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This summary report is based on the main conclusions of two panel discussions on foreign policy held at CIDOB on September 21st, 2023, as part of the project "Japan and the EU: Global partners for a secure and open Indo-Pacific". The document assesses the changing international environment and its impact on relations between the European Union (EU) and Japan. It goes on to highlight two new forms of security – economic and information security – that are a cause of concern for both partners and which open up new possibilities for joint action. It concludes by noting the new cooperation dynamics between Tokyo and Brussels and what the future holds for them.I. IntroductionThe current international order is under challenge from a confluence of enduring trends the pace of which has been quickened more recently by a series of critical events that only underline the international system's shortcomings and contradictions.The first of these events was the COVID-19 pandemic, which provided multiple examples of the fragility of global supply chains and the dependence on manufactured goods imported from China, often essential goods. The pandemic acted as an accelerator for at least three major long-term trends that were already underway. The first of these was the confrontation between the major international powers, the United States and China. They went from being partners for development to considering themselves competitors and, on certain matters, systemic rivals. Some commentators say there was already an underlying trend towards decoupling prior to the pandemic, acknowledging that the Chinese market was looking to replace imports with local products (increasing the US or German trade deficit) and two independent digital spheres were forming, tethered to two diverging socio-political models (García-Herrero, 2023). The pandemic, however, saw the strategic contest over international ascendancy and shaping norms and alliances step up a notch.The trend towards the securitisation of technology and innovation has also gained momentum in the wake of the pandemic. This was clear during the race to create and produce a vaccine against the coronavirus. Nonetheless, both before – with the disputes over 5G networks or industrial espionage – and after – in the framework of what has been called the "chip war" – we witnessed the rise of an increasingly strategic association between big tech corporations and the security of states. Taiwan is a prime example. One single firm, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), acts as a deterrent to any potential invasion of the island because it alone dominates the global market for the most advanced chips. Recent international conflicts, first in Ukraine and more lately in Gaza, have hastened this trend towards the technologisation of economic, political and social relations. Cyberwarfare, drones, satellites and grassroots innovation (or lack thereof) are elements that can make the difference between victory and defeat. We are witnessing the new nature of "hybrid wars", those that combine physical military operations with cybernetic action. They are not only fought on the battlefield, rather they involve the mass use of disinformation or cyberattacks that seek to undermine the values of the adversary and the legitimacy of their political systems; or in the case of a war, undermine their confidence and operability. In this type of conflict, the aim is not so much victory but destabilisation (Bargués and Bourekba, 2022).As well as this technological offshoot, the two conflicts are reinforcing the self-image of what are termed the Global North and South, which resonates through the main debates on economic development, international justice or the fight against climate change. Several votes at the United Nations and the imposition of sanctions on Russia have revealed greater coordination of agendas around the narrative of the "decline of the West" and the realisation that there is scope to increase the gains of middle powers and transnational corporations.While Japan and the EU are different in nature (one is a regional actor, the other a state) they share common ground: democracy, respect for a multipolar, rules-based international order that is peaceful and prosperous, plus many of the challenges mentioned at the start of this paper.II. New security dynamics: disinformation and economic security Against this backdrop of transformation of the international system and acceleration of the geopolitical competition, new forms of (in)security have appeared on the agendas of Japan and the EU, but also of other international powers like China, the United States or India. We are talking about disinformation and economic security, two increasingly central elements of Japan and the EU's conception of security.DisinformationThe rapid succession of technological breakthroughs of recent years, along with the growing development of artificial intelligence (AI), the digital transition and the rise of disinformation have laid bare the exploitation of new technology and the challenges it poses to the security and the future of states. In times of crisis, we have seen how disinformation becomes a "weapon of mass infoxication" on the margins of international law, which comes at a relatively low cost and prevents effective governance. Though not a new phenomenon – propaganda was crucial during the Cold War, for instance – viral media and the current porousness of social networks have amplified their potential as a weapon in the narrative war in the hands of external actors. The emergence of generative AI, moreover, not only raises the possibility of an "alternative account" of the facts, but rather enables credibly recreating the facts and even replacing them in people's perception of reality (through deep fakes). This threatens notions of truth and trust, which are essential to democratic governance and election processes.Unlike the EU and the United States, Japan has not been significantly exposed to outside interference in the shape of disinformation. But Tokyo considers this phenomenon a potential threat to national security and democratic health. Namely, the rise of generative AI could quickly break down some of the barriers, such as the language factor, which certain analysts had identified as having put a brake on the proliferation of this phenomenon on the archipelago (Kuwahara, 2022). Thus, in the framework of the National Security Strategy launched in late 2022 by the Kishida administration, Japan identified the challenge of the manipulation of information in situations of conflict and announced the adoption of countermeasures. The government is the chief instigator (top-down action) through coordination with its counterparts in other countries (government-to-government) and non-governmental actors.In the case of the EU, the destabilising effect of disinformation reached new heights during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It is the reason why, nearly a decade ago now, its greater exposure to this type of campaign prompted Brussels to begin to pursue strategies to respond to this hybrid threat. Since then, Brussels has tried to tackle disinformation via a consumer-based rather than security-centred approach. Initially, the European Commission focused its efforts on controlling content rather than trying to regulate tech companies and the major platforms. That approach has shifted, however, with the realisation that the problem of disinformation is not so much the message as its replication and amplification. This shift in focus also counters one of the main risks of focusing on the message, which is that it jeopardises the right to freedom of expression. It is with this rationale that the Digital Services Act (DSA) entered into force in January 2024. It contains specific provisions to control algorithms, which are responsible for "clustering" potentially like-minded social media users, which in turn is key for the propagation of the message through information bubbles and echo chambers.Action that is limited exclusively to algorithmic governance, however, falls short in the face of the complexity of the sociopsychological processes involved in disinformation (Colomina, 2022). With that in mind, the EU has adopted a whole-of-society approach that recognises that it is essential to combine online action with offline measures – in the real world – that mitigate the inequalities, divisions and social fractures that disinformation thrives on. Thus, while the Japanese approach has prioritised government-to-government exchange, a more decentralised strategy prevails in Brussels, where other social sectors, such as journalists, fact checkers, researchers and civil society, play an extremely important role in lockstep with the efforts at the highest level. The EU's decentralised approach to confronting disinformation suits the fragmented media landscape of the 27 member states, which differs from the high degree of concentration in the case of Japan, where large print and television media are the main channels of information. Economic security The new dynamics of reglobalisation, coupled with a return to protectionist measures, the exploitation of interdependencies and economic coercion, are shaping a new global economic landscape in which open economies and interdependence have come to be seen as risks rather than factors of mutual security. Consequently, "economic security" is gaining ground in the national strategies of countries like Japan, one of its chief proponents. While there is no one single definition of economic security, nor of the areas it encompasses, in general terms it seeks to protect a national economy from external interference, minimising the impact of supply chain disruptions, dependence on certain products or the capacity for economic coercion in the hands of