Suchergebnisse

A raíz del cambio climático, aumenta la frecuencia de las sequías y las inundaciones. Actualmente, el riesgo de inundación afecta ya a 3.000 millones de personas –4 de cada 10 habitantes del planeta– repartidos en 110 países. Las inundaciones responden a factores naturales, como las lluvias torrenciales, los monzones o los ciclones, a los que más recientemente se suman las inundaciones costeras debido al aumento del nivel del mar, con especial incidencia en los estados insulares del Pacífico. Su impacto destructivo se multiplica en las cuencas de los grandes ríos (como el Nilo, el Yangtsé, el Mekong, el Indus o el Ganges) a orillas de los cuales se han formado históricamente grandes núcleos de población.En regiones como Asia Meridional o África, la devastación causada por las catástrofes naturales se suma a otras crisis, no solo ambientales, sino también sociales y políticas, lo que agrava las tasas de pobreza, riesgos para la salud, dificultando el acceso a la educación y la seguridad humana básica. La incapacidad del Estado de responder a estas crisis abre la puerta a grupos insurgentes o violentos para proliferar y planta la semilla de futuros conflictos.

Disinformation has a damaging impact on both the European Union enlargement process and the internal image the EU has of itself, and the external image it conveys to the world. This CIDOB Briefing presents the main conclusions of the seminar "Disinformation in Enlargement Countries: Sowing Instability, Distorting EU's Perception", which was organised by CIDOB on 4 October 2024 and funded by the CERV (Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values) Programme of the European Commission. Bringing together researchers and journalists, the seminar analysed the problem of disinformation on two key EU fronts, namely the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans. In both these zones, disinformation affects local realities while also being part of regional trends. These include a noticeably greater interaction between domestic and external actors, strong discursive connections with new global antiliberal narratives, and the use of local and regional divisions for the benefit of domestic and external political stakeholders.







The problem of disinformation has been identified by the European Union as one of the greatest challenges facing the continent's democratic governments and civil society. While there is a tendency to speak of disinformation primarily as an external threat, fuelled inter alia by the Russian government in an attempt to destabilise the European project and its support for Ukraine, the issue of fake news does not have clearly defined internal-external boundaries. The campaigns of external governments interact with the messages of domestic actors in such a way that disinformation becomes a phenomenon that is both international and local. The methodologies, tools, and strategies of manipulation are employed on a global scale, while the messages are tailored to fit local realities. These dynamics are clearly observable in the two geographical areas of the EU's Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans.Battle of narratives in Russia's shadowIn the Eastern Neighbourhood of the EU, the disinformation phenomenon is set against the background of the war in Ukraine. Since the Russian invasion in 2022, the main objective of the Kremlin's disinformation strategies in neighbouring countries has been to weaken diplomatic, economic, and military support for the Ukrainian government. This occurs in addition to Russian efforts of previous years to undermine the European project in countries deemed by Moscow to be in its "sphere of influence", among them Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine itself. Russia's disinformation project also targets key EU member states with more Kremlin-friendly governments, among them Slovakia and Hungary, as well as European political forces at the extremes of the political spectrum.Russia's disinformation strategies in the Eastern Neighbourhood have undergone changes in recent years, in particular when giving a more important role to local actors in disseminating fake news and pro-Kremlin stories. In discussions about disinformation, the role of foreign governments is especially singled out, but it is important to remember that by far the greatest part of the disinformation that is circulating is produced at the local level. Within this domestic production of false content, the Kremlin can benefit by amplifying information that strategically favours it. In this regard, local channels are not only a mechanism for unilateral dissemination of Russian-generated content. Furthermore, there are domestic stakeholders with an autonomous political agenda who are producing their own disinformation and, if it creates instability and division, it is further disseminated by the Russian propaganda system. And in order to counter the effects of news verification services, new agents like "alternative fact checkers" are being promoted in efforts to discredit factually correct news. In addition to this dynamic of interaction between internal and external actors is the use of transnational tools and channels, among them social networks with Russian links like