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A raíz del cambio climático, aumenta la frecuencia de las sequías y las inundaciones. Actualmente, el riesgo de inundación afecta ya a 3.000 millones de personas –4 de cada 10 habitantes del planeta– repartidos en 110 países. Las inundaciones responden a factores naturales, como las lluvias torrenciales, los monzones o los ciclones, a los que más recientemente se suman las inundaciones costeras debido al aumento del nivel del mar, con especial incidencia en los estados insulares del Pacífico. Su impacto destructivo se multiplica en las cuencas de los grandes ríos (como el Nilo, el Yangtsé, el Mekong, el Indus o el Ganges) a orillas de los cuales se han formado históricamente grandes núcleos de población.En regiones como Asia Meridional o África, la devastación causada por las catástrofes naturales se suma a otras crisis, no solo ambientales, sino también sociales y políticas, lo que agrava las tasas de pobreza, riesgos para la salud, dificultando el acceso a la educación y la seguridad humana básica. La incapacidad del Estado de responder a estas crisis abre la puerta a grupos insurgentes o violentos para proliferar y planta la semilla de futuros conflictos.
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La desinformación, independientemente de su origen, ha sido considerada por las fuerzas políticas tradicionales de la Unión Europea como un problema para la democracia. Sin embargo, el auge de la extrema derecha puede influir en cómo se enmarca el debate de las noticias falsas a nivel europeo. Podemos pasar a un modelo dicotómico más cercano al estadounidense, donde se continuaría luchando contra las noticias falsas que tienen su origen fuera de la UE, pero habría una tendencia a normalizar la desinformación política interna. El auge de los partidos de extrema derecha en Europa ha tenido un fuerte impacto en las políticas y en el discurso público en áreas como la migración o la lucha contra el cambio climático. La estrategia de estos partidos radicales ha sido politizar fuertemente debates públicos donde antes existía un consenso entre las grandes familias de centroizquierda y centroderecha. Otro campo en el que esta politización también podría aumentar es en el de la lucha contra la desinformación. El discurso de las fuerzas políticas tradicionales considera que la proliferación de noticias falsas es, en sí mismo, un peligro para la democracia, independientemente de su origen y motivación. En cambio, las fuerzas de extrema derecha -que en múltiples casos han hecho de las noticias falsas una de sus estrategias comunicativas centrales- se han mostrado críticas con el hecho de que se señale o limite la desinformación generada por actores locales con los que comparten posiciones políticas. A su vez, el segmento más proatlantista de la extrema derecha ha apoyado la lucha contra la desinformación en caso de que esta venga de actores externos como Rusia o China. Esta dicotomía entre ser permisivo con parte de la desinformación interna y poner el foco mayoritariamente en la externa encaja con una tendencia en auge en la Unión Europea, donde el discurso oficial incide mayoritariamente en las noticias falsas generadas por actores extranjeros -y en el que institucionalmente es más fácil luchar contra la desinformación «externa» que admitir vulnerabilidades democráticas internas-. El auge de la extrema derecha y su politización del debate podría reforzar esta política dicotómica que identifica la desinformación como un peligro fundamentalmente externo, a pesar de que la mayoría de noticias falsas se generan a nivel local, como por ejemplo las campañas de desinformación de Viktor Orbán contra la UE, la difusión de audios falsos en las últimas elecciones en Eslovaquia, o la coordinación de mensajes de grupos de extrema derecha contra refugiados y minorías en Europa.Las diferentes familias de la extrema derecha han mostrado en varias ocasiones su escepticismo con la lucha contra la desinformación. Identidad y Democracia (ID), el grupo que en la anterior legislatura del Parlamento Europeo acogía tanto a Alternativa por Alemania como a Reagrupamiento Nacional de Marine Le Pen, criticó la idea misma de la batalla contra las noticias falsas. ID tildó la Ley de Servicios Digitales (DSA, en inglés) -la principal legislación comunitaria en materia de desinformación- como un mecanismo para imponer la «censura online» y votó en contra de resoluciones contra la injerencia extranjera y la desinformación.En cambio, el grupo de los Conservadores y Reformistas Europeos (CRE) ha adoptado la postura dicotómica entre desinformación interna y externa mencionada anteriormente. A pesar de dar apoyo a la lucha contra la desinformación de actores externos y haber votado a favor de la DSA, al inicio de la pandemia, el grupo alertó de la posibilidad de «censura» y criticó dar dinero público a organizaciones de fact-checking. Europarlamentarios del grupo han señalado no sólo a actores externos, sino también a «organizaciones no gubernamentales» de fuerzas izquierdistas o verdes -es decir, las opuestas a la extrema derecha- como origen de la desinformación. La principal fuerza del CRE, los Hermanos de Italia de Giorgia Meloni, han catalogado la lucha contra la desinformación como parte de una «nueva Guerra Fría» y se han posicionado en contra de la «censura arbitraria» en redes sociales. La segunda fuerza en número de escaños de este grupo, el partido polaco Ley y Justicia, ha sido acusado de promover desinformación y, durante su gobierno, Polonia cayó del puesto 18 al 57 en libertad de expresión, según Reporteros Sin Fronteras.Una «americanización» del debatePara entender hacia qué dirección podría virar la Unión Europea, es ilustrativo analizar el caso de Estados Unidos, donde -al contrario que en la UE- el debate sobre la desinformación ya está absolutamente polarizado y se ha convertido en un arma de batalla partidista. A grandes rasgos, para el Partido Demócrata, la lucha contra la desinformación es una manera de defender la buena salud de la democracia. El Partido Republicano, en cambio, la considera una excusa para la censura y la supresión de la libertad de expresión. La mayoría del electorado republicano cree que retirar una noticia, aunque sea falsa, constituye censura. Como ha explicado el periodista Mark Scott, entre las élites republicanas se ha extendido la teoría de que existe una alianza entre los demócratas, Silicon Valley, el llamado movimiento woke, y los académicos expertos en desinformación, que tiene como objetivo censurar los mensajes de derechas e imponer un pensamiento único liberal. Esta visión ha tenido eco en distintos grupos políticos europeos de extrema derecha.La politización extrema de este debate en Estados Unidos ha hecho que las plataformas digitales, ante la proliferación de la desinformación, miren hacia otro lado, para evitar ser acusadas de partidistas y pro-Partido Demócrata. La «neutralidad», en el caso estadounidense, se equipara con permitir la desinformación. En el contexto legal de Estados Unidos, además, son las plataformas las que deciden qué contenido se queda o se elimina de la red social, dándoles una autonomía total en la moderación de contenidos -al contrario que en el caso europeo, donde la DSA obliga a estas empresas a combatir activamente la desinformación-. Aunque diversas plataformas han decidido simplemente retirarse de la batalla contra la desinformación, otras como X (antiguo Twitter) de Elon Musk han integrado esta proliferación de contenidos falsos en su modelo de negocio. El resultado es la generación a gran escala de desinformación local que no está regulada ni por la administración ni por las propias redes sociales.Una securitización de la lucha contra las noticias falsas¿Podría, entonces, el auge de la extrema derecha europea provocar un viraje hacia la politizada -y a la vez permisiva- dirección estadounidense? En el campo regulatorio, eso parece poco probable. La extrema derecha no tiene mayoría en el Parlamento Europeo y parte de ella -el grupo CRE- ha votado a favor de la DSA. Sin embargo, lo que sí puede cambiar es el discurso hegemónico sobre la desinformación en Europa.De una visión negativa en su totalidad de la desinformación y las noticias falsas, se puede pasar a una dicotómica que considera la interna como discurso amparado en la libertad de expresión y la externa como una amenaza contra la que se debe luchar -a pesar de que la frontera entre actores internos y externos es difusa, y la línea divisoria entre temas locales e internacionales no está clara-. Una deriva en este sentido replicaría la permisividad -especialmente de la derecha tradicional europea- ante ciertas prácticas autoritarias internas de la nueva derecha radical, siempre y cuando mantengan una postura geopolítica proatlantista y antirrusa. Más que generar un sano debate sobre la necesidad y el grado de poder regulador de las autoridades públicas -en un ámbito donde existen preocupaciones legítimas y visiones distintas sobre cómo proteger la libertad de expresión-, la tolerancia hacia cierta desinformación local abriría la puerta a una aplicación partidista sin apenas atisbos de neutralidad. La lucha contra la desinformación ya no sería un mecanismo de protección del derecho de los ciudadanos a una información veraz, sino un arma de defensa selectiva frente a ciertos actores externos. Un viraje así no sería impensable en una Europa con un discurso cada vez más securitizado.Palabras clave: desinformación, extrema derecha, democracia, noticias falsas, UE, Estados Unidos, DSA, regulación, censura, politización, polarizaciónTodas las publicaciones expresan las opiniones de sus autores/as y no reflejan necesariamente los puntos de vista de CIDOB o sus financiadores.