others to bring pressure to bear or influence domestic political decisions.Japan has been an early advocate of this concept, which, aside from its habit of putting forward terms that then become all the rage in strategic thinking, can be put down to its insular nature and its heavy dependence on imported commodities and natural resources. Starting in 2020, Tokyo has begun a process of institutionalising economic security through the creation of government positions assigned to this task, as well as the adoption of various legislative packages to ensure its defence. One of the main ones is the Economic Security Promotion Act of 2022, which rests on four key pillars: 1) strengthening supply chains, especially of critical raw materials, 2) security of critical and core infrastructure, 3) developing advanced technology and 4) a patent non-disclosure system. At the same time, Japan has transferred the concept to its bilateral relations – with the United States, South Korea or the United Kingdom – and the fora in which it participates, like the G7 or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The G7 statement on economic resilience and economic security during the Hiroshima summit in May 2023 was particularly important. It was the first ever reference to the concept in the multilateral sphere, which is a measure of its consolidation on the agenda and in international cooperation.At the same time, these economic security initiatives are indirectly linked to Tokyo's proposal for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP), a strategy unveiled in 2016 that aims to safeguard the rules-based international order, promote peace and shared prosperity, maritime and air security, and develop connectivity in the region. It is hard to disassociate this approach from Beijing's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and the need to preserve freedom of navigation through this vital artery for Japan and the rest of the world, as approximately a third of global trade flows through it. Although the FOIP's principles of openness and inclusivity could be seen to be at odds with economic security – particularly given the economic rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo in the region – cooperation in this field depends on a free and open region, and vice versa. What is more, it is through greater development of connectivity and exchange with the countries of the region (including the ASEAN members and India) that Tokyo can diversify its trade portfolio and boost its economic resilience.The EU too has adopted the principle of economic security in the last year. Supply chain disruptions during the pandemic, the closure of the Russian gas tap after the invasion of Ukraine and the restriction on imports that China imposed on Lithuania following the opening of a representative office in Taiwan in 2021 are powerful incentives for the adoption of instruments to safeguard the EU's economic security. Among the various measures adopted, four types of mechanism stand out: 1) the revitalisation of industrial policy and the adoption of political initiatives to improve EU production capacity and productivity; 2) diversification and stockpiling efforts to reduce dependence on products and natural resources; 3) the adoption of measures to counter external mechanisms that give competitors the edge, such as anti-subsidy measures; and 4) tools devoted to strategic competition, like the anti-coercion instrument or controls on exports of certain products (Burguete, 2023). More recently, in January 2024, Brussels launched new initiatives aimed at reinforcing its Economic Security Strategy, put forward for the first time in June 2023. With a more geopolitical approach akin to that of Washington, Brussels is seeking tighter control over investments, greater coordination in the control of exports, investment for research into advanced technologies and the protection of innovation. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the different member states will accept this new legislative package.We can say that Japan and the EU are adopting different, though complementary, mechanisms that can boost domestic capacities to address the challenges ahead of them. Yet, while we can note progress in the field of economic security – as we shall see below – cooperation in the field of disinformation remains at an earlier stage. There is, however, huge potential for bilateral cooperation, and there are powerful incentives for it.III. A new era of cooperation between Japan and the European Union? In the last two decades relations between the EU and Japan have been marked by a considerable degree of mutual understanding, with a predominance of economic matters, despite the trade tensions and conflicts towards the end of the 20th century. Yet this has yielded limited results in terms of joint initiatives and plans (Tanaka, 2013). In 2022, Japan was the EU's second biggest trading partner in Asia, behind China, and the seventh globally. That same year Japanese imports into the EU came to nearly €70bn, while EU exports the other way amounted to over €71.6bn (European Commission, 2023).As far as security is concerned, progress has been slow, fettered by Japan's constitutional constraints, which place restrictions on its military capabilities, and, on the European side, owing to its complex security framework and its partial overlap with NATO. Until a few years ago, cooperation in this area had been limited to "softer" forms of security such as antipiracy operations off Somalia. It is worth recalling that in the case of both the EU and Japan traditional security (the military aspect) falls to the United States, since both actors are eminently economic powers but lacking in comparable military might. They are, then, relations that on security matters are triangular rather than bilateral and cannot be understood without Washington.This has been no impediment to Brussels and Tokyo strengthening ties over the last few years, primarily on political and trade matters. In 2019, the two parties adopted the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, which lifted most of the tariffs existing between the two economies, and the Strategic Partnership Agreement, based on cooperation and the defence of shared values such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights or free trade. In the latter agreement, Japan and the EU identified the common threats of cybersecurity, natural disasters, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maritime (in)security. The two agreements established a framework that would cement political, security and development cooperation cast in liberal values to jointly uphold the rules-based international order.In this new phase of cooperation, security issues have gained importance because both actors perceive a greater interdependence and interconnection in their security. According to the Joint Statement of the Japan-EU Summit of July 2023, "the security of Europe and that of the Indo-Pacific are closely interlinked". And the facts appear to bear it out. Japan was one of the countries that did not hesitate to show its support for Ukraine following the Russian invasion of 2022, taking part in the international sanctions regime, as well as dispatching arms to Kyiv. Coordination with the EU in this field has been remarkable.If we look at the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific released in 2021, Brussels also aspires to greater involvement in the security of the region in four main areas: maritime security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and crisis management. However, despite European ambitions, there are differences over the commitment (economic and/or military) that the various member states would be willing to make in the Indo-Pacific. As often happens, European policy towards the region is the sum of the convergences and divergences of the member states. According to a survey by the European Council for Foreign Relations, 23 out of the 27 member states point to security as an important element of Europe's Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet only 12 would be interested in contributing to freedom of navigation operations and just 4 would commit warships to the region (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain). It will also be important to consider NATO involvement in this area. In 2023, it submitted a proposal to open a civilian liaison office in Tokyo, an idea that was dropped largely due to French reluctance in the face of a possible response from China.Japan welcomes even limited European involvement in the region and this is in step with the growing interconnection between Europe's security and that of the Indo-Pacific. However, more coordination and communication among the various European and international actors in the region, especially in the military field, will be essential in order to avoid undesired tensions.Lastly, cooperation on economic security has acquired a more central position in recent months. In June 2023, this was a particularly important matter during the High-Level Economic Dialogue between Japan and the EU, especially with regard to cases of economic coercion, non-market access policies and control over investments and exports, as well as action aimed at making supply chains more resilient. In a subsequent joint statement, the two actors identified multiple areas of cooperation in this field, with a clear reference to de-risking, as well as cooperation on semiconductors and protecting critical infrastructure like submarine cables. This first reference reveals a complementary approach to economic security conceptions and strategies for the two actors, which makes for a more holistic approach.However, one of the future challenges in order to guarantee this cooperation is related to two fundamental contradictions of economic security. For one thing, it is an area where economic interests and national security may collide. For another, owing to the long list of issues it encompasses – security, trade, tech or industrial policies – economic security has a cooperative side, but also a competitive one. The predominance of security issues may come at the expense of economic interests for the two actors, both in their relations and in their own domestic dynamics, and vice versa. Thus, careful and respectful communication and coordination between them, as well as within them, in the EU's case, will be key in order to guarantee effective cooperation between Japan and the EU. IV. ConclusionsOver the last two decades, bilateral relations between the EU and Japan (which on security matters become triangular on account of the simultaneous presence of the United States) have been marked by stability and ongoing outreach. There are those who say that this is the main problem: the lack of problems. Three factors, however, have brought about a more recent revitalisation and strengthening of relations:(1) The situation of "permacrisis" and the speeding up of dynamics of geopolitical competition and fracture.