Telegram. At the international level, Russia's increasing disinformation activity in the Global South, by means of generating content in European languages like Spanish in Latin America, and French in West Africa, is also affecting the EU. For example, in Mexico, Nicaragua, and Colombia, Russia has produced disinformation that seeks to influence local perceptions of Russia and discredit the Ukrainian government. The reach of this content goes beyond national borders as it aims to be reproduced in Latin American communities in the United States and in the diaspora communities of European countries like Spain.At the local level, Russian disinformation seeks to aggravate existing political, ethnic, and social divisions, and to spread home-grown narratives that are favourable to Russia. Political polarisation, for example, simultaneously benefits certain local political stakeholders like the Slovakian and Hungarian governments, and external actors like Russia. Political use by local politicians of the war in Ukraine and the arrival of Ukrainian refugees has meant that in Slovakia, for example, a majority of citizens (51%) blames the West or Ukraine rather than Russia (41%) for the war. Only 30% supports Ukraine's EU and NATO membership, while 36% is positively disposed to the establishment of an authoritarian regime in Slovakia. In a situation of increasingly illiberal European governments like those of Slovakia and Hungary, Russia further benefits from the erosion of critical media systems and civil society. It is important to emphasise, nonetheless, that low levels of freedom of expression affect not only the more pro-Russian countries like Slovakia (which dropped from 17th to 29th place in the World Press Freedom Index) and Hungary (in 67th place) but also countries that are more aligned with EU foreign policy like Greece (88th place), Bulgaria (59th), and Poland (47th). Apart from the benefits that Russian might accrue from disseminating disinformation, the problem of declining freedom of expression in the EU is also due to internal causes.Finally, political exploitation of ethnic divisions is one of the factors that explains instability in Moldova, where the Russian disinformation machinery has also taken advantage of the presence of a significant Russian-speaking community. One way of attacking pro-European politicians like the current Moldovan president, Maia Sandu, is accusing them of being anti-Russian and of trying to marginalise this community and its language. This story was being pushed by the Kremlin even before its attack on Ukraine.Russian activity in the Eastern Neighbourhood also engages with battles to dominate global narratives, for example by means of the current trend of global antiliberal traditionalism and nationalist historical revisionism. In the former case, Russia has sought to present itself as an upholder of traditional, conservative values, while promoting a story of a decadent, globalist, and "woke" European Union. Conservative governments and religious institutions in the Eastern Neighbourhood also use this traditionalist discourse as a legitimising tool, thus presenting themselves as protectors of the essence of the motherland, tradition, and national interests. To return to the case of Maia Sandu, there has been a proliferation of content emphasising the fact that she is not married, or claiming that she is secretly Muslim, or from a sexual minority, in order to discredit her among the more traditionalist voters. This antiliberal wave has had an impact in other countries of the region, including Slovakia where 50% of citizens see their national identity and values threatened by the western way of life. In these circumstances, conservative stakeholders like the Orthodox Church have also played a key role in spreading rhetoric that opposes principles upheld by the European Union. One notable case is the Orthodox Church of Georgia.In the domain of historical narratives, Russia has made attempts at historical revisionism to improve its own image and undermine that of Ukraine in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In its efforts to legitimise its influence-seeking manoeuvres, Russia has been pushing pan-Slavic narratives in order to foster ties with countries like Slovakia. Furthermore, it has taken advantage of numerous occasions to present itself as the sole liberator of these countries in the Second World War by means of an "anti-fascist" story that defines its opponents as Nazis or fascists, as in the case of the Ukrainian government. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has identified traumatic historical experiences linked to the Soviet past and turned them into revisionism against Ukraine. For example, some disinformation campaigns accuse the Ukrainians of being responsible for the repression of the 1956 Hungarian revolution and for the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.Against European enlargement into the BalkansIn the Western Balkans, disinformation campaigns by both internal and external actors are exploiting the divisions and structural weaknesses of these societies to propagate their narratives. In this region, disinformation significantly appears as a project of a government in power, as is the case of Serbia, the most economically and militarily powerful state of the Western Balkans. Using strategies similar to those employed in Hungary and Slovakia, the Serbian government is promoting its own disinformation discourse, which is having divisive social and ethnic effects, as well as fuelling scepticism about European integration, all of which well suits Russian interests in the region. In Serbia, Russian disinformation activity is scant as the Belgrade government itself contributes to the Kremlin's strategic objectives. However, besides the Serbian case, there are two structural factors that enable disinformation campaigns in the Western Balkans. First, there are deep divisions and serious ethnic tensions in the individual countries of the region, and between them and certain EU member states, for example Bulgaria and Greece. In this situation of many stakeholders with nationalist agendas, historic grievances, and revisionism of the past, the presence of disinformation is, in good part, a symptom of these existing divisions and their exploitation by political actors.Second, the Western Balkans media establishment is underfunded, politicised, and linked to economic powers with interests that are sometimes associated with agents of disinformation. Although there are exceptions of high-quality investigative journalism like the Balkan Insight network, journalists in the Western Balkans generally work in precarious conditions with little time to check content in the general context of a business model in crisis where funding from non-transparent sources is accepted. In addition, after the 2008 economic crisis, the Balkans experienced major structural changes in funding from external media groups, with a significant withdrawal of western companies and an inflow of oligarchs with economic interests in Russia.Russian media outlets including Russia Today, TASS, Ria Novosti, and Sputnik have taken advantage of this media crisis to increase their presence by offering free content in local languages to be reproduced by the region's media in their portals. In the Balkans, countries like Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia stand out for the number of local news items that cite Russian media sources. This Russian influence in the sphere of information is achieved not only by means of content placement but also through the movement of capital for "strategic corruption", which manages to gain influence over, or ownership of the local media. In this regard, Bulgaria and Croatia stand out as the countries with the highest incidence of "illegal financial flows" coming from Russia.All these factors have ensured that the Western Balkans becomes a big loser in the process of European enlargement. It is important to note that disinformation has not caused the stalling of European enlargement. In this case, too, fake news and manipulative narratives exploit already-existing grievances and feelings of discontent. For years now, the process of European enlargement into the Western Balkans has been paralysed by European elites that are wary of the costs and risks of further enlargement, together with a European populace that is increasingly in favour of a "fortress Europe" that is closed to the outside world. Existing anti-immigration trends in the EU are used to reinforce anti-enlargement messages. For example, Islamophobia and rejection of refugees by some European citizens is used to promote the idea that "Europe does not want more Muslims". The aim is to mobilise a majority or a significant percentage of Muslims in countries of the Western Balkans—among them Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia—against EU enlargement.Given this indefinite postponement of future accession to the EU, and awareness of the EU's lack of credibility, there is a growing feeling of discontent among the region's citizens, and a search for alternatives beyond the European project. All of this creates a breeding ground where anti-EU domestic and external stakeholders can simply intensify existing concerns and misgivings in order to further undermine the enlargement process.In the midst of this crisis of credibility of pro-EU voices, increasing numbers of authoritarian-leaning governments are offering "alternative" political and geopolitical projects. These governments are wielding a nationalist narrative claiming that joining the EU would mean a loss of national identity and traditional values. As an alternative to submission to a globalist, ultraliberal, and technocratic agenda, they hold out a protective response to globalising processes and increasing risks in the international arena. In this regard, governments like those of Serbia, Slovakia, Hungary, and Georgia are looking for "alternative" international relations in which the EU would no longer be the main partner, but just one alongside others like the United States, Russia, China, and Turkey. The weakening of the enlargement process and intensifying relations with these alternative powers are especially beneficial for the more autocratic Western Balkan states because they can forget about the democratising and liberalising reforms they need to complete if they are to join the EU without losing the economic benefits of world trade which they can now access through