Como introducción al número conmemorativo del 40 aniversario de Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals, este artículo examina la evolución de las relaciones internacionales durante las últimas cuatro décadas, en paralelo a los contenidos de la publicación y en el contexto de la actual crisis del orden (o desorden) internacional: desde el fin de la Guerra Fría y la confianza en la globalización y la democracia liberal en el mundo unipolar de mediados de la década de 1990, pasando por la expansión de los valores e ideas de gobernanza global de finales del siglo pasado, hasta llegar a la creciente multipolaridad, a la rivalidad entre China y Estados Unidos y a la contestación del orden liberal y permacrisis de los últimos años. Se mencionan especialmente las consecuencias de la pandemia de la COVID-19 y de la guerra de Rusia en Ucrania.
En un context de crisis successives, l'última de les quals la sanitària i econòmica de la COVID-19, aquest article analitza les quatre fractures principals a les que s'enfronta la UE (de valors, de solidaritat, institucional i de transformació internacional) per a les quals s'imposen tres mesures si es vol assolir un nou ordre europeu: més democràcia, més flexibilitat i millor acció exterior. La geopolítica actual demana més que mai que la UE defensi els seus valors fonamentals, agilitzi la presa de decisions i augmenti i faciliti la cooperació en les relacions internacionals.
This article analyses strategies for preventing and combatting violent extremism in Spain since the Madrid attacks in 2004. Initially concerned with anticipating the terrorist threat by means of police, military, and legal measures, these strategies have gradually incorporated approaches and measures that address the phenomenon of radicalisation. It is argued that the advent of the battle to "counter violent extremism" (CVE) and for the "prevention of violent extremism" (PVE) represents a step forward in the approach to terrorism since its target is not terrorism as such but the factors and conditions that can lead to it. In the case of Spain, CVE and PVE policies come together in the present strategy against violent radicalisation.
Los temporeros agrícolas en España son noticia año tras año. En 2020, los mismos problemas se repitieron una y otra vez, agravados por el contexto de la pandemia del COVID-19. Este artículo analiza cuatro casos que fueron noticia: las condiciones de los asentamientos irregulares en Andalucía; la situación de las temporeras marroquíes contratadas en origen que quedaron atrapadas en Huelva; las duras condiciones laborales del campo a la luz de la muerte de un solicitante de asilo en Lorca; y la presencia de temporeros en las calles de Lleida, que generó nuevamente un debate sobre sus condiciones de alojamiento en medio de los primeros brotes de COVID-19 del verano. El objetivo final del artículo es ilustrar con casos concretos problemas estructurales que vienen de lejos y, con ello, apuntar posibles soluciones a corto, medio y largo plazo.
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Las elecciones presidenciales del 28 de julio de 2024 pretendían ser el inicio de un cambio político hacia la resolución de un conflicto social que ha expulsado a millones de venezolanos del país. Las fundamentadas sospechas de graves irregularidades afectan la credibilidad de los resultados oficiales que dan por vencedor a Nicolás Maduro y cierran la puerta a una pronta reconciliación.En contra de los sondeos previos, el Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) declaró la victoria de Nicolás Maduro con un 51,2% de los votos frente al opositor Edmundo González Urrutia al que se le atribuyó un 44,2% de apoyos con el 80% de votos escrutados. Mientras Maduro y sus seguidores celebraban el resultado en las inmediaciones de Miraflores, la oposición recomendó calma y tiempo para verificar el recuento, reclamando las actas que no han sido entregadas. La supuesta victoria de Nicolás Maduro, además de contradecir todas las encuestas pre-electorales publicadas que daban un margen de entre el 15 y el 20% a la oposición, ha ido acompañada de retrasos inexplicables en la transmisión de los datos que el gobierno achacó a un hackeo exterior del que no dio pruebas y, 24 horas después de anunciar la controvertida victoria, el Consejo Nacional electoral todavía no había presentado datos detallados de las elecciones.Salvo amigos incondicionales como los líderes de Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua y Honduras, y aliados estratégicos como Irán, Rusia o China, estos últimos con pocas credenciales democráticas, una buena parte de los países de la región han expresado dudas sobre los resultados. Desde acusaciones directas como las de Argentina, Ecuador o Panamá, o la incredulidad de Chile expresada por su presidente y su canciller, a la exigencia de mayor transparencia de muchos otros países incluyendo Brasil y Colombia, que fueron los principales valedores de estas elecciones y reclaman ver los datos detallados. Estados Unidos, el Alto representante de la política exterior de la Unión Europea, y países como España, Portugal o Alemania, entre otros, reclaman los datos que no acaban de llegar. En comparecencia ante la prensa, el candidato González Urrutia y la líder María Corina Machado llamaron a la calma y afirmaron que han conseguido el 73% de las actas electorales y la victoria de la oposición es irrefutable A la espera de los informes de los pocos observadores que fueron autorizados a hacer el seguimiento electoral, se mantiene un tenso impasse en el interior y entre buena parte de la Comunidad Internacional. Una contienda desigualEstas elecciones fueron fruto de un conjunto de factores que propiciaron que gobierno y oposición firmaran el Acuerdo de Barbados en octubre de 2023 al que se llegó con la mediación de Noruega y el apoyo de países como México, Brasil y Colombia. El fracaso de la estrategia de confrontación de la parte más radical de la oposición, incluyendo la proclamación de un presidente encargado, Juan Guaidó, que llegó a contar con el reconocimiento de más de 60 países, consiguió convencer al grueso de la oposición de retomar la estrategia electoral. Por su parte, el gobierno de Maduro vio en el acuerdo la posibilidad de liberarse de las sanciones internacionales tras un acercamiento de Estados Unidos y la UE, interesados en asegurarse recursos petroleros tras la invasión rusa de Ucrania. Las expectativas de la oposición eran optimistas, pese a su clara desventaja ante la intimidación, los trucos legales y la manipulación por parte del gobierno. Además de estar en condiciones financieras y de poder muy desfavorables, durante la campaña se sucedieron encarcelamientos, inhabilitaciones e intimidación a opositores. Pero persistieron en participar pese a la inhabilitación de su candidata más popular y ganadora de las primarias de 2023, María Corina Machado, y acordaron unidos respaldar al veterano diplomático Edmundo González Urrutia. Se mantuvieron en la contienda, a pesar de la manipulación de los registros electorales y de los centros de votación, y del hecho de que el 90% de los más de siete millones de venezolanos en el exterior no podían participar. El gobierno denegó la entrada a varias delegaciones de partidos políticos y organismos independientes. Los escasos 635 observadores electorales procedieron de la Unión Africana, la red de Observación Electoral de Educación (una pequeña ONG), un pequeño panel de Expertos de Naciones Unidas (que no hace informe público) y observadores del Carter Center (del cual aún se esperan los informes). La Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA) no pudo enviar ninguna misión porque Venezuela abandonó la organización, y la UE fue desautorizada en mayo por el gobierno de Maduro debido a la continuidad de las sanciones selectivas. Brasil también retiró sus observadores debido a los ataques de Maduro contra su sistema electoral, aunque mantuvo como enviado al hoy asesor y exministro de Exteriores Celso Amorín.Todas estas maniobras del gobierno sirvieron para atribuirse una victoria que es poco creíble, teniendo en cuenta el deseo de cambio que se percibe en el país, el desgaste de 25 años en el poder, la corrupción galopante, la desinstitucionalización y la debacle económica y social que sumerge a más de un 50% de los venezolanos en la pobreza (según estudios independientes ya que no existen estadísticas oficiales). El oficialismo no está dispuesto a dejar el poder y asumir los costes legales y políticos de esta realidad. Antes del primer boletín electoral del CNE que anunció la victoria de Maduro, hubo declaraciones del ministro de Defensa, Vladimir Padrino, y del ministro de Interior advirtiendo que la respuesta ante posibles altercados sería contundente. En esta situación, la llamada de María Corina Machado a las Fuerzas Armadas a «contar la verdad» y a distanciarse del régimen de Maduro es ilusoria teniendo en cuentan que cogobiernan el país desde 1999 y la supervivencia del régimen es la suya propia.Un escenario postelectoral sombrío¿Qué pasará en los próximos meses? En primer lugar, continuará la movilización de la oposición contra el fraude electoral presentando sus pruebas. En segundo lugar, aunque se llamó a la calma, ha sido inevitable que las protestas tomaran la calle, provocando las primeras víctimas y detenciones. Pero, sobre todo, se apela al apoyo internacional en la región, a la UE y a EE.UU. exigiendo transparencia y reconocimiento de los resultados reales. Como el propio Maduro admitió en su discurso de victoria, la historia se repite. Nuevamente, la disputa política postelectoral girará en torno al reconocimiento del régimen o de la oposición en un enfrentamiento que ya dura un cuarto de siglo. Aunque la oposición fue unida y aceptando las desfavorables condiciones acordadas, una vez más se le ha impedido acceder al poder por las urnas. Las opciones para poner fin a 25 años de Chavismo son limitadas: las instituciones nacionales son cautivas del gobierno; la solidaridad de la comunidad internacional no ha tenido mucho efecto en el pasado porque Venezuela cuenta con el apoyo de actores como China y Rusia, aunque si se confirma el fraude aumentará el ostracismo internacional; finalmente, la opción de volver a las calles está reeditando nuevos episodios de violencia y represión. Las elecciones presidenciales del 28 de julio de 2024 confirmaron el enquistamiento de un autoritarismo competitivo donde no se da opción a la alternancia y el régimen se perpetua por las buenas o por las malas. Sin juego limpio, las elecciones solo sirven para tratar de legitimar la continuidad de Nicolás Maduro otros seis años, un largo mandato presidencial que en América Latina tiene únicamente México, con la gran diferencia que allí no hay reelección posible. Otros seis años del ineficiente y autoritario gobierno de Nicolás Maduro son una mala noticia para una reconciliación nacional y para el futuro económico, social y político del país. En el mejor de los casos, los próximos meses revelarán la verdad, pero nada asegura que prevalezca. Eso incrementará la inestabilidad y el enfrentamiento entre venezolanos, con consecuencias regionales negativas. Palabras clave: Venezuela, elecciones, Maduro, fraude, chavismo, oposición, América LatinaTodas las publicaciones expresan las opiniones de sus autores/as y no reflejan necesariamente los puntos de vista de CIDOB o sus financiadores.