(2) The new balances of power in the international system thanks to the consolidation of China as a global player with the capacity to influence in any part of the world, plus the rise of the Global South as a new "imagined community" on the geopolitical map. Despite their diversity, they share a growing interest in exploring alternatives to a Western-led international order.(3) The acceleration of new international dynamics such as digitalisation, the emergence of hybrid threats or reglobalisation, which, together with the COVID-19 pandemic and the outbreak of war in Ukraine, have alerted states to new dimensions of national security.As a result, in the face of future uncertainties and the prospect of greater rapport between Tokyo and Brussels, three main issues stand out. First, as democracies committed to the liberal, rules-based multilateral system, Japan and the EU are natural partners – "like- minded" allies– that share values and principles, as well as a vital interest in maintaining peace and prosperity in their regional environments.Second, although together they are the world's first and fourth biggest economies, they do not wield political and military power to match their economic might. However, after three decades of prioritising the economy and trade, they now see the need to invest in their defence, with a view to preserving their "strategic autonomy" and not being dragged into a conflict against their will or against their interests. Moreover, despite the triangular relationship in the military sphere, both actors are moving forward on cooperation in new forms of security, such as economic security. These new dynamics have enabled closer exchange and coordination between Tokyo and Brussels, though there is still room for improvement. Namely, cooperation on tech, including cybersecurity and disinformation, offers new opportunities to strengthen Japan-EU ties and common defence in the face of these challenges.Third, there is a growing sense thatEuropean and Asian security scenarios are increasingly connected,and that the security of Japan, South Korea or Taiwan also depend, more and more so, on what happens in Ukraine. In such a scenario, the United States' allies aim to be active players – not just a battleground – in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing.Despite that, there are still multiple areas for greater cooperation between Tokyo and Brussels and the 27 member states. The challenge is to ensure the agenda of the two actors keeps in step with the tempo of the systemic changes the international order is undergoing and to play a role in them that is commensurate with their economic, cultural and human power. Just months away from a possible return of Donald Trump to the White House, who could renege on his international commitments and threaten security alliances, the ties between the EU and Japan may offer a necessary foothold for facing the turbulence ahead. ReferencesBargués, Pol and Bourekba, Moussa. "War by all means: the rise of hybrid warfare", in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 11-16. Available online.Benson, Emily; Steinberg, Federico and Álvarez-Aragonés, Pau. "The European Union's Economic Security Strategy Update". CSIS Commentary, 2024. (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.Burguete, Víctor. "Contribución de la UE a la reglobalización: de la búsqueda de la autonomía a la estrategia de seguridad económica". Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 298, 2023.Colomina, Carme. "Words as weapons: from disinformation to the global battle for the narrative" in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 17-24. Available online.European Commission. EU trade Relations with Japan (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.García-Herrero, Alicia. China-EU roller-coaster relations: Where do we stand and what to do? Text of testimony to the US Congress, June 2023. Available onlineTanaka, Toshiro. "EU-Japan Relations" in Christiansen, Thomas; Kirchner, Emil and Murray, Philomena (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, pp. 509-520.Tirado, Carmen. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Una iniciativa japonesa de política exterior para la cooperación global", Global Affairs Journal 2, 2020.Kuwahara, Kyoko. "Disinformation Threats during a Taiwan Contingency and Countermeasures". Research Report, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 22, 2022. Available online.Vidal, Lluc. "Beyond the Gaiatsu Model: Japan's Asia-Pacific Policy and Neoclassical Realism", Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2022, 9 (1), pp. 26–49.

This summary report is based on the main conclusions of two panel discussions on foreign policy held at CIDOB on September 21st, 2023, as part of the project "Japan and the EU: Global partners for a secure and open Indo-Pacific". The document assesses the changing international environment and its impact on relations between the European Union (EU) and Japan. It goes on to highlight two new forms of security – economic and information security – that are a cause of concern for both partners and which open up new possibilities for joint action. It concludes by noting the new cooperation dynamics between Tokyo and Brussels and what the future holds for them.I. IntroductionThe current international order is under challenge from a confluence of enduring trends the pace of which has been quickened more recently by a series of critical events that only underline the international system's shortcomings and contradictions.The first of these events was the COVID-19 pandemic, which provided multiple examples of the fragility of global supply chains and the dependence on manufactured goods imported from China, often essential goods. The pandemic acted as an accelerator for at least three major long-term trends that were already underway. The first of these was the confrontation between the major international powers, the United States and China. They went from being partners for development to considering themselves competitors and, on certain matters, systemic rivals. Some commentators say there was already an underlying trend towards decoupling prior to the pandemic, acknowledging that the Chinese market was looking to replace imports with local products (increasing the US or German trade deficit) and two independent digital spheres were forming, tethered to two diverging socio-political models (García-Herrero, 2023). The pandemic, however, saw the strategic contest over international ascendancy and shaping norms and alliances step up a notch.The trend towards the securitisation of technology and innovation has also gained momentum in the wake of the pandemic. This was clear during the race to create and produce a vaccine against the coronavirus. Nonetheless, both before – with the disputes over 5G networks or industrial espionage – and after – in the framework of what has been called the "chip war" – we witnessed the rise of an increasingly strategic association between big tech corporations and the security of states. Taiwan is a prime example. One single firm, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), acts as a deterrent to any potential invasion of the island because it alone dominates the global market for the most advanced chips. Recent international conflicts, first in Ukraine and more lately in Gaza, have hastened this trend towards the technologisation of economic, political and social relations. Cyberwarfare, drones, satellites and grassroots innovation (or lack thereof) are elements that can make the difference between victory and defeat. We are witnessing the new nature of "hybrid wars", those that combine physical military operations with cybernetic action. They are not only fought on the battlefield, rather they involve the mass use of disinformation or cyberattacks that seek to undermine the values of the adversary and the legitimacy of their political systems; or in the case of a war, undermine their confidence and operability. In this type of conflict, the aim is not so much victory but destabilisation (Bargués and Bourekba, 2022).As well as this technological offshoot, the two conflicts are reinforcing the self-image of what are termed the Global North and South, which resonates through the main debates on economic development, international justice or the fight against climate change. Several votes at the United Nations and the imposition of sanctions on Russia have revealed greater coordination of agendas around the narrative of the "decline of the West" and the realisation that there is scope to increase the gains of middle powers and transnational corporations.While Japan and the EU are different in nature (one is a regional