alternative markets. Imperfect solutions, necessary pluralismIn this situation of a faltering EU enlargement process, increasing Russian activity, strengthening of the local authoritarian stakeholders who are disseminating disinformation, and attacks on civil society and the media domain, what measures might reduce the impact of disinformation campaigns in the Eastern Neighbourhood and Western Balkans?First of all, it is important to distinguish between having a robust, pluralistic media system and having a pro-EU integration stance. Although both leanings tend to come together, being pro-EU does not necessarily mean being more democratic. In the Western Balkans, a more pro-European agenda and a more plural media system are factors that tend to be linked, but there are social movements, independent media, and civil society organisations that tend to be critical of some EU policies. For example, there have recently been protests over mining agreements between the EU and Serbia, with the result that these associations were labelled "anti-European". Cases like this one are important reminders that acritical agreement with European policies is not equivalent to more pluralism and more democracy. However, a civil society and media that are active and rigorous in public debate do mean more pluralism and more democracy. Within the European Union itself, there are critical views regarding certain EU policies, but they are not labelled as "anti-European" because of this. This critical pluralism is seen as part of European values, and it should be a mainstay of campaigns against disinformation. Contributing to this pluralism would help to counter social division, authoritarianism, and the weakness of media systems.While there is broad agreement on the structural factors that should be favoured when attempting to build a society that can better resist disinformation, there is greater divergence with respect to specific actions aiming to counteract its general influence and particular campaigns. One of the most important debates concerns sanctions imposed on Russian media outlets like Russia Today and Sputnik, which are accused of promoting disinformation aimed at instigating instability in the EU and undermining efforts to support Ukraine. Beyond disagreements over whether these sanctions are legitimate—due to precedents they may set and the symbolic impact of the fact that a leading liberal power like the EU should be sanctioning media outlets—the most common debate today is about the real usefulness of such measures. On the one hand, some observers consider that imposing these sanctions is not very effective because the content can easily be replicated on new websites, in what is known as "information laundering". There is an additional argument that outlets like Russia Today are easy to identify as Russian, while with pages that replicate content it is more difficult to identify the origin of the information. One the other hand, others believe that imposing these sanctions is better than doing nothing since, whatever the case, they do inflict administrative costs on the Russian disinformation bureaucracy as well as sending a signal to Moscow and its European allies that the EU is not just passively acquiescing. Finally, still others have the view that censorship of Russian media outlets should be accompanied by broader sanctions extending to the Russian energy sector, which still receives European revenue through indirect distribution conduits via third countries like Turkey.In the field of countermeasures against disinformation, there is further debate about the effectiveness of debunking and of the work of fact-checking bodies. A first problem is asymmetry in the resources and capacity for reaction of these organisations when compared with those of the agents that are promoting disinformation. Deciding priorities when countering fake news and manipulative discourse in a situation of meagre resources, when there is a need to react quickly, is a major challenge. Furthermore, offering factual data and a rigorous version of the events in question is no guarantee that citizens will stop believing "alternative facts" or conspiracy theories. Nevertheless, some commentators argue that discontinuing fact-checking efforts would entail the risk of leaving existing disinformation without a factual journalistic response. In this case, the debate is not so much about whether or not debunking activities should exist, but about the quantity of resources that should be allocated to them in contrast to alternatives that might be more effective. Although not presented as a strategy that opposes verification, other ways of countering foreign disinformation, such as that proposed by the EU's European External Action Service (EEAS), suggest a change of paradigm. The EEAS plan for tackling FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) is less concerned with the narrative and content of disinformation than with the actions and tactics employed to magnify them. The aim is to cut off high-impact disinformation campaigns by quantitatively and quantitatively identifying patterns and strategies, for example coordinated action through bots for disseminating fake news in the social networks.Finally, there is also heated debate about