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This summary report is based on the main conclusions of two panel discussions on foreign policy held at CIDOB on September 21st, 2023, as part of the project "Japan and the EU: Global partners for a secure and open Indo-Pacific". The document assesses the changing international environment and its impact on relations between the European Union (EU) and Japan. It goes on to highlight two new forms of security – economic and information security – that are a cause of concern for both partners and which open up new possibilities for joint action. It concludes by noting the new cooperation dynamics between Tokyo and Brussels and what the future holds for them.I. IntroductionThe current international order is under challenge from a confluence of enduring trends the pace of which has been quickened more recently by a series of critical events that only underline the international system's shortcomings and contradictions.The first of these events was the COVID-19 pandemic, which provided multiple examples of the fragility of global supply chains and the dependence on manufactured goods imported from China, often essential goods. The pandemic acted as an accelerator for at least three major long-term trends that were already underway. The first of these was the confrontation between the major international powers, the United States and China. They went from being partners for development to considering themselves competitors and, on certain matters, systemic rivals. Some commentators say there was already an underlying trend towards decoupling prior to the pandemic, acknowledging that the Chinese market was looking to replace imports with local products (increasing the US or German trade deficit) and two independent digital spheres were forming, tethered to two diverging socio-political models (García-Herrero, 2023). The pandemic, however, saw the strategic contest over international ascendancy and shaping norms and alliances step up a notch.The trend towards the securitisation of technology and innovation has also gained momentum in the wake of the pandemic. This was clear during the race to create and produce a vaccine against the coronavirus. Nonetheless, both before – with the disputes over 5G networks or industrial espionage – and after – in the framework of what has been called the "chip war" – we witnessed the rise of an increasingly strategic association between big tech corporations and the security of states. Taiwan is a prime example. One single firm, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), acts as a deterrent to any potential invasion of the island because it alone dominates the global market for the most advanced chips. Recent international conflicts, first in Ukraine and more lately in Gaza, have hastened this trend towards the technologisation of economic, political and social relations. Cyberwarfare, drones, satellites and grassroots innovation (or lack thereof) are elements that can make the difference between victory and defeat. We are witnessing the new nature of "hybrid wars", those that combine physical military operations with cybernetic action. They are not only fought on the battlefield, rather they involve the mass use of disinformation or cyberattacks that seek to undermine the values of the adversary and the legitimacy of their political systems; or in the case of a war, undermine their confidence and operability. In this type of conflict, the aim is not so much victory but destabilisation (Bargués and Bourekba, 2022).As well as this technological offshoot, the two conflicts are reinforcing the self-image of what are termed the Global North and South, which resonates through the main debates on economic development, international justice or the fight against climate change. Several votes at the United Nations and the imposition of sanctions on Russia have revealed greater coordination of agendas around the narrative of the "decline of the West" and the realisation that there is scope to increase the gains of middle powers and transnational corporations.While Japan and the EU are different in nature (one is a regional actor, the other a state) they share common ground: democracy, respect for a multipolar, rules-based international order that is peaceful and prosperous, plus many of the challenges mentioned at the start of this paper.II. New security dynamics: disinformation and economic security Against this backdrop of transformation of the international system and acceleration of the geopolitical competition, new forms of (in)security have appeared on the agendas of Japan and the EU, but also of other international powers like China, the United States or India. We are talking about disinformation and economic security, two increasingly central elements of Japan and the EU's conception of security.DisinformationThe rapid succession of technological breakthroughs of recent years, along with the growing development of artificial intelligence (AI), the digital transition and the rise of disinformation have laid bare the exploitation of new technology and the challenges it poses to the security and the future of states. In times of crisis, we have seen how disinformation becomes a "weapon of mass infoxication" on the margins of international law, which comes at a relatively low cost and prevents effective governance. Though not a new phenomenon – propaganda was crucial during the Cold War, for instance – viral media and the current porousness of social networks have amplified their potential as a weapon in the narrative war in the hands of external actors. The emergence of generative AI, moreover, not only raises the possibility of an "alternative account" of the facts, but rather enables credibly recreating the facts and even replacing them in people's perception of reality (through deep fakes). This threatens notions of truth and trust, which are essential to democratic governance and election processes.Unlike the EU and the United States, Japan has not been significantly exposed to outside interference in the shape of disinformation. But Tokyo considers this phenomenon a potential threat to national security and democratic health. Namely, the rise of generative AI could quickly break down some of the barriers, such as the language factor, which certain analysts had identified as having put a brake on the proliferation of this phenomenon on the archipelago (Kuwahara, 2022). Thus, in the framework of the National Security Strategy launched in late 2022 by the Kishida administration, Japan identified the challenge of the manipulation of information in situations of conflict and announced the adoption of countermeasures. The government is the chief instigator (top-down action) through coordination with its counterparts in other countries (government-to-government) and non-governmental actors.In the case of the EU, the destabilising effect of disinformation reached new heights during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It is the reason why, nearly a decade ago now, its greater exposure to this type of campaign prompted Brussels to begin to pursue strategies to respond to this hybrid threat. Since then, Brussels has tried to tackle disinformation via a consumer-based rather than security-centred approach. Initially, the European Commission focused its efforts on controlling content rather than trying to regulate tech companies and the major platforms. That approach has shifted, however, with the realisation that the problem of disinformation is not so much the message as its replication and amplification. This shift in focus also counters one of the main risks of focusing on the message, which is that it jeopardises the right to freedom of expression. It is with this rationale that the Digital Services Act (DSA) entered into force in January 2024. It contains specific provisions to control algorithms, which are responsible for "clustering" potentially like-minded social media users, which in turn is key for the propagation of the message through information bubbles and echo chambers.Action that is limited exclusively to algorithmic governance, however, falls short in the face of the complexity of the sociopsychological processes involved in disinformation (Colomina, 2022). With that in mind, the EU has adopted a whole-of-society approach that recognises that it is essential to combine online action with offline measures – in the real world – that mitigate the inequalities, divisions and social fractures that disinformation thrives on. Thus, while the Japanese approach has prioritised government-to-government exchange, a more decentralised strategy prevails in Brussels, where other social sectors, such as journalists, fact checkers, researchers and civil society, play an extremely important role in lockstep with the efforts at the highest level. The EU's decentralised approach to confronting disinformation suits the fragmented media landscape of the 27 member states, which differs from the high degree of concentration in the case of Japan, where large print and television media are the main channels of information. Economic security The new dynamics of reglobalisation, coupled with a return to protectionist measures, the exploitation of interdependencies and economic coercion, are shaping a new global economic landscape in which open economies and interdependence have come to be seen as risks rather than factors of mutual security. Consequently, "economic security" is gaining ground in the national strategies of countries like Japan, one of its chief proponents. While there is no one single definition of economic security, nor of the areas it encompasses, in general terms it seeks to protect a national economy from external interference, minimising the impact of supply chain disruptions, dependence on certain products or the capacity for economic coercion in the hands of others to bring pressure to bear or influence domestic political decisions.Japan has been an early advocate of this concept, which, aside from its habit of putting forward terms that then become all the rage in strategic thinking, can be put down to its insular nature and its heavy dependence on imported commodities and natural resources. Starting in 2020, Tokyo has begun a process of institutionalising economic security through the creation of government positions assigned to this task, as well as the adoption of various legislative packages to ensure its defence. One of the main ones is the Economic Security Promotion Act of 2022, which rests on four key pillars: 1) strengthening supply chains, especially of critical raw materials, 2) security of critical and core infrastructure, 3) developing advanced technology and 4) a patent non-disclosure system. At the same time, Japan has transferred the concept to its bilateral relations – with the United States, South Korea or the United Kingdom – and the fora in which it participates, like the G7 or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The G7 statement on economic resilience and economic security during