actor, the other a state) they share common ground: democracy, respect for a multipolar, rules-based international order that is peaceful and prosperous, plus many of the challenges mentioned at the start of this paper.II. New security dynamics: disinformation and economic security Against this backdrop of transformation of the international system and acceleration of the geopolitical competition, new forms of (in)security have appeared on the agendas of Japan and the EU, but also of other international powers like China, the United States or India. We are talking about disinformation and economic security, two increasingly central elements of Japan and the EU's conception of security.DisinformationThe rapid succession of technological breakthroughs of recent years, along with the growing development of artificial intelligence (AI), the digital transition and the rise of disinformation have laid bare the exploitation of new technology and the challenges it poses to the security and the future of states. In times of crisis, we have seen how disinformation becomes a "weapon of mass infoxication" on the margins of international law, which comes at a relatively low cost and prevents effective governance. Though not a new phenomenon – propaganda was crucial during the Cold War, for instance – viral media and the current porousness of social networks have amplified their potential as a weapon in the narrative war in the hands of external actors. The emergence of generative AI, moreover, not only raises the possibility of an "alternative account" of the facts, but rather enables credibly recreating the facts and even replacing them in people's perception of reality (through deep fakes). This threatens notions of truth and trust, which are essential to democratic governance and election processes.Unlike the EU and the United States, Japan has not been significantly exposed to outside interference in the shape of disinformation. But Tokyo considers this phenomenon a potential threat to national security and democratic health. Namely, the rise of generative AI could quickly break down some of the barriers, such as the language factor, which certain analysts had identified as having put a brake on the proliferation of this phenomenon on the archipelago (Kuwahara, 2022). Thus, in the framework of the National Security Strategy launched in late 2022 by the Kishida administration, Japan identified the challenge of the manipulation of information in situations of conflict and announced the adoption of countermeasures. The government is the chief instigator (top-down action) through coordination with its counterparts in other countries (government-to-government) and non-governmental actors.In the case of the EU, the destabilising effect of disinformation reached new heights during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It is the reason why, nearly a decade ago now, its greater exposure to this type of campaign prompted Brussels to begin to pursue strategies to respond to this hybrid threat. Since then, Brussels has tried to tackle disinformation via a consumer-based rather than security-centred approach. Initially, the European Commission focused its efforts on controlling content rather than trying to regulate tech companies and the major platforms. That approach has shifted, however, with the realisation that the problem of disinformation is not so much the message as its replication and amplification. This shift in focus also counters one of the main risks of focusing on the message, which is that it jeopardises the right to freedom of expression. It is with this rationale that the Digital Services Act (DSA) entered into force in January 2024. It contains specific provisions to control algorithms, which are responsible for "clustering" potentially like-minded social media users, which in turn is key for the propagation of the message through information bubbles and echo chambers.Action that is limited exclusively to algorithmic governance, however, falls short in the face of the complexity of the sociopsychological processes involved in disinformation (Colomina, 2022). With that in mind, the EU has adopted a whole-of-society approach that recognises that it is essential to combine online action with offline measures – in the real world – that mitigate the inequalities, divisions and social fractures that disinformation thrives on. Thus, while the Japanese approach has prioritised government-to-government exchange, a more decentralised strategy prevails in Brussels, where other social sectors, such as journalists, fact checkers, researchers and civil society, play an extremely important role in lockstep with the efforts at the highest level. The EU's decentralised approach to confronting disinformation suits the fragmented media landscape of the 27 member states, which differs from the high degree of concentration in the case of Japan, where large print and television media are the main channels of information. Economic security The new dynamics of reglobalisation, coupled with a return to protectionist measures, the exploitation of interdependencies and economic coercion, are shaping a new global economic landscape in which open economies and interdependence have come to be seen as risks rather than factors of mutual security. Consequently, "economic security" is gaining ground in the national strategies of countries like Japan, one of its chief proponents. While there is no one single definition of economic security, nor of the areas it encompasses, in general terms it seeks to protect a national economy from external interference, minimising the impact of supply chain disruptions, dependence on certain products or the capacity for economic coercion in the hands of others to bring pressure to bear or influence domestic political decisions.Japan has been an early advocate of this concept, which, aside from its habit of putting forward terms that then become all the rage in strategic thinking, can be put down to its insular nature and its heavy dependence on imported commodities and natural resources. Starting in 2020, Tokyo has begun a process of institutionalising economic security through the creation of government positions assigned to this task, as well as the adoption of various legislative packages to ensure its defence. One of the main ones is the Economic Security Promotion Act of 2022, which rests on four key pillars: 1) strengthening supply chains, especially of critical raw materials, 2) security of critical and core infrastructure, 3) developing advanced technology and 4) a patent non-disclosure system. At the same time, Japan has transferred the concept to its bilateral relations – with the United States, South Korea or the United Kingdom – and the fora in which it participates, like the G7 or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The G7 statement on economic resilience and economic security during the Hiroshima summit in May 2023 was particularly important. It was the first ever reference to the concept in the multilateral sphere, which is a measure of its consolidation on the agenda and in international cooperation.At the same time, these economic security initiatives are indirectly linked to Tokyo's proposal for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP), a strategy unveiled in 2016 that aims to safeguard the rules-based international order, promote peace and shared prosperity, maritime and air security, and develop connectivity in the region. It is hard to disassociate this approach from Beijing's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and the need to preserve freedom of navigation through this vital artery for Japan and the rest of the world, as approximately a third of global trade flows through it. Although the FOIP's principles of openness and inclusivity could be seen to be at odds with economic security – particularly given the economic rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo in the region – cooperation in this field depends on a free and open region, and vice versa. What is more, it is through greater development of connectivity and exchange with the countries of the region (including the ASEAN members and India) that Tokyo can diversify its trade portfolio and boost its economic resilience.The EU too has adopted the principle of economic security in the last year. Supply chain disruptions during the pandemic, the closure of the Russian gas tap after the invasion of Ukraine and the restriction on imports that China imposed on Lithuania following the opening of a representative office in Taiwan in 2021 are powerful incentives for the adoption of instruments to safeguard the EU's economic security. Among the various measures adopted, four types of mechanism stand out: 1) the revitalisation of industrial policy and the adoption of political initiatives to improve EU production capacity and productivity; 2) diversification and stockpiling efforts to reduce dependence on products and natural resources; 3) the adoption of measures to counter external mechanisms that give competitors the edge, such as anti-subsidy measures; and 4) tools devoted to strategic competition, like the anti-coercion instrument or controls on exports of certain products (Burguete, 2023). More recently, in January 2024, Brussels launched new initiatives aimed at reinforcing its Economic Security Strategy, put forward for the first time in June 2023. With a more geopolitical approach akin to that of Washington, Brussels is seeking tighter control over investments, greater coordination in the control of exports, investment for research into advanced technologies and the protection of innovation. