Suchergebnisse

Historically, the development of modern banking has been an important component of economic change, but it has not always been so clear whether it has been a factor in the genesis of growth or a response to and a consequence of it. In the case of the Ottoman Empire, corporate banks—wholly or partly financed with Western capital—had established themselves in strength in Istanbul after the Crimean War, especially in the decade 1863–72 when no less than eight opened there. All, however, concentrated to varying degrees on meeting the financial needs of the government at a time when the Porte was borrowing almost continuously, both short-term and long-term, a fact that explains the eclipse of several of them around the time of the bankruptcy of 1875.

During the middle and later decades of the nineteenth century successive generations of Ottoman statesmen made a sustained effort to transform the traditional-style Islamic empire, responsibility for which they had inherited, into a modern state. The difficulties they faced were enormous and, as is well known, ultimately proved insurmountable, so that what was left of the their territories finally disintegrated in the decade following the revolution of 1908. However, if there was one problem above all others to which could be ascribed the failure in turn of the Tanzimat, Hamidian, and Young Turk reformers, it was the financial weakness of the central government. Partly because of the inadequate tax base provided by an overwhelmingly agricultural economy, partly because of an inadequate administrative machine (especially in respect of tax collection and the control of expenditure), and partly because of the high level of military expenditure necessitated by constant external and internal threats to its integrity, the nineteenth century Ottoman state never had enough money, and from this one overwhelming fact derived a host of other woes.