the Hiroshima summit in May 2023 was particularly important. It was the first ever reference to the concept in the multilateral sphere, which is a measure of its consolidation on the agenda and in international cooperation.At the same time, these economic security initiatives are indirectly linked to Tokyo's proposal for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP), a strategy unveiled in 2016 that aims to safeguard the rules-based international order, promote peace and shared prosperity, maritime and air security, and develop connectivity in the region. It is hard to disassociate this approach from Beijing's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and the need to preserve freedom of navigation through this vital artery for Japan and the rest of the world, as approximately a third of global trade flows through it. Although the FOIP's principles of openness and inclusivity could be seen to be at odds with economic security – particularly given the economic rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo in the region – cooperation in this field depends on a free and open region, and vice versa. What is more, it is through greater development of connectivity and exchange with the countries of the region (including the ASEAN members and India) that Tokyo can diversify its trade portfolio and boost its economic resilience.The EU too has adopted the principle of economic security in the last year. Supply chain disruptions during the pandemic, the closure of the Russian gas tap after the invasion of Ukraine and the restriction on imports that China imposed on Lithuania following the opening of a representative office in Taiwan in 2021 are powerful incentives for the adoption of instruments to safeguard the EU's economic security. Among the various measures adopted, four types of mechanism stand out: 1) the revitalisation of industrial policy and the adoption of political initiatives to improve EU production capacity and productivity; 2) diversification and stockpiling efforts to reduce dependence on products and natural resources; 3) the adoption of measures to counter external mechanisms that give competitors the edge, such as anti-subsidy measures; and 4) tools devoted to strategic competition, like the anti-coercion instrument or controls on exports of certain products (Burguete, 2023). More recently, in January 2024, Brussels launched new initiatives aimed at reinforcing its Economic Security Strategy, put forward for the first time in June 2023. With a more geopolitical approach akin to that of Washington, Brussels is seeking tighter control over investments, greater coordination in the control of exports, investment for research into advanced technologies and the protection of innovation. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the different member states will accept this new legislative package.We can say that Japan and the EU are adopting different, though complementary, mechanisms that can boost domestic capacities to address the challenges ahead of them. Yet, while we can note progress in the field of economic security – as we shall see below – cooperation in the field of disinformation remains at an earlier stage. There is, however, huge potential for bilateral cooperation, and there are powerful incentives for it.III. A new era of cooperation between Japan and the European Union? In the last two decades relations between the EU and Japan have been marked by a considerable degree of mutual understanding, with a predominance of economic matters, despite the trade tensions and conflicts towards the end of the 20th century. Yet this has yielded limited results in terms of joint initiatives and plans (Tanaka, 2013). In 2022, Japan was the EU's second biggest trading partner in Asia, behind China, and the seventh globally. That same year Japanese imports into the EU came to nearly €70bn, while EU exports the other way amounted to over €71.6bn (European Commission, 2023).As far as security is concerned, progress has been slow, fettered by Japan's constitutional constraints, which place restrictions on its military capabilities, and, on the European side, owing to its complex security framework and its partial overlap with NATO. Until a few years ago, cooperation in this area had been limited to "softer" forms of security such as antipiracy operations off Somalia. It is worth recalling that in the case of both the EU and Japan traditional security (the military aspect) falls to the United States, since both actors are eminently economic powers but lacking in comparable military might. They are, then, relations that on security matters are triangular rather than bilateral and cannot be understood without Washington.This has been no impediment to Brussels and Tokyo strengthening ties over the last few years, primarily on political and trade matters. In 2019, the two parties adopted the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, which lifted most of the tariffs existing between the two economies, and the Strategic Partnership Agreement, based on cooperation and the defence of shared values such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights or free trade. In the latter agreement, Japan and the EU identified the common threats of cybersecurity, natural disasters, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maritime (in)security. The two agreements established a framework that would cement political, security and development cooperation cast in liberal values to jointly uphold the rules-based international order.In this new phase of cooperation, security issues have gained importance because both actors perceive a greater interdependence and interconnection in their security. According to the Joint Statement of the Japan-EU Summit of July 2023, "the security of Europe and that of the Indo-Pacific are closely interlinked". And the facts appear to bear it out. Japan was one of the countries that did not hesitate to show its support for Ukraine following the Russian invasion of 2022, taking part in the international sanctions regime, as well as dispatching arms to Kyiv. Coordination with the EU in this field has been remarkable.If we look at the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific released in 2021, Brussels also aspires to greater involvement in the security of the region in four main areas: maritime security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and crisis management. However, despite European ambitions, there are differences over the commitment (economic and/or military) that the various member states would be willing to make in the Indo-Pacific. As often happens, European policy towards the region is the sum of the convergences and divergences of the member states. According to a survey by the European Council for Foreign Relations, 23 out of the 27 member states point to security as an important element of Europe's Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet only 12 would be interested in contributing to freedom of navigation operations and just 4 would commit warships to the region (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain). It will also be important to consider NATO involvement in this area. In 2023, it submitted a proposal to open a civilian liaison office in Tokyo, an idea that was dropped largely due to French reluctance in the face of a possible response from China.Japan welcomes even limited European involvement in the region and this is in step with the growing interconnection between Europe's security and that of the Indo-Pacific. However, more coordination and communication among the various European and international actors in the region, especially in the military field, will be essential in order to avoid undesired tensions.Lastly, cooperation on economic security has acquired a more central position in recent months. In June 2023, this was a particularly important matter during the High-Level Economic Dialogue between Japan and the EU, especially with regard to cases of economic coercion, non-market access policies and control over investments and exports, as well as action aimed at making supply chains more resilient. In a subsequent joint statement, the two actors identified multiple areas of cooperation in this field, with a clear reference to de-risking, as well as cooperation on semiconductors and protecting critical infrastructure like submarine cables. This first reference reveals a complementary approach to economic security conceptions and strategies for the two actors, which makes for a more holistic approach.However, one of the future challenges in order to guarantee this cooperation is related to two fundamental contradictions of economic security. For one thing, it is an area where economic interests and national security may collide. For another, owing to the long list of issues it encompasses – security, trade, tech or industrial policies – economic security has a cooperative side, but also a competitive one. The predominance of security issues may come at the expense of economic interests for the two actors, both in their relations and in their own domestic dynamics, and vice versa. Thus, careful and respectful communication and coordination between them, as well as within them, in the EU's case, will be key in order to guarantee effective cooperation between Japan and the EU. IV. ConclusionsOver the last two decades, bilateral relations between the EU and Japan (which on security matters become triangular on account of the simultaneous presence of the United States) have been marked by stability and ongoing outreach. There are those who say that this is the main problem: the lack of problems. Three factors, however, have brought about a more recent revitalisation and strengthening of relations:(1) The situation of "permacrisis" and the speeding up of dynamics of geopolitical competition and fracture.(2) The new balances of power in the international system thanks to the consolidation of China as a global player with the capacity to influence in any part of the world, plus the rise of the Global South as a new "imagined community" on the geopolitical map. Despite their diversity, they share a growing interest in exploring alternatives to a Western-led international order.