whether the priority response should be to shore up the strategic communication of European governments and institutions. This would entail creating their own narrative that would seek to have an emotional impact on European citizens, as a way of opposing the information being sent out by Russia and other purveyors of disinformation. This strategy would be in the framework of a pre-bunking stance that considers it necessary to go beyond reactive responses or merely countering disinformation with data and facts. From this standpoint, it is believed that the EU is caught up in a clash of narratives to which it must respond forcefully. While accepting the existence of this discursive competition, other observers consider that there is no clear boundary between strategic communication and propaganda. Certain more emotional stories that define the existing conflict mostly from a "security" standpoint, or a heavy-handed friend/enemy dialectic can be detrimental to pluralism in the public debate while also imposing a framework that excludes critics of European institutional policy.In both the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans, the European Union is moving in a scenario of tension between countering the influence of external actors while keeping the enlargement process at a standstill; wanting to foster a stronger, pluralist, civil society while opting for a more homogenous discourse that might robustly counteract the Russian discourse; and taking actions against disinformation while guaranteeing freedom of expression in a context of scarce resources and the protracted nature of the military conflict in Ukraine.Co-funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA). Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.DigiDem-EU - Digital Democracies: At the intersection between technology, democracy and rights in the EU (Grant Agreement 101140646)Keywords: Disinformation, enlargement, EU, Western Balkans, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Serbia, FIMI, narratives, Kremlin, fact-checkers, Slovakia

La desinformación, independientemente de su origen, ha sido considerada por las fuerzas políticas tradicionales de la Unión Europea como un problema para la democracia. Sin embargo, el auge de la extrema derecha puede influir en cómo se enmarca el debate de las noticias falsas a nivel europeo. Podemos pasar a un modelo dicotómico más cercano al estadounidense, donde se continuaría luchando contra las noticias falsas que tienen su origen fuera de la UE, pero habría una tendencia a normalizar la desinformación política interna. El auge de los partidos de extrema derecha en Europa ha tenido un fuerte impacto en las políticas y en el discurso público en áreas como la migración o la lucha contra el cambio climático. La estrategia de estos partidos radicales ha sido politizar fuertemente debates públicos donde antes existía un consenso entre las grandes familias de centroizquierda y centroderecha. Otro campo en el que esta politización también podría aumentar es en el de la lucha contra la desinformación. El discurso de las fuerzas políticas tradicionales considera que la proliferación de noticias falsas es, en sí mismo, un peligro para la democracia, independientemente de su origen y motivación. En cambio, las fuerzas de extrema derecha -que en múltiples casos han hecho de las noticias falsas una de sus estrategias comunicativas centrales- se han mostrado críticas con el hecho de que se señale o limite la desinformación generada por actores locales con los que comparten posiciones políticas. A su vez, el segmento más proatlantista de la extrema derecha ha apoyado la lucha contra la desinformación en caso de que esta venga de actores externos como Rusia o China. Esta dicotomía entre ser permisivo con parte de la desinformación interna y poner el foco mayoritariamente en la externa encaja con una tendencia en auge en la Unión Europea, donde el discurso oficial incide mayoritariamente en las noticias falsas generadas por actores extranjeros -y en el que institucionalmente es más fácil luchar contra la desinformación «externa» que admitir vulnerabilidades democráticas internas-. El auge de la extrema derecha y su politización del debate podría reforzar esta política dicotómica que identifica la desinformación como un peligro fundamentalmente externo, a pesar de que la mayoría de noticias falsas se generan a nivel local, como por ejemplo las campañas de desinformación de Viktor Orbán contra la UE, la difusión de audios falsos en las últimas elecciones en Eslovaquia, o la coordinación de mensajes de grupos de extrema derecha contra refugiados y minorías en Europa.Las diferentes familias de la extrema derecha han mostrado en varias ocasiones su escepticismo con la lucha contra la desinformación. Identidad y Democracia (ID), el grupo que en la anterior legislatura del Parlamento Europeo acogía tanto a Alternativa por Alemania como a Reagrupamiento Nacional de Marine Le Pen, criticó la idea misma de la batalla contra las noticias falsas. ID tildó la Ley de Servicios Digitales (DSA, en inglés) -la principal legislación comunitaria en materia de desinformación- como un mecanismo para imponer la «censura online» y votó en contra de resoluciones contra la injerencia extranjera y la