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the different member states will accept this new legislative package.We can say that Japan and the EU are adopting different, though complementary, mechanisms that can boost domestic capacities to address the challenges ahead of them. Yet, while we can note progress in the field of economic security – as we shall see below – cooperation in the field of disinformation remains at an earlier stage. There is, however, huge potential for bilateral cooperation, and there are powerful incentives for it.III. A new era of cooperation between Japan and the European Union? In the last two decades relations between the EU and Japan have been marked by a considerable degree of mutual understanding, with a predominance of economic matters, despite the trade tensions and conflicts towards the end of the 20th century. Yet this has yielded limited results in terms of joint initiatives and plans (Tanaka, 2013). In 2022, Japan was the EU's second biggest trading partner in Asia, behind China, and the seventh globally. That same year Japanese imports into the EU came to nearly €70bn, while EU exports the other way amounted to over €71.6bn (European Commission, 2023).As far as security is concerned, progress has been slow, fettered by Japan's constitutional constraints, which place restrictions on its military capabilities, and, on the European side, owing to its complex security framework and its partial overlap with NATO. Until a few years ago, cooperation in this area had been limited to "softer" forms of security such as antipiracy operations off Somalia. It is worth recalling that in the case of both the EU and Japan traditional security (the military aspect) falls to the United States, since both actors are eminently economic powers but lacking in comparable military might. They are, then, relations that on security matters are triangular rather than bilateral and cannot be understood without Washington.This has been no impediment to Brussels and Tokyo strengthening ties over the last few years, primarily on political and trade matters. In 2019, the two parties adopted the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, which lifted most of the tariffs existing between the two economies, and the Strategic Partnership Agreement, based on cooperation and the defence of shared values such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights or free trade. In the latter agreement, Japan and the EU identified the common threats of cybersecurity, natural disasters, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maritime (in)security. The two agreements established a framework that would cement political, security and development cooperation cast in liberal values to jointly uphold the rules-based international order.In this new phase of cooperation, security issues have gained importance because both actors perceive a greater interdependence and interconnection in their security. According to the Joint Statement of the Japan-EU Summit of July 2023, "the security of Europe and that of the Indo-Pacific are closely interlinked". And the facts appear to bear it out. Japan was one of the countries that did not hesitate to show its support for Ukraine following the Russian invasion of 2022, taking part in the international sanctions regime, as well as dispatching arms to Kyiv. Coordination with the EU in this field has been remarkable.If we look at the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific released in 2021, Brussels also aspires to greater involvement in the security of the region in four main areas: maritime security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and crisis management. However, despite European ambitions, there are differences over the commitment (economic and/or military) that the various member states would be willing to make in the Indo-Pacific. As often happens, European policy towards the region is the sum of the convergences and divergences of the member states. According to a survey by the European Council for Foreign Relations, 23 out of the 27 member states point to security as an important element of Europe's Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet only 12 would be interested in contributing to freedom of navigation operations and just 4 would commit warships to the region (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain). It will also be important to consider NATO involvement in this area. In 2023, it submitted a proposal to open a civilian liaison office in Tokyo, an idea that was dropped largely due to French reluctance in the face of a possible response from China.Japan welcomes even limited European involvement in the region and this is in step with the growing interconnection between Europe's security and that of the Indo-Pacific. However, more coordination and communication among the various European and international actors in the region, especially in the military field, will be essential in order to avoid undesired tensions.Lastly, cooperation on economic security has acquired a more central position in recent months. In June 2023, this was a particularly important matter during the High-Level Economic Dialogue between Japan and the EU, especially with regard to cases of economic coercion, non-market access policies and control over investments and exports, as well as action aimed at making supply chains more resilient. In a subsequent joint statement, the two actors identified multiple areas of cooperation in this field, with a clear reference to de-risking, as well as cooperation on semiconductors and protecting critical infrastructure like submarine cables. This first reference reveals a complementary approach to economic security conceptions and strategies for the two actors, which makes for a more holistic approach.However, one of the future challenges in order to guarantee this cooperation is related to two fundamental contradictions of economic security. For one thing, it is an area where economic interests and national security may collide. For another, owing to the long list of issues it encompasses – security, trade, tech or industrial policies – economic security has a cooperative side, but also a competitive one. The predominance of security issues may come at the expense of economic interests for the two actors, both in their relations and in their own domestic dynamics, and vice versa. Thus, careful and respectful communication and coordination between them, as well as within them, in the EU's case, will be key in order to guarantee effective cooperation between Japan and the EU. IV. ConclusionsOver the last two decades, bilateral relations between the EU and Japan (which on security matters become triangular on account of the simultaneous presence of the United States) have been marked by stability and ongoing outreach. There are those who say that this is the main problem: the lack of problems. Three factors, however, have brought about a more recent revitalisation and strengthening of relations:(1) The situation of "permacrisis" and the speeding up of dynamics of geopolitical competition and fracture.(2) The new balances of power in the international system thanks to the consolidation of China as a global player with the capacity to influence in any part of the world, plus the rise of the Global South as a new "imagined community" on the geopolitical map. Despite their diversity, they share a growing interest in exploring alternatives to a Western-led international order.(3) The acceleration of new international dynamics such as digitalisation, the emergence of hybrid threats or reglobalisation, which, together with the COVID-19 pandemic and the outbreak of war in Ukraine, have alerted states to new dimensions of national security.As a result, in the face of future uncertainties and the prospect of greater rapport between Tokyo and Brussels, three main issues stand out. First, as democracies committed to the liberal, rules-based multilateral system, Japan and the EU are natural partners – "like- minded" allies– that share values and principles, as well as a vital interest in maintaining peace and prosperity in their regional environments.Second, although together they are the world's first and fourth biggest economies, they do not wield political and military power to match their economic might. However, after three decades of prioritising the economy and trade, they now see the need to invest in their defence, with a view to preserving their "strategic autonomy" and not being dragged into a conflict against their will or against their interests. Moreover, despite the triangular relationship in the military sphere, both actors are moving forward on cooperation in new forms of security, such as economic security. These new dynamics have enabled closer exchange and coordination between Tokyo and Brussels, though there is still room for improvement. Namely, cooperation on tech, including cybersecurity and disinformation, offers new opportunities to strengthen Japan-EU ties and common defence in the face of these challenges.Third, there is a growing sense thatEuropean and Asian security scenarios are increasingly connected,and that the security of Japan, South Korea or Taiwan also depend, more and more so, on what happens in Ukraine. In such a scenario, the United States' allies aim to be active players – not just a battleground – in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing.Despite that, there are still multiple areas for greater cooperation between Tokyo and Brussels and the 27 member states. The challenge is to ensure the agenda of the two actors keeps in step with the tempo of the systemic changes the international order is undergoing and to play a role in them that is commensurate with their economic, cultural and human power. Just months away from a possible return of Donald Trump to the White House, who could renege on his international commitments and threaten security alliances, the ties between the EU and Japan may offer a necessary foothold for facing the turbulence ahead. ReferencesBargués, Pol and Bourekba, Moussa. "War by all means: the rise of hybrid warfare", in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 11-16. Available online.Benson, Emily; Steinberg, Federico and Álvarez-Aragonés, Pau. "The European Union's Economic Security Strategy Update". CSIS Commentary, 2024. (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.Burguete, Víctor. "Contribución de la UE a la reglobalización: de la búsqueda de la autonomía a la estrategia de seguridad económica". Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 298, 2023.Colomina, Carme. "Words as weapons: from disinformation to the global battle for the narrative" in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 17-24. Available online.European Commission. EU trade Relations with Japan (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.García-Herrero, Alicia. China-EU roller-coaster relations: Where do we stand and what to do? Text of testimony to the US Congress, June 2023. Available onlineTanaka, Toshiro. "EU-Japan Relations" in Christiansen, Thomas; Kirchner, Emil and Murray, Philomena (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, pp. 509-520.Tirado, Carmen. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Una iniciativa japonesa de política exterior para la cooperación global", Global Affairs Journal 2, 2020.Kuwahara, Kyoko. "Disinformation Threats during a Taiwan Contingency and Countermeasures". Research Report, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 22, 2022. Available online.Vidal, Lluc. "Beyond the Gaiatsu Model: Japan's Asia-Pacific Policy and Neoclassical Realism", Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2022, 9 (1), pp. 26–49.

Este documento de síntesis se basa en las principales conclusiones de dos diálogos sobre política exterior celebrados en CIDOB el 21 de septiembre de 2023, en el marco del proyecto «Japan and the EU: Global Partners for a Secure and Open Indo-Pacific». El documento realiza un diagnóstico del contexto internacional cambiante y su impacto en las relaciones entre la Unión Europea y Japón; a continuación, destaca dos nuevas formas de seguridad ‒económica e informativa‒ que preocupan a ambos actores y que abren nuevas posibilidades para una acción conjunta. Finalmente, concluye señalando las nuevas dinámicas de cooperación entre Tokio y Bruselas y su futuro. I. IntroducciónEl orden internacional vigente se está viendo cuestionado por la confluencia de diversas tendencias de largo recorrido que, de manera más reciente, se han acelerado por diversos sucesos coyunturales que han subrayado las carencias y las incoherencias del sistema internacional.El primero de estos acontecimientos fue la pandemia global de la COVID-19, que dio múltiples ejemplos de la fragilidad de las cadenas de distribución globales y de la enorme dependencia de las importaciones de bienes manufacturados en China, en muchos casos, bienes esenciales. La pandemia fue un factor acelerador de, por lo menos, tres grandes tendencias de largo recorrido que estaban ya desplegándose: la primera, la confrontación entre las grandes potencias internacionales ‒Estados Unidos y China‒ que, de socios para el desarrollo, pasaron a considerarse competidores y en algunas cuestiones, rivales sistémicos. Algunos autores afirman que la tendencia de fondo era ya hacia el desacople con anterioridad a la pandemia debido a que el mercado chino aspiraba a sustituir importaciones por producción local (agrandando el déficit comercial de EEUU o de Alemania) y también, a la configuración de dos esferas digitales independientes, ligadas también a dos modelos sociopolíticos divergentes (García-Herrero, 2023). No obstante, la pandemia ha adelantado varias casillas la partida estratégica por la influencia internacional y la conformación de normas y alianzas.También a raíz de la pandemia, ha tomado velocidad la tendencia hacia la securitización de la tecnología y la innovación, algo que fue evidente durante la carrera para el diseño y la producción de las vacunas frente al coronavirus. No obstante, tanto antes ‒con las disputas por las redes 5G o el espionaje industrial‒ como después ‒en el marco de la denominada «guerra de los chips»‒ hemos visto emerger una asociación cada vez más estratégica entre las grandes corporaciones tecnológicas y la seguridad de los estados. Taiwán es uno de los casos paradigmáticos, donde una sola empresa, la Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) actúa como elemento disuasorio de cualquier potencial invasión de la isla debido a que domina en solitario el mercado global de los semiconductores más avanzados. Esta tendencia a la tecnologización de las relaciones económicas, políticas y sociales se ha visto acelerada por los recientes conflictos internacionales, primero en Ucrania y más recientemente en Gaza, donde la importancia de la ciberguerra, los drones, los satélites y la innovación autóctona (o la ausencia de estas capacidades) son elementos que dirimen la victoria, de la derrota. Estamos siendo testigos de la nueva naturaleza de las denominadas «guerras híbridas», que combinan operaciones militares cinéticas con cibernéticas y que no solo se luchan en el campo de batalla, sino que emplean masivamente elementos de desinformación o los ciberataques y que persiguen dañar los valores cohesionantes del adversario y la legitimidad de su sistema político, o en el caso de una guerra, minar su confianza y su operatividad. En este tipo de conflictos, el objetivo no es tanto la victoria como la desestabilización (Bargués y Bourekba, 2022).Además de la derivada tecnológica, ambos conflictos están reforzando la autoconsciencia de los denominados Norte y Sur global, que ha impregnado muchos debates de las últimas décadas ‒respecto al desarrollo económico, la justicia internacional o la lucha contra el cambio climático‒ pero que a través de las diversas votaciones en el seno de las Naciones Unidas y de la imposición de sanciones a Rusia, ha generado incentivos mucho más potentes para la coordinación de agendas, en aras a la narrativa del «declive de occidente» y a la constatación de que aumenta el margen de ganancia de las potencias medias y las corporaciones transnacionales.Si bien Japón y la Unión Europea (UE) son actores de naturaleza distinta ‒uno regional y el otro nacional‒, comparten atributos como la democracia, el respeto de un orden internacional basado en reglas, multipolar, próspero y pacífico y también, muchos de los retos hemos citado al principio.II. Nuevas dinámicas de seguridad: desinformación y seguridad económica En este contexto de transformación del sistema internacional y de aceleración de la competición geopolítica, nuevas formas de (in)seguridad han aparecido en las agendas políticas de Japón y la Unión Europea, pero también de otras potencias internacionales como China, Estados Unidos o la India. Hablamos de la desinformación y la seguridad económica, dos elementos cada vez más centrales en la concepción de seguridad de Japón y de la UE.DesinformaciónLos rápidos avances tecnológicos de los últimos años, con el creciente desarrollo de la inteligencia artificial (IA), la transición digital y el auge de la desinformación han evidenciado la instrumentalización de las nuevas tecnologías y los retos que suponen para la seguridad y el futuro de los estados. En momentos de crisis, hemos visto como la desinformación se convierte en un «arma de infoxicación masiva» en los márgenes del derecho internacional, con un coste relativamente bajo que impide una gobernanza efectiva. Aunque no se trata de un fenómeno nuevo ‒sin ir más lejos, la propaganda fue clave durante la Guerra Fría‒ la viralización y la porosidad actual de las redes sociales han amplificado su potencial como arma de guerra narrativa en manos de actores ajenos. Además, el surgimiento de la IA generativa no solo plantea un relato alternativo de los hechos, sino que permite recrearlos de manera creíble e incluso reemplazarlos en la percepción de realidad de los individuos (a través de las Deep Fake), poniendo con ello en peligro las nociones de verdad y de confianza, que son esenciales para la gobernanza democrática y los procesos electorales.A diferencia de la UE o de EEUU, Japón no se ha visto expuesto significativamente a interferencias externas de desinformación. No obstante, Tokio considera este fenómeno como un peligro potencial para la seguridad nacional y para la salud democrática. En concreto, el auge de la IA generativa puede erosionar rápidamente algunas de las barreras ‒como el elemento lingüístico‒, que algunos análisis habían identificado como un freno a la proliferación de este fenómeno en el archipiélago (Kuwahara, 2022). Así, en el marco de la Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional lanzada a finales de 2022 por la administración Kishida, Japón identificó el reto de la instrumentalización de la información en contextos de conflicto y anunció la adopción de contramedidas en las que el gobierno es el principal impulsor (top-down) a través de la coordinación con sus homólogos en otros países (government-to-government) y con actores no gubernamentales.Para la UE, el efecto desestabilizador de la desinformación alcanzó cotas inéditas durante la anexión rusa de Crimea en 2014. Es por ello que hace ya casi una década, su mayor exposición a este tipo de campañas provocó que Bruselas empezara a buscar estrategias para responder a esta amenaza híbrida. Desde entonces, Bruselas ha tratado de hacer frente a la desinformación a través de un enfoque basado en el consumidor ‒y no securitario‒. Inicialmente, la Comisión Europea dedicó sus esfuerzos al control de contenidos en lugar de intentar regular las compañías tecnológicas y las grandes plataformas. No obstante, dicho enfoque ha variado debido a la constatación de que el problema de la desinformación no es tanto el mensaje, como su réplica y la amplificación. Este cambio de foco solventa, además, uno de los principales riesgos de centrarse