(3) The acceleration of new international dynamics such as digitalisation, the emergence of hybrid threats or reglobalisation, which, together with the COVID-19 pandemic and the outbreak of war in Ukraine, have alerted states to new dimensions of national security.As a result, in the face of future uncertainties and the prospect of greater rapport between Tokyo and Brussels, three main issues stand out. First, as democracies committed to the liberal, rules-based multilateral system, Japan and the EU are natural partners – "like- minded" allies– that share values and principles, as well as a vital interest in maintaining peace and prosperity in their regional environments.Second, although together they are the world's first and fourth biggest economies, they do not wield political and military power to match their economic might. However, after three decades of prioritising the economy and trade, they now see the need to invest in their defence, with a view to preserving their "strategic autonomy" and not being dragged into a conflict against their will or against their interests. Moreover, despite the triangular relationship in the military sphere, both actors are moving forward on cooperation in new forms of security, such as economic security. These new dynamics have enabled closer exchange and coordination between Tokyo and Brussels, though there is still room for improvement. Namely, cooperation on tech, including cybersecurity and disinformation, offers new opportunities to strengthen Japan-EU ties and common defence in the face of these challenges.Third, there is a growing sense thatEuropean and Asian security scenarios are increasingly connected,and that the security of Japan, South Korea or Taiwan also depend, more and more so, on what happens in Ukraine. In such a scenario, the United States' allies aim to be active players – not just a battleground – in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing.Despite that, there are still multiple areas for greater cooperation between Tokyo and Brussels and the 27 member states. The challenge is to ensure the agenda of the two actors keeps in step with the tempo of the systemic changes the international order is undergoing and to play a role in them that is commensurate with their economic, cultural and human power. Just months away from a possible return of Donald Trump to the White House, who could renege on his international commitments and threaten security alliances, the ties between the EU and Japan may offer a necessary foothold for facing the turbulence ahead. ReferencesBargués, Pol and Bourekba, Moussa. "War by all means: the rise of hybrid warfare", in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 11-16. Available online.Benson, Emily; Steinberg, Federico and Álvarez-Aragonés, Pau. "The European Union's Economic Security Strategy Update". CSIS Commentary, 2024. (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.Burguete, Víctor. "Contribución de la UE a la reglobalización: de la búsqueda de la autonomía a la estrategia de seguridad económica". Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 298, 2023.Colomina, Carme. "Words as weapons: from disinformation to the global battle for the narrative" in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 17-24. Available online.European Commission. EU trade Relations with Japan (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.García-Herrero, Alicia. China-EU roller-coaster relations: Where do we stand and what to do? Text of testimony to the US Congress, June 2023. Available onlineTanaka, Toshiro. "EU-Japan Relations" in Christiansen, Thomas; Kirchner, Emil and Murray, Philomena (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, pp. 509-520.Tirado, Carmen. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Una iniciativa japonesa de política exterior para la cooperación global", Global Affairs Journal 2, 2020.Kuwahara, Kyoko. "Disinformation Threats during a Taiwan Contingency and Countermeasures". Research Report, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 22, 2022. Available online.Vidal, Lluc. "Beyond the Gaiatsu Model: Japan's Asia-Pacific Policy and Neoclassical Realism", Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2022, 9 (1), pp. 26–49.
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This summary report is based on the main conclusions of two panel discussions on foreign policy held at CIDOB on September 21st, 2023, as part of the project "Japan and the EU: Global partners for a secure and open Indo-Pacific". The document assesses the changing international environment and its impact on relations between the European Union (EU) and Japan. It goes on to highlight two new forms of security – economic and information security – that are a cause of concern for both partners and which open up new possibilities for joint action. It concludes by noting the new cooperation dynamics between Tokyo and Brussels and what the future holds for them.I. IntroductionThe current international order is under challenge from a confluence of enduring trends the pace of which has been quickened more recently by a series of critical events that only underline the international system's shortcomings and contradictions.The first of these events was the COVID-19 pandemic, which provided multiple examples of the fragility of global supply chains and the dependence on manufactured goods imported from China, often essential goods. The pandemic acted as an accelerator for at least three major long-term trends that were already underway. The first of these was the confrontation between the major international powers, the United States and China. They went from being partners for development to considering themselves competitors and, on certain matters, systemic rivals. Some commentators say there was already an underlying trend towards decoupling prior to the pandemic, acknowledging that the Chinese market was looking to replace imports with local products (increasing the US or German trade deficit) and two independent digital spheres were forming, tethered to two diverging socio-political models (García-Herrero, 2023). The pandemic, however, saw the strategic contest over international ascendancy and shaping norms and alliances step up a notch.The trend towards the securitisation of technology and innovation has also gained momentum in the wake of the pandemic. This was clear during the race to create and produce a vaccine against the coronavirus. Nonetheless, both before – with the disputes over 5G networks or industrial espionage – and after – in the framework of what has been called the "chip war" – we witnessed the rise of an increasingly strategic association between big tech corporations and the security of states. Taiwan is a prime example. One single firm, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), acts as a deterrent to any potential invasion of the island because it alone dominates the global market for the most advanced chips. Recent international conflicts, first in Ukraine and more lately in Gaza, have hastened this trend towards the technologisation of economic, political and social relations. Cyberwarfare, drones, satellites and grassroots innovation (or lack thereof) are elements that can make the difference between victory and defeat. We are witnessing the new nature of "hybrid wars", those that combine physical military operations with cybernetic action. They are not only fought on the battlefield, rather they involve the mass use of disinformation or cyberattacks that seek to undermine the values of the adversary and the legitimacy of their political systems; or in the case of a war, undermine their confidence and operability. In this type of conflict, the aim is not so much victory but destabilisation (Bargués and Bourekba, 2022).As well as this technological offshoot, the two conflicts are reinforcing the self-image of what are termed the Global North and South, which resonates through the main debates on economic development, international justice or the fight against climate change. Several votes at the United Nations and the imposition of sanctions on Russia have revealed greater coordination of agendas around the narrative of the "decline of the West" and the realisation that there is scope to increase the gains of middle powers and transnational corporations.While Japan and the EU are different in nature (one is a regional actor, the other a state) they share common ground: democracy, respect for a multipolar, rules-based international order that is peaceful and prosperous, plus many of the challenges mentioned at the start of this paper.II. New security dynamics: disinformation and economic security Against this backdrop of transformation of the international system and acceleration of the geopolitical competition, new forms of (in)security have appeared on the agendas of Japan and the EU, but also of other international powers like China, the United States or India. We are talking about disinformation and economic security, two increasingly central elements of Japan and the EU's conception of security.DisinformationThe rapid succession of technological breakthroughs of recent years, along with the growing development of artificial intelligence (AI), the digital transition and the rise of disinformation have laid bare the exploitation of new technology and the challenges it poses to the security and the future of states. In times of crisis, we have seen how disinformation becomes a "weapon of mass infoxication" on the margins of international law, which comes at a relatively low cost and prevents effective governance. Though not a new phenomenon – propaganda was crucial during the Cold War, for instance – viral media and the current porousness of social networks have amplified their potential as a weapon in the narrative war in the hands of external actors. The emergence of generative AI, moreover, not only raises the possibility of an "alternative account" of the facts, but rather enables credibly recreating the facts and even replacing them in people's perception of reality (through deep fakes). This threatens notions of truth and trust, which are essential to democratic governance and election processes.Unlike the EU and the United States, Japan has not been significantly exposed to outside interference in the shape of disinformation. But Tokyo considers this phenomenon a potential threat to national security and democratic health. Namely, the rise of generative AI could quickly break down some of the barriers, such as the language factor, which certain analysts had identified as having put a brake on the proliferation of this phenomenon on the archipelago (Kuwahara, 2022). Thus, in the framework of the National Security Strategy launched in late 2022 by the Kishida administration, Japan identified the challenge of the manipulation of information in situations of conflict and announced the adoption of countermeasures. The government is the chief instigator (top-down action) through coordination with its counterparts in other countries (government-to-government) and non-governmental actors.In the case of the EU, the destabilising effect of disinformation reached new heights during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It is the reason why, nearly a decade ago now, its greater exposure to this type of campaign prompted Brussels to begin to pursue strategies to respond to this hybrid threat. Since then, Brussels has tried to tackle disinformation via a consumer-based rather than security-centred approach. Initially, the European Commission focused its efforts on controlling content rather than trying to regulate tech companies and the major platforms. That approach has shifted, however, with the realisation that the problem of disinformation is not so much the message as its replication and amplification. This shift in focus also