desinformación.En cambio, el grupo de los Conservadores y Reformistas Europeos (CRE) ha adoptado la postura dicotómica entre desinformación interna y externa mencionada anteriormente. A pesar de dar apoyo a la lucha contra la desinformación de actores externos y haber votado a favor de la DSA, al inicio de la pandemia, el grupo alertó de la posibilidad de «censura» y criticó dar dinero público a organizaciones de fact-checking. Europarlamentarios del grupo han señalado no sólo a actores externos, sino también a «organizaciones no gubernamentales» de fuerzas izquierdistas o verdes -es decir, las opuestas a la extrema derecha- como origen de la desinformación. La principal fuerza del CRE, los Hermanos de Italia de Giorgia Meloni, han catalogado la lucha contra la desinformación como parte de una «nueva Guerra Fría» y se han posicionado en contra de la «censura arbitraria» en redes sociales. La segunda fuerza en número de escaños de este grupo, el partido polaco Ley y Justicia, ha sido acusado de promover desinformación y, durante su gobierno, Polonia cayó del puesto 18 al 57 en libertad de expresión, según Reporteros Sin Fronteras.Una «americanización» del debatePara entender hacia qué dirección podría virar la Unión Europea, es ilustrativo analizar el caso de Estados Unidos, donde -al contrario que en la UE- el debate sobre la desinformación ya está absolutamente polarizado y se ha convertido en un arma de batalla partidista. A grandes rasgos, para el Partido Demócrata, la lucha contra la desinformación es una manera de defender la buena salud de la democracia. El Partido Republicano, en cambio, la considera una excusa para la censura y la supresión de la libertad de expresión. La mayoría del electorado republicano cree que retirar una noticia, aunque sea falsa, constituye censura. Como ha explicado el periodista Mark Scott, entre las élites republicanas se ha extendido la teoría de que existe una alianza entre los demócratas, Silicon Valley, el llamado movimiento woke, y los académicos expertos en desinformación, que tiene como objetivo censurar los mensajes de derechas e imponer un pensamiento único liberal. Esta visión ha tenido eco en distintos grupos políticos europeos de extrema derecha.La politización extrema de este debate en Estados Unidos ha hecho que las plataformas digitales, ante la proliferación de la desinformación, miren hacia otro lado, para evitar ser acusadas de partidistas y pro-Partido Demócrata. La «neutralidad», en el caso estadounidense, se equipara con permitir la desinformación. En el contexto legal de Estados Unidos, además, son las plataformas las que deciden qué contenido se queda o se elimina de la red social, dándoles una autonomía total en la moderación de contenidos -al contrario que en el caso europeo, donde la DSA obliga a estas empresas a combatir activamente la desinformación-. Aunque diversas plataformas han decidido simplemente retirarse de la batalla contra la desinformación, otras como X (antiguo Twitter) de Elon Musk han integrado esta proliferación de contenidos falsos en su modelo de negocio. El resultado es la generación a gran escala de desinformación local que no está regulada ni por la administración ni por las propias redes sociales.Una securitización de la lucha contra las noticias falsas¿Podría, entonces, el auge de la extrema derecha europea provocar un viraje hacia la politizada -y a la vez permisiva- dirección estadounidense? En el campo regulatorio, eso parece poco probable. La extrema derecha no tiene mayoría en el Parlamento Europeo y parte de ella -el grupo CRE- ha votado a favor de la DSA. Sin embargo, lo que sí puede cambiar es el discurso hegemónico sobre la desinformación en Europa.De una visión negativa en su totalidad de la desinformación y las noticias falsas, se puede pasar a una dicotómica que considera la interna como discurso amparado en la libertad de expresión y la externa como una amenaza contra la que se debe luchar -a pesar de que la frontera entre actores internos y externos es difusa, y la línea divisoria entre temas locales e internacionales no está clara-. Una deriva en este sentido replicaría la permisividad -especialmente de la derecha tradicional europea- ante ciertas prácticas autoritarias internas de la nueva derecha radical, siempre y cuando mantengan una postura geopolítica proatlantista y antirrusa. Más que generar un sano debate sobre la necesidad y el grado de poder regulador de las autoridades públicas -en un ámbito donde existen preocupaciones legítimas y visiones distintas sobre cómo proteger la libertad de expresión-, la tolerancia hacia cierta desinformación local abriría la puerta a una aplicación partidista sin apenas atisbos de neutralidad. La lucha contra la desinformación ya no sería un mecanismo de protección del derecho de los ciudadanos a una información veraz, sino un arma de defensa selectiva frente a ciertos actores externos. Un viraje así no sería impensable en una Europa con un discurso cada vez más securitizado.Palabras clave: desinformación, extrema derecha, democracia, noticias falsas, UE, Estados Unidos, DSA, regulación, censura, politización, polarizaciónTodas las publicaciones expresan las opiniones de sus autores/as y no reflejan necesariamente los puntos de vista de CIDOB o sus financiadores.