en el mensaje, como es el de comprometer el derecho a la libertad de expresión. Es con esta lógica que la Digital Service Act (DSA) entró en vigor en enero de 2024, ya que contiene disposiciones específicas para controlar los algoritmos, que son responsables de la clusterización de usuarios potencialmente afines de redes sociales y que es clave para la propagación del mensaje dentro de burbujas informativas y cámaras de resonancia.No obstante, una actuación que se ciña exclusivamente a la gobernanza algorítmica es insuficiente ante la complejidad de procesos sociopsicológicos vinculados a la desinformación (Colomina, 2022). Consciente de ello, la UE ha adoptado un enfoque que abarca a toda la sociedad (whole-of-society approach) y que comprende que es imprescindible acompañar las acciones online de intervenciones offline ‒en el mundo real‒,que palien las desigualdades, divisiones y fracturas sociales en las que medra la desinformación. Así, mientras el enfoque japonés ha priorizado los intercambios de gobierno a gobierno, en Bruselas prevalece una estrategia más descentralizada, donde otros sectores sociales –como los periodistas, los verificadores, los investigadores y la sociedad civil– comparten un papel extremadamente relevante en paralelo a los esfuerzos al más alto nivel. Esta estrategia también se adecua a la fragmentación del ecosistema mediático de los 27 países miembros y que difiere de la alta concentración en el caso de Japón, donde los grandes medios de prensa y televisión son los principales canales de información.Seguridad económica Las nuevas dinámicas de reglobalización, sumadas a un retorno de medidas proteccionistas, la instrumentalización de las interdependencias y la coerción económica, están dibujando un nuevo panorama económico global, en el que la apertura económica y la interdependencia han pasado de a ser vistas como riesgos en lugar de ser factores de seguridad mutua. Como consecuencia, la seguridad económica está ganando relevancia dentro de las estrategias nacionales de países como Japón, que ha sido uno de sus principales impulsores. Aunque no existe una definición única sobre la seguridad económica, ni de los ámbitos que esta engloba, de manera general busca proteger de injerencias externas la economía nacional, minimizando el impacto de las disrupciones en las cadenas de suministros, la dependencia en ciertos productos o la capacidad de coerción económica en manos de otros para presionar o influenciar las decisiones políticas domésticas.Japón ha sido uno de los promotores iniciales de este concepto, algo que, además de por su tendencia a sugerir términos que luego harán fortuna en el pensamiento estratégico, se explica por su carácter insular y por su profunda dependencia de las importaciones de materias primas y recursos naturales. Desde 2020, Tokio ha iniciado un proceso de institucionalización de la seguridad económica mediante la creación de posiciones gubernamentales dedicadas a esta cuestión, así como la adopción de diferentes paquetes legislativos para su defensa. Uno de los principales es la Ley de Promoción de la Seguridad Económica de 2022, que identifica cuatro pilares clave: 1) el fortalecimiento de las cadenas de suministros, especialmente de materias primas críticas, 2) la protección de infraestructuras críticas y esenciales, 3) el desarrollo de tecnología puntera y 4) un sistema de confidencialidad de las patentes. En paralelo, Japón también ha trasladado este concepto a sus relaciones bilaterales –en concreto, con Estados Unidos, Corea del Sur o Reino Unido– y los foros en los que participa, como el G7 y el Diálogo Cuadrilateral de Seguridad (QUAD por sus siglas en inglés), siendo especialmente relevante la declaración del G7 durante la cumbre de Hiroshima para la resiliencia económica y seguridad económica en mayo de 2023. Se trata de la primera referencia en el ámbito multilateral en este concepto, lo que es indicativo de su consolidación en la agenda y la cooperación internacional.En paralelo, estas iniciativas para la seguridad económica se encuentran vinculadas de forma indirecta a la propuesta de Tokio de un «Indopacífico Libre y Abierto» (FOIP por sus siglas en inglés), una estrategia presentada en 2016 que busca defender el orden internacional basado en normas, la promoción de la paz y la prosperidad conjunta, la seguridad marítima y aérea y el desarrollo de la conectividad en la región. Resulta difícil desvincular este enfoque de la creciente asertividad de Beijing en el mar de China Meridional y del imperativo de preservar la libertad de navegación por esta artería de comunicación que es vital para Japón, pero también para el resto de mundo, ya que por ella discurre aproximadamente un tercio del comercio mundial. Si bien los principios de apertura e inclusividad de la FOIP podrían ser vistos como contrapuestos a la seguridad económica ‒especialmente debido a la competición económica entre Beijing y Tokio en la región‒, la cooperación en este ámbito depende de una región abierta y libre, y viceversa. Es más, es mediante un mayor desarrollo de la conectividad y los intercambios con los países de la región (incluyendo a los miembros de ASEAN y la India) que Tokio puede diversificar su cartera comercial y potenciar su resiliencia económica.También la Unión Europea ha adoptado el principio de seguridad económica en el último año. Las disrupciones en la cadena de suministros durante la pandemia, el cierre del grifo del gas ruso tras la invasión rusa de Ucrania y la restricción de importaciones que China aplicó a Lituania tras la apertura de una oficina de representación de Taiwán en 2021, han sido poderosos incentivos para la adopción de instrumentos que garanticen la seguridad económica de la Unión. Entre las diferentes medidas adoptadas, destacan cuatro tipos de mecanismos: 1) la revitalización de la política industrial y la adopción de iniciativas políticas para mejorar la capacidad de producción y la productividad en la UE; 2) los esfuerzos de diversificación y almacenamiento para reducir las dependencias en productos y recursos naturales; 3) la adopción de medidas para contrarrestar mecanismos externos que dotan a los competidores de mayor competitividad – como los mecanismos antisubvención– y, 4) herramientas dedicadas a la competición estratégica, como el instrumento de anticoerción o el control de exportación de ciertos productos (Burguete, 2023). Más recientemente, en enero de 2024, Bruselas ha presentado nuevas iniciativas dirigidas a fortalecer su Estrategia de Seguridad Económica, propuesta por primera vez en junio de 2023. Con un enfoque más geopolítico y similar al de Washington, Bruselas busca un control más estricto de las inversiones, mayor coordinación en el control de exportaciones, inversiones para la investigación en tecnologías avanzadas y la protección de la innovación, si bien está aún por ver hasta qué punto los diferentes estados miembros aceptarán este nuevo paquete legislativo (Benson, Steinberg and Alvarez-Aragones, 2024)‒.Es posible afirmar que tanto Japón como la UE están adoptando mecanismos diferentes, aunque con perspectivas complementarias que pueden fortalecer las capacidades domesticas para enfrentar los retos que les aguardan. Sin embargo, si bien podemos registrar avances en el ámbito de la seguridad económica ‒como veremos a continuación‒, la cooperación en el ámbito de la desinformación está aún en una fase más temprana. Existe, no obstante, un gran potencial para la cooperación bilateral, al que se suman cada vez más, incentivos inexcusables.III. ¿Una nueva era de cooperación entre Japón y la Unión Europea? En las últimas dos décadas, la relación entre la Unión Europea y Japón ha estado marcada por una gran sintonía entre ambos, con una predominancia de las cuestiones económicas ‒pese a las tensiones y conflictos comerciales de finales del siglo XX‒ que, no obstante, ha tenido una materialización reducida en términos de iniciativas y planes conjuntos (Tanaka, 2013). En 2022, Japón era el segundo socio comercial asiático de la Unión Europea ‒por detrás de China‒ y el séptimo en el mundo. Ese mismo año, las importaciones japonesas por parte de la Unión alcanzaron casi 70.000 millones de euros y, a su vez, la UE exportó más de 71.600 millones de euros (Comisión Europea, 2023).En cuanto al ámbito de seguridad, los avances han sido limitados, coartados por los límites constitucionales de Japón ‒que le imponen restricciones a sus capacidades militares‒ y por la parte europea, debido al complejo entramado securitario y a su parcial superposición con el de la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte (OTAN). La cooperación en este ámbito había estado, hasta hace unos años, circunscrita a formas de seguridad más «blandas», como operaciones antipiratería en Somalia. Cabe recordar que la seguridad tradicional (en su vertiente militar) recae tanto en el caso de la UE como de Japón, en los Estados Unidos, ya que ambos actores son potencias eminentemente económicas, pero que carecen de unas fuerzas militares equiparables. Es, por tanto, una relación que, en materia de seguridad, es más triangular que bilateral, y que no se explica sin la concurrencia de Washington.Esto no ha sido impedimento para que en los últimos años, Bruselas y Tokio hayan estrechado sus lazos, principalmente en asuntos políticos y comerciales. En 2019, ambas partes adoptaron el Acuerdo de Asociación Económica Japón-UE –que ponía fin a la existencia de la mayoría de los aranceles entre ambas economías– y el Acuerdo de Asociación Estratégica –basado en la cooperación y la defensa de valores comunes como la democracia, el estado de derecho, los derechos humanos o el libre comercio–. En este último, Japón y la Unión Europea identificaron como amenazas comunes la ciberseguridad, las catástrofes naturales, el terrorismo, la proliferación de armas de destrucción marina y la (in)seguridad marítima. Ambos acuerdos