counters one of the main risks of focusing on the message, which is that it jeopardises the right to freedom of expression. It is with this rationale that the Digital Services Act (DSA) entered into force in January 2024. It contains specific provisions to control algorithms, which are responsible for "clustering" potentially like-minded social media users, which in turn is key for the propagation of the message through information bubbles and echo chambers.Action that is limited exclusively to algorithmic governance, however, falls short in the face of the complexity of the sociopsychological processes involved in disinformation (Colomina, 2022). With that in mind, the EU has adopted a whole-of-society approach that recognises that it is essential to combine online action with offline measures – in the real world – that mitigate the inequalities, divisions and social fractures that disinformation thrives on. Thus, while the Japanese approach has prioritised government-to-government exchange, a more decentralised strategy prevails in Brussels, where other social sectors, such as journalists, fact checkers, researchers and civil society, play an extremely important role in lockstep with the efforts at the highest level. The EU's decentralised approach to confronting disinformation suits the fragmented media landscape of the 27 member states, which differs from the high degree of concentration in the case of Japan, where large print and television media are the main channels of information. Economic security The new dynamics of reglobalisation, coupled with a return to protectionist measures, the exploitation of interdependencies and economic coercion, are shaping a new global economic landscape in which open economies and interdependence have come to be seen as risks rather than factors of mutual security. Consequently, "economic security" is gaining ground in the national strategies of countries like Japan, one of its chief proponents. While there is no one single definition of economic security, nor of the areas it encompasses, in general terms it seeks to protect a national economy from external interference, minimising the impact of supply chain disruptions, dependence on certain products or the capacity for economic coercion in the hands of others to bring pressure to bear or influence domestic political decisions.Japan has been an early advocate of this concept, which, aside from its habit of putting forward terms that then become all the rage in strategic thinking, can be put down to its insular nature and its heavy dependence on imported commodities and natural resources. Starting in 2020, Tokyo has begun a process of institutionalising economic security through the creation of government positions assigned to this task, as well as the adoption of various legislative packages to ensure its defence. One of the main ones is the Economic Security Promotion Act of 2022, which rests on four key pillars: 1) strengthening supply chains, especially of critical raw materials, 2) security of critical and core infrastructure, 3) developing advanced technology and 4) a patent non-disclosure system. At the same time, Japan has transferred the concept to its bilateral relations – with the United States, South Korea or the United Kingdom – and the fora in which it participates, like the G7 or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The G7 statement on economic resilience and economic security during the Hiroshima summit in May 2023 was particularly important. It was the first ever reference to the concept in the multilateral sphere, which is a measure of its consolidation on the agenda and in international cooperation.At the same time, these economic security initiatives are indirectly linked to Tokyo's proposal for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP), a strategy unveiled in 2016 that aims to safeguard the rules-based international order, promote peace and shared prosperity, maritime and air security, and develop connectivity in the region. It is hard to disassociate this approach from Beijing's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and the need to preserve freedom of navigation through this vital artery for Japan and the rest of the world, as approximately a third of global trade flows through it. Although the FOIP's principles of openness and inclusivity could be seen to be at odds with economic security – particularly given the economic rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo in the region – cooperation in this field depends on a free and open region, and vice versa. What is more, it is through greater development of connectivity and exchange with the countries of the region (including the ASEAN members and India) that Tokyo can diversify its trade portfolio and boost its economic resilience.The EU too has adopted the principle of economic security in the last year. Supply chain disruptions during the pandemic, the closure of the Russian gas tap after the invasion of Ukraine and the restriction on imports that China imposed on Lithuania following the opening of a representative office in Taiwan in 2021 are powerful incentives for the adoption of instruments to safeguard the EU's economic security. Among the various measures adopted, four types of mechanism stand out: 1) the revitalisation of industrial policy and the adoption of political initiatives to improve EU production capacity and productivity; 2) diversification and stockpiling efforts to reduce dependence on products and natural resources; 3) the adoption of measures to counter external mechanisms that give competitors the edge, such as anti-subsidy measures; and 4) tools devoted to strategic competition, like the anti-coercion instrument or controls on exports of certain products (Burguete, 2023). More recently, in January 2024, Brussels launched new initiatives aimed at reinforcing its Economic Security Strategy, put forward for the first time in June 2023. With a more geopolitical approach akin to that of Washington, Brussels is seeking tighter control over investments, greater coordination in the control of exports, investment for research into advanced technologies and the protection of innovation. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the different member states will accept this new legislative package.We can say that Japan and the EU are adopting different, though complementary, mechanisms that can boost domestic capacities to address the challenges ahead of them. Yet, while we can note progress in the field of economic security – as we shall see below – cooperation in the field of disinformation remains at an earlier stage. There is, however, huge potential for bilateral cooperation, and there are powerful incentives for it.III. A new era of cooperation between Japan and the European Union? In the last two decades relations between the EU and Japan have been marked by a considerable degree of mutual understanding, with a predominance of economic matters, despite the trade tensions and conflicts towards the end of the 20th century. Yet this has yielded limited results in terms of joint initiatives and plans (Tanaka, 2013). In 2022, Japan was the EU's second biggest trading partner in Asia, behind China, and the seventh globally. That same year Japanese imports into the EU came to nearly €70bn, while EU exports the other way amounted to over €71.6bn (European Commission, 2023).As far as security is concerned, progress has been slow, fettered by Japan's constitutional constraints, which place restrictions on its military capabilities, and, on the European side, owing to its complex security framework and its partial overlap with NATO. Until a few years ago, cooperation in this area had been limited to "softer" forms of security such as antipiracy operations off Somalia. It is worth recalling that in the case of both the EU and Japan traditional security (the military aspect) falls to the United States, since both actors are eminently economic powers but lacking in comparable military might. They are, then, relations that on security matters are triangular rather than bilateral and cannot be understood without Washington.This has been no impediment to Brussels and Tokyo strengthening ties over the last few years, primarily on political and trade matters. In 2019, the two parties adopted the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, which lifted most of the tariffs existing between the two economies, and the Strategic Partnership Agreement, based on cooperation and the defence of shared values such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights or free trade. In the latter agreement, Japan and the EU identified the common threats of cybersecurity, natural disasters, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maritime (in)security. The two agreements established a framework that would cement political, security and development cooperation cast in liberal values to jointly uphold the rules-based international order.In this new phase of cooperation, security issues have gained importance because both actors perceive a greater interdependence and interconnection in their security. According to the Joint Statement of the Japan-EU Summit of July 2023, "the security of Europe and that of the Indo-Pacific are closely interlinked". And the facts appear to bear it out. Japan was one of the countries that did not hesitate to show its support for Ukraine following the Russian invasion of 2022, taking part in the international sanctions regime, as well as dispatching arms to Kyiv. Coordination with the EU in this field has been remarkable.If we look at the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific released in 2021, Brussels also aspires to greater involvement in the security of the region in four main areas: maritime security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and crisis management. However, despite European ambitions, there are differences over the commitment (economic and/or military) that the various member states would be willing to make in the Indo-Pacific. As often happens, European policy towards the region is the sum of the convergences and divergences of the member states. According to a survey by the European Council for Foreign Relations, 23 out of the 27 member states point to security as an important element of Europe's Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet only 12 would be interested in contributing to freedom of navigation operations and just 4 would commit warships to the region (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain). It will also be important to consider NATO involvement in this area. In 2023, it submitted a proposal to open a civilian liaison office in Tokyo, an idea that was dropped largely due to French reluctance in the face of a possible response from China.Japan welcomes even limited European involvement in the region and this is in step with the growing interconnection between Europe's security and that of the Indo-Pacific. However, more coordination and communication among the various