey, we find that individuals with higher levels of schooling, but whose income outcomes fall short of that predicted by their biographical characteristics, in turn display a greater propensity to engage in protest activities. We discuss a number of interpretations that are consistent with this finding, including the idea that economic conditions can affect how individuals trade off the use of their human capital between production and political activities. Our results could also reflect a link between education, ''grievance'', and political protest, although we argue that this is unlikely to be the sole explanation. Separately, we show that the interaction between schooling and economic conditions matters too at the country level: Rising education levels coupled with macroeconomic weakness are associated with increased incumbent turnover, as well as subsequent pressures toward democratization.

We construct a general axiomatic approach to measuring spatial concentration around a center or capital point of interest, a concept with wide applicability from urban economics, economic geography and trade, to political economy and industrial organization. By analogy with expected utility theory, we propose a basic axiom of independence (sub-group consistency) and continuity for a concentration order that ranks any two distributions relative to the capital point. We show that this axiom implies an expected influence representation of that order, conceptualizing concentration as an aggregation of the expected influence exerted by the capital on all points in the relevant space (or vice-versa). We then propose two axioms (monotonicity and rank invariance) and prove that they imply that the associated influence function must be a decreasing isoelastic function of the distance to the capital. We apply our index to measure the concentration of population around capital cities across countries and US states, and also in US metropolitan areas. We show its advantages over alternative measures, and explore its correlations with many economic and political variables of interest.