establecieron un marco vinculante que cementaría una cooperación política, de seguridad y desarrollo enmarcada en valores liberales para sostener conjuntamente el orden internacional basado en reglas.En este nuevo estadio de cooperación, las cuestiones securitarias han ganado importancia debido a que ambos actores perciben una mayor interdependencia e interconexión de su seguridad. Según la Declaración Conjunta de la Cumbre Japón-Unión Europea de julio de 2023, «la seguridad de Europa y la del Indopacífico se encuentran estrechamente interrelacionadas». Y los hechos parecen reafirmarlo; Japón ha sido uno de los países que no ha dudado en mostrar su apoyo a Ucrania tras la invasión rusa de 2022, participando en el régimen internacional de sanciones, así como el envío de armamento a Kiev. La coordinación con la Unión Europea en este ámbito ha sido remarcable.Si atendemos a la Estrategia de la UE para la Cooperación en el Indopacífico publicada en 2021, también Bruselas aspira a una mayor implicación en la seguridad de la región en cuatro dominios principales: la seguridad marítima, el contraterrorismo, la ciberseguridad y la gestión de crisis. No obstante, pese a las ambiciones europeas, existen divergencias en cuanto a la implicación –económica y/o militar– que los distintos estados miembros estarían dispuestos a destinar al Indopacífico. Como sucede a menudo, la política europea hacia la región es la suma resultante de las convergencias y divergencias de los estados miembros. Según una encuesta del European Council for Foreign Relations, 23 estados miembros de los 27 identifican la seguridad como un elemento importante de la estrategia europea para el Indopacífico; no obstante, solo 12 de ellos estarían interesados en contribuir a las operaciones de libertad de navegación y tan solo 4 destinarían buques de guerra a la región (Bélgica, Alemania, Holanda y España). En este ámbito también será importante considerar el papel de la OTAN, que en 2023 elevó la propuesta de abrir una oficina civil de enlace de la Alianza en Tokio, una idea que quedó abandonada principalmente debido a la reticencia francesa ante la posible respuesta de China.Para Japón, aunque sea limitada, la implicación europea en la región es bienvenida y está en consonancia con la creciente interrelación entre la seguridad de Europa y la del Indopacífico. No obstante, más coordinación y comunicación entre los diferentes actores europeos e internacionales presentes en la región, especialmente en el ámbito militar, será esencial para evitar tensiones indeseadas.Finalmente, la cooperación en el ámbito de la seguridad económica ha ganado centralidad en los últimos meses. En junio de 2023, esta cuestión fue de especial relevancia durante el Diálogo Económico de Alto Nivel entre Japón y la Unión Europea, especialmente en lo referente a casos de coerción económica, políticas de no-acceso a mercados, el control de inversiones y de exportaciones, así como acciones destinadas a hacer las cadenas de suministros más resilientes. En la posterior declaración conjunta, ambos actores identificaron múltiples áreas de cooperación en este ámbito, con una referencia clara a minimizar riesgos (de-risking) así como en la cooperación en semiconductores y la protección de infraestructuras críticas, como los cables submarinos. Esta primera referencia hace evidente un enfoque complementario de las estrategias y concepciones de la seguridad económica para ambos actores, ofreciendo un enfoque más holístico.Sin embargo, uno de los retos futuros para garantizar esta cooperación tiene que ver con dos contradicciones fundamentales de la seguridad económica. Por una parte, se trata de un área en la que los intereses económicos y de seguridad nacional pueden entrar en contradicción. Por otra, y debido a la larga lista de cuestiones que contempla ‒desde políticas de seguridad, comerciales, tecnológicas o industriales‒, la seguridad económica tiene una vertiente cooperativa, aunque también competitiva. El predominio de cuestiones de seguridad puede ser a expensas de intereses económicos para ambos actores, tanto en su relación como en sus propias dinámicas domésticas‒ y viceversa. Por lo tanto, una comunicación y coordinación cuidadosa y respetuosa entre ambos acores, así como dentro de ellos, será clave para garantizar una cooperación efectiva entre Japón y la Unión Europea. IV. ConclusionesA lo largo de las dos últimas dos décadas, la relación bilateral UE-Japón ‒que en temas de seguridad deviene triangular por la concurrencia de EEUU‒ ha estado marcada por la estabilidad y el acercamiento. Hay incluso quién afirma que ése es su principal problema: la ausencia de problemas. No obstante, tres factores han propiciado más recientemente una revitalización y el fortalecimiento de la relación:(1) La situación de permacrisis y la aceleración de dinámicas de competición geopolítica y de fractura;(2) Los nuevos equilibrios de poder en el sistema internacional, debido a la consolidación de China como un actor global con capacidad de influencia en cualquier parte del planeta; pero también el auge del Sur Global como nueva «comunidad imaginada» geopolítica que, pese a su diversidad, comparten un creciente interés en explorar alternativas a un orden internacional liderado por Occidente.(3) La aceleración de nuevas dinámicas internacionales, como la digitalización, la emergencia de amenazas híbridas o la reglobalización, que sumadas a la pandemia de la COVID y al inicio de la guerra de Ucrania, que han subrayado nuevas dimensiones de seguridad nacional a los estados.Como resultado, frente a las incertidumbres del futuro y la mayor complicidad entre Tokio y Bruselas, cabe destacar tres cuestiones principales. Primero, en tanto que democracias comprometidas con el sistema multilateral liberal y basado en reglas, Japón y la UE son dos socios naturales‒de «mentalidad afín»‒, que comparten valores y principios, además de un interés vital por mantener la paz y la prosperidad en sus entornos regionales.Segundo, si bien en su conjunto, representan la primera y la cuarta economía del mundo, no disponen de un poder político y militar acorde a su poder económico. No obstante, tras décadas de priorizar la economía y el comercio, ven ahora la necesidad de invertir en su defensa, con vistas a preservar su «autonomía estratégica» y no verse arrastrados a un conflicto contra su voluntad o sus intereses. Además, pese a esta relación triangular en el ámbito militar, ambos actores avanzan en la cooperación de nuevas formas de seguridad, como la seguridad económica. Estas nuevas dinámicas han permitido fortalecer los intercambios y la coordinación entre Tokio y Bruselas, aunque aún existe margen de mejora. En concreto, la cooperación en el ámbito tecnológico, incluyendo la ciberseguridad y la desinformación, ofrece nuevas oportunidades para fortalecer los vínculos y las defensas comunes frente a estos retos.Tercero, aumenta la sensación de que los escenarios de seguridad europeo y asiático están cada vez más conectados, y que la seguridad de Japón, de Corea del Sur o de Taiwán, dependen también y de manera creciente, de lo que suceda en Ucrania. En este escenario, los aliados de EEUU aspiran a ser un jugador activo ‒y no un mero campo de juego‒ de la rivalidad entre Washington y Beijing.Pese a ello, aún existen múltiples áreas para una mayor cooperación entre Tokio y Bruselas y los 27 estados miembros. El reto es acompasar la agenda de los dos actores al tempo de los cambios sistémicos que experimenta el orden internacional, y lograr tener un papel protagonista en ellos, que sea acorde al enorme poder económico, cultural y humano. A meses vista de un posible retorno a la Casa Blanca de Donald Trump, que podría renegar de sus compromisos internacionales y amenazar las alianzas de seguridad, el vínculo entre la UE y Japón puede ser un asidero necesario para enfrentar las turbulencias que nos aguardan. ReferenciasBargués, Pol y Bourekba, Moussa. «La guerra por todos los medios: la intensificación de los conflictos híbridos», en Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, y Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Amenazas Híbridas, Orden Vulnerable. Barcelona: CIDOB Report nº 8, 2022, pp. 11-16. Accesible en línea.Benson, Emily; Steinberg, Federico y Álvarez-Aragonés, Pau. «The European Union's Economic Security Strategy Update». CSIS Commentary, 2024. (en línea) [Fecha de consulta: 23.02.2024]. Accesible en línea.Burguete, Víctor. «Contribución de la UE a la reglobalización: de la búsqueda de la autonomía a la estrategia de seguridad económica». Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 298, 2023.Colomina, Carme. «La palabra como arma: de la desinformación a la batalla global por la narrativa» en Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, y Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Amenazas Híbridas, Orden Vulnerable. Barcelona: CIDOB Report nº8, 2022, pp. 17-24.Comisión Europea. EU trade Relations with Japan (en línea). [Fecha de consulta: 23.02.2024]. Accesible en línea. García-Herrero, Alicia. China-EU roller-coaster relations: Where do we stand and what to do?. Texto de la comparecencia ante el Congreso de los EEUU, junio de 2023. Accesible en línea.Tanaka, Toshiro. «EU-Japan Relations» en Christiansen, Thomas; Kirchner, Emil y Murray, Philomena (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, pp. 509-520.Tirado, Carmen. «Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Una iniciativa japonesa de política exterior para la cooperación global», Global Affairs Journal 2, 2020.Kuwahara, Kyoko. «Disinformation Threats during a Taiwan Contingency and Countermeasures». Research Report, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 22, 2022Vidal, Lluc. «Beyond the Gaiatsu Model: Japan's Asia-Pacific Policy and Neoclassical Realism», Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2022, 9(1), pp. 26–49.