European and international actors in the region, especially in the military field, will be essential in order to avoid undesired tensions.Lastly, cooperation on economic security has acquired a more central position in recent months. In June 2023, this was a particularly important matter during the High-Level Economic Dialogue between Japan and the EU, especially with regard to cases of economic coercion, non-market access policies and control over investments and exports, as well as action aimed at making supply chains more resilient. In a subsequent joint statement, the two actors identified multiple areas of cooperation in this field, with a clear reference to de-risking, as well as cooperation on semiconductors and protecting critical infrastructure like submarine cables. This first reference reveals a complementary approach to economic security conceptions and strategies for the two actors, which makes for a more holistic approach.However, one of the future challenges in order to guarantee this cooperation is related to two fundamental contradictions of economic security. For one thing, it is an area where economic interests and national security may collide. For another, owing to the long list of issues it encompasses – security, trade, tech or industrial policies – economic security has a cooperative side, but also a competitive one. The predominance of security issues may come at the expense of economic interests for the two actors, both in their relations and in their own domestic dynamics, and vice versa. Thus, careful and respectful communication and coordination between them, as well as within them, in the EU's case, will be key in order to guarantee effective cooperation between Japan and the EU. IV. ConclusionsOver the last two decades, bilateral relations between the EU and Japan (which on security matters become triangular on account of the simultaneous presence of the United States) have been marked by stability and ongoing outreach. There are those who say that this is the main problem: the lack of problems. Three factors, however, have brought about a more recent revitalisation and strengthening of relations:(1) The situation of "permacrisis" and the speeding up of dynamics of geopolitical competition and fracture.(2) The new balances of power in the international system thanks to the consolidation of China as a global player with the capacity to influence in any part of the world, plus the rise of the Global South as a new "imagined community" on the geopolitical map. Despite their diversity, they share a growing interest in exploring alternatives to a Western-led international order.(3) The acceleration of new international dynamics such as digitalisation, the emergence of hybrid threats or reglobalisation, which, together with the COVID-19 pandemic and the outbreak of war in Ukraine, have alerted states to new dimensions of national security.As a result, in the face of future uncertainties and the prospect of greater rapport between Tokyo and Brussels, three main issues stand out. First, as democracies committed to the liberal, rules-based multilateral system, Japan and the EU are natural partners – "like- minded" allies– that share values and principles, as well as a vital interest in maintaining peace and prosperity in their regional environments.Second, although together they are the world's first and fourth biggest economies, they do not wield political and military power to match their economic might. However, after three decades of prioritising the economy and trade, they now see the need to invest in their defence, with a view to preserving their "strategic autonomy" and not being dragged into a conflict against their will or against their interests. Moreover, despite the triangular relationship in the military sphere, both actors are moving forward on cooperation in new forms of security, such as economic security. These new dynamics have enabled closer exchange and coordination between Tokyo and Brussels, though there is still room for improvement. Namely, cooperation on tech, including cybersecurity and disinformation, offers new opportunities to strengthen Japan-EU ties and common defence in the face of these challenges.Third, there is a growing sense thatEuropean and Asian security scenarios are increasingly connected,and that the security of Japan, South Korea or Taiwan also depend, more and more so, on what happens in Ukraine. In such a scenario, the United States' allies aim to be active players – not just a battleground – in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing.Despite that, there are still multiple areas for greater cooperation between Tokyo and Brussels and the 27 member states. The challenge is to ensure the agenda of the two actors keeps in step with the tempo of the systemic changes the international order is undergoing and to play a role in them that is commensurate with their economic, cultural and human power. Just months away from a possible return of Donald Trump to the White House, who could renege on his international commitments and threaten security alliances, the ties between the EU and Japan may offer a necessary foothold for facing the turbulence ahead. ReferencesBargués, Pol and Bourekba, Moussa. "War by all means: the rise of hybrid warfare", in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 11-16. Available online.Benson, Emily; Steinberg, Federico and Álvarez-Aragonés, Pau. "The European Union's Economic Security Strategy Update". CSIS Commentary, 2024. (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.Burguete, Víctor. "Contribución de la UE a la reglobalización: de la búsqueda de la autonomía a la estrategia de seguridad económica". Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 298, 2023.Colomina, Carme. "Words as weapons: from disinformation to the global battle for the narrative" in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 17-24. Available online.European Commission. EU trade Relations with Japan (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.García-Herrero, Alicia. China-EU roller-coaster relations: Where do we stand and what to do? Text of testimony to the US Congress, June 2023. Available onlineTanaka, Toshiro. "EU-Japan Relations" in Christiansen, Thomas; Kirchner, Emil and Murray, Philomena (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, pp. 509-520.Tirado, Carmen. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Una iniciativa japonesa de política exterior para la cooperación global", Global Affairs Journal 2, 2020.Kuwahara, Kyoko. "Disinformation Threats during a Taiwan Contingency and Countermeasures". Research Report, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 22, 2022. Available online.Vidal, Lluc. "Beyond the Gaiatsu Model: Japan's Asia-Pacific Policy and Neoclassical Realism", Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2022, 9 (1), pp. 26–49.
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After four months of war in Gaza, the European Union, or at least its High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell, seems determined to talk about peace. Borrell is even saying that the international community will have to "impose" it. But in such an asymmetrical conflict, how can peace be imagined? The Hamas attacks of 7 October 2023 in which more than 1,100 Israelis, mostly civilians, were killed and some 240 people were taken hostage, unleashed a devastating war with a direct impact on regional stability. The Israeli response has resulted in the deaths of more than more than 30,000 Palestinians, the majority of them women and children, and the forced displacement of more than one and a half million Palestinians who are living in subhuman conditions without shelter, food, or water, and still threatened by Israeli army bombing attacks.With growing international pressure for a ceasefire in Gaza, the government of Benjamin Netanyahu is still persisting in its military campaign in pursuance of its goals: eradication of Hamas, freeing the hostages, and ensuring that Gaza will never again pose a threat to Israel. However, increasing numbers of international and regional actors are beginning to talk about peace. For the European Union and the international community, this peace entails the two-state solution, which goes back to the original formula put forth by the United Nations in 1947.The EU's advocacy of the two-state solution is nothing new. What has changed is that since the beginning of the year, EU institutions have tried to resume a certain impartiality in the conflict and are beginning to speak out in favour of peace. First, in Lisbon, the High Representative, Josep Borrell, stated: "Peace will only be achieved in a lasting manner if the international community gets involved intensely to achieve it and imposes a solution". Later, at the University of Valladolid, in his speech on being invested with an Honorary Doctorate, the head of EU diplomacy pointed out that Israel has financed Hamas with the aim of weakening the Palestinian National Authority.Even more ambitiously, at the end of January, Borrell presented to the foreign ministers of the EU 27 and representatives from Israel and the Arab countries a 10-point plan for the creation of two states. This plan envisages a "Preparatory Peace Conference" and talks until it is possible for the parties to agree on a solution. Always wary of idealism, Borrell did not speak of "peace" but of "solutions": "We have to stop talking about the 'peace' process and start talking more concretely about the 'two-state solution' process".Despite international consensus on the formula presented by the United Nations, and Borrell's determination to move closer to the inevitable horizon of peace, there are obstacles that will be difficult to overcome.First, how could peace that entails the creation of a Palestinian state be "imposed" when Israel vehemently opposes this? The Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu recently declared that in any future arrangement, "the state of Israel has to control the entire area from the river to the sea". Heavy external pressure would be needed to convince the Israeli government, and this seems impossible in view of the unconditional support that it has had—and continues to have—from Washington, regardless of the war crimes the Israeli army is committing. As yet, there is no sign that either Moscow or Beijing intends to be involved in any peace initiative. Key regional stakeholders like Egypt, Turkey, and the Gulf states are concentrating all their diplomatic efforts on achieving a ceasefire in Gaza. As long as the Gaza Strip is being bombed and regionalisation of the conflict continues, the Arab countries see as unrealistic any peace-making effort that does not start with achieving an end to the war, and that does not include official recognition of a Palestinian state.Despite its economic power, the European Union—Israel's main trading partner and largest provider of foreign aid to the Palestinians—has been unable to make any progress towards achieving peace between the two sides. The initial reluctance of Brussels, like Washington, to pressure Israel to end its military campaign has "shredded" EU credibility in Palestine and a good part of the Middle East. However, in order to redress this situation, Brussels could promote EU-wide recognition of a Palestinian state in accordance with the 1999 Berlin Declaration, which stated its readiness to consider this "in due course".The second stumbling block builds upon the question: who would sign a peace agreement? Even if peace could be imposed from the outside, the Israeli and Palestinian stakeholders have diametrically opposed positions. The Israeli government wants total control of all territories it occupies, including Gaza, and rather than any intention to put an end to colonisation, it aims to keep encouraging it. The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) opposes any kind of solution that does not include an end to the occupation and creation of a Palestinian state with the 1967 borders. Notwithstanding the PNA's crisis of diminished legitimacy, Palestinians do agree that ending the Israeli occupation is the first step towards the creation of a Palestinian state.It is estimated that more than 700,000 Jewish settlers are living illegally in occupied Palestinian territories. Moreover, since 7 October, eviction of Palestinians from their homes and colonisation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem have intensified with Israeli government and military support, as expanding the illegal settlements was already a priority of the Netanyahu government. It is a gradual but implacable strategy. In the words of the BBC, one day a motorhome moves in, the next a few houses are built, and then an urban centre is established. In these circumstances, any proposal for negotiation that does not envisage an end to the occupation is, perforce, doomed to failure.An even thornier matter is the role of Hamas in future negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. This militant Palestinian group which committed the atrocities of 7 October is a stakeholder that Israel wishes to eradicate and that the United States and the European Union have labelled as a terrorist group. Hence the dilemma is the following: on the one hand, any attempt at negotiation that includes Hamas will be used by Israel as an argument not to engage and, on the other hand, excluding Hamas—which is supported by part of the population of Gaza and, in growing numbers, by the population in the West Bank—will only increase the division within the Palestinian leadership.Talking about peace is as necessary as it is easy to see an infinite number of obstacles. Imposing peace would seem unviable without a more powerful and more credible Europe, without a more impartial United States, and without other legitimate stakeholders who are able to bring Israeli and Palestinian positions closer together. In such a lopsided conflict, the most likely scenario is that Israel will keep rejecting any solution that involves the creation of a Palestinian state, that Hamas will survive the current war and the international community will continue to back the two-state solution without taking any real measures to end the occupation. Keywords: Israel, Palestine, negotiation, peace, Gaza, EU, Washington, Netanyahu, PNA, Hamas, Middle East All the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution
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Tras cuatro meses de guerra en Gaza, la Unión Europea, de la mano del Alto Representante para la Política Exterior y de Seguridad, Josep Borrell, parece determinada a hablar de paz, incluso a «imponerla desde la comunidad internacional». ¿Pero cómo imaginar una paz ante un conflicto tan asimétrico? Los ataques del 7 de octubre liderados por Hamás, con más de 1.100 israelíes muertos, la mayoría civiles, y el cautiverio de cerca de 240 rehenes, ha desatado una guerra de destrucción con un impacto directo en la estabilidad regional. La respuesta israelí ha causado la muerte de más de 27.000 palestinos, la mayoría de ellos mujeres y menores de edad, y el desplazamiento forzoso de más de un millón y medio de palestinos en condiciones infrahumanas, sin techo, sin apenas alimentos o agua, todavía amenazados por los bombardeos del ejército israelí.Mientras crece la presión internacional para lograr un alto el fuego en Gaza, el gobierno de Benjamín Netanyahu persiste en la campaña militar para alcanzar sus objetivos: la erradicación de Hamás, la liberación de los rehenes, y garantizar que Gaza no vuelva nunca a representar una amenaza para Israel. Aun así, son cada vez más los actores internacionales y regionales que empiezan a hablar de paz. Una paz que, para la Unión Europea y para la comunidad internacional, pasa por la creación de dos Estados, retomando la fórmula originaria sugerida por Naciones Unidas en 1947.La defensa de la solución de dos Estados por parte de la UE no es nueva. Lo que es innovador es que, desde principios de año, las instituciones comunitarias han intentado retomar una cierta equidistancia en el conflicto y empiezan a hablar de paz con osadía. Primero fue en Lisboa, donde el Alto Representante, Josep Borrell, aseguró: «la paz solamente se podrá alcanzar de forma duradera si la comunidad internacional se involucra dramáticamente en conseguirlo e impone una solución». Después, en la Universidad de Valladolid, en su discurso de investidura como doctor honoris causa, el jefe de la diplomacia europea apuntó que Israel ha financiado a Hamás con el objetivo de debilitar a la Autoridad Nacional Palestina.Más ambicioso todavía, a finales de enero, Borrell presentó un plan de 12 puntos para la creación de dos Estados ante los ministros de Exteriores de los veintisiete y representantes de Israel y de los países árabes. El plan prevé una conferencia preparatoria de paz y conversaciones hasta que sea posible que los interlocutores acuerden una resolución. Tan reacio al idealismo como acostumbra, Borrell no habló de paz sino de soluciones: «tenemos que dejar de hablar del proceso de paz y comenzar a hablar más concretamente sobre el proceso de solución de dos Estados».A pesar del consenso internacional acerca de la fórmula sugerida por Naciones Unidas, y de la determinación de Borrell para acercarnos al horizonte inevitable de una paz, existen obstáculos difícilmente superables.En primer lugar, ¿cómo podría «imponerse» una paz que implica la creación de un Estado palestino con el desacuerdo frontal de Israel? Como señaló recientemente el primer ministro israelí, Benjamín Netanyahu: «debo aclarar que en cualquier acuerdo de futuro, el estado de Israel debe tener el control total del área, desde el río hasta el mar». Para convencer al gobierno de Tel Aviv, sería necesaria una fuerte presión externa que parece imposible a tenor del apoyo incondicional a Netanyahu que ha mantenido – y sigue manteniendo – Washington, incluso ante los crímenes de guerra que el ejército israelí está cometiendo. Hasta el momento, no hay indicación de que Moscú o Beijing tengan la intención de involucrarse en cualquier iniciativa de paz. Los actores regionales clave como Egipto, Turquía y los países del Golfo están centrando todos sus esfuerzos diplomáticos en conseguir un alto el fuego en Gaza. Mientras los bombardeos persistan en la Franja y la regionalización del conflicto continúe, los países árabes consideran poco realista cualquier intento de paz que no comience con la consecución del fin de la guerra y que no incluya el reconocimiento oficial del Estado palestino.A pesar de su poder económico, la Unión Europea ―principal socio comercial de Israel y mayor proveedor de ayuda exterior a los palestinos― ha sido incapaz de impulsar la paz entre unos y otros. La renuncia inicial de Bruselas, como Washington, a presionar a Israel para que detenga su campaña militar, ha deslegitimado a la UE en Palestina y en buena parte de Oriente Próximo. Sin embargo, para revertir esta dinámica, Bruselas podría impulsar el reconocimiento del Estado palestino a nivel de la UE en línea con la declaración de Berlín (1999), en la que prometía hacerlo «a su debido tiempo».El segundo obstáculo obliga a definir ¿quién firmaría la paz? Aunque pudiera imponerse una paz desde fuera, los interlocutores israelíes y palestinos tienen visiones diametralmente opuestas. El gobierno israelí quiere el control total de los territorios palestinos que ocupa, incluyendo Gaza, y no tiene intención de detener la colonización sino de seguir fomentándola. Por su parte, la Autoridad Palestina (ANP) se opone a cualquier tipo de solución que no contemple el fin de la ocupación y la creación de un Estado palestino con las fronteras de 1967. A pesar de la crisis de legitimidad de la ANP, los palestinos comparten que el fin de la ocupación israelí es el primer paso hacia la creación del Estado palestino.Se calcula que más de 700.000 colonos judíos viven ilegalmente en los territorios palestinos ocupados. Además, desde el 7 de octubre se ha acelerado la expulsión de palestinos de sus casas y la colonización de Cisjordania y Jerusalén Este con el apoyo del gobierno y la protección del ejército israelí, puesto que la expansión de los asentamientos ilegales ya era una prioridad para el gobierno de Netanyahu. Es una estrategia gradual pero implacable: un día una caravana, el siguiente unas casas, y después un núcleo urbano, como explica la BBC. Bajo estas condiciones, cualquier propuesta de negociación que no contemple el fin de la ocupación estará inevitablemente condenada al fracaso.Más espinosa todavía es la cuestión del rol de Hamás en las futuras negociaciones entre israelíes y palestinos. El grupo militante palestino responsable de las atrocidades del 7-O es un actor que Israel quiere erradicar, y que Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea han calificado de grupo terrorista. El dilema por lo tanto es el siguiente: por un lado, cualquier intento de negociación que incluya a Hamás será un argumento para que Israel no se involucre; por otro, excluir a Hamás, que mantiene el apoyo de parte de la población en Gaza y un creciente respaldo en Cisjordania, aumentará la división en el seno del liderazgo palestino.Hablar de paz es tan necesario como fácil es intuir un infinito de obstáculos. Imponer la paz parece inviable sin una Europa con más legitimad y poder, sin unos Estados Unidos más equidistantes y sin otros interlocutores legítimos que puedan acercar las posiciones entre israelíes y palestinos. En un conflicto tan asimétrico, el escenario más probable es que Israel siga rechazando cualquier solución que implique la creación de un Estado palestino, que Hamás sobreviva a la guerra en curso, mientras que la comunidad internacional seguirá apostando por la solución de los dos Estados sin tomar medidas concretas para poner fin a la ocupación.Palabras clave: Israel, Palestina, negociación, paz, Gaza, UE, EE.UU, Netanyahu, ANP, Hamás, Oriente Próximo Todas las publicaciones expresan las opiniones de sus autores/as y no reflejan necesariamente los puntos de vista de CIDOB como institución.