La desinformación, independientemente de su origen, ha sido considerada por las fuerzas políticas tradicionales de la Unión Europea como un problema para la democracia. Sin embargo, el auge de la extrema derecha puede influir en cómo se enmarca el debate de las noticias falsas a nivel europeo. Podemos pasar a un modelo dicotómico más cercano al estadounidense, donde se continuaría luchando contra las noticias falsas que tienen su origen fuera de la UE, pero habría una tendencia a normalizar la desinformación política interna. El auge de los partidos de extrema derecha en Europa ha tenido un fuerte impacto en las políticas y en el discurso público en áreas como la migración o la lucha contra el cambio climático. La estrategia de estos partidos radicales ha sido politizar fuertemente debates públicos donde antes existía un consenso entre las grandes familias de centroizquierda y centroderecha. Otro campo en el que esta politización también podría aumentar es en el de la lucha contra la desinformación. El discurso de las fuerzas políticas tradicionales considera que la proliferación de noticias falsas es, en sí mismo, un peligro para la democracia, independientemente de su origen y motivación. En cambio, las fuerzas de extrema derecha -que en múltiples casos han hecho de las noticias falsas una de sus estrategias comunicativas centrales- se han mostrado críticas con el hecho de que se señale o limite la desinformación generada por actores locales con los que comparten posiciones políticas. A su vez, el segmento más proatlantista de la extrema derecha ha apoyado la lucha contra la desinformación en caso de que esta venga de actores externos como Rusia o China. Esta dicotomía entre ser permisivo con parte de la desinformación interna y poner el foco mayoritariamente en la externa encaja con una tendencia en auge en la Unión Europea, donde el discurso oficial incide mayoritariamente en las noticias falsas generadas por actores extranjeros -y en el que institucionalmente es más fácil luchar contra la desinformación «externa» que admitir vulnerabilidades democráticas internas-. El auge de la extrema derecha y su politización del debate podría reforzar esta política dicotómica que identifica la desinformación como un peligro fundamentalmente externo, a pesar de que la mayoría de noticias falsas se generan a nivel local, como por ejemplo las campañas de desinformación de Viktor Orbán contra la UE, la difusión de audios falsos en las últimas elecciones en Eslovaquia, o la coordinación de mensajes de grupos de extrema derecha contra refugiados y minorías en Europa.Las diferentes familias de la extrema derecha han mostrado en varias ocasiones su escepticismo con la lucha contra la desinformación. Identidad y Democracia (ID), el grupo que en la anterior legislatura del Parlamento Europeo acogía tanto a Alternativa por Alemania como a Reagrupamiento Nacional de Marine Le Pen, criticó la idea misma de la batalla contra las noticias falsas. ID tildó la Ley de Servicios Digitales (DSA, en inglés) -la principal legislación comunitaria en materia de desinformación- como un mecanismo para imponer la «censura online» y votó en contra de resoluciones contra la injerencia extranjera y la desinformación.En cambio, el grupo de los Conservadores y Reformistas Europeos (CRE) ha adoptado la postura dicotómica entre desinformación interna y externa mencionada anteriormente. A pesar de dar apoyo a la lucha contra la desinformación de actores externos y haber votado a favor de la DSA, al inicio de la pandemia, el grupo alertó de la posibilidad de «censura» y criticó dar dinero público a organizaciones de fact-checking. Europarlamentarios del grupo han señalado no sólo a actores externos, sino también a «organizaciones no gubernamentales» de fuerzas izquierdistas o verdes -es decir, las opuestas a la extrema derecha- como origen de la desinformación. La principal fuerza del CRE, los Hermanos de Italia de Giorgia Meloni, han catalogado la lucha contra la desinformación como parte de una «nueva Guerra Fría» y se han posicionado en contra de la «censura arbitraria» en redes sociales. La segunda fuerza en número de escaños de este grupo, el partido polaco Ley y Justicia, ha sido acusado de promover desinformación y, durante su gobierno, Polonia cayó del puesto 18 al 57 en libertad de expresión, según Reporteros Sin Fronteras.Una «americanización» del debatePara entender hacia qué dirección podría virar la Unión Europea, es ilustrativo analizar el caso de Estados Unidos, donde -al contrario que en la UE- el debate sobre la desinformación ya está absolutamente polarizado y se ha convertido en un arma de batalla partidista. A grandes rasgos, para el Partido Demócrata, la lucha contra la desinformación es una manera de defender la buena salud de la democracia. El Partido Republicano, en cambio, la considera una excusa para la censura y la supresión de la libertad de expresión. La mayoría del electorado republicano cree que retirar una noticia, aunque sea falsa, constituye censura. Como ha explicado el periodista Mark Scott, entre las élites republicanas se ha extendido la teoría de que existe una alianza entre los demócratas, Silicon Valley, el llamado movimiento woke, y los académicos expertos en desinformación, que tiene como objetivo censurar los mensajes de derechas e imponer un pensamiento único liberal. Esta visión ha tenido eco en distintos grupos políticos europeos de extrema derecha.La politización extrema de este debate en Estados Unidos ha hecho que las plataformas digitales, ante la proliferación de la desinformación, miren hacia otro lado, para evitar ser acusadas de partidistas y pro-Partido Demócrata. La «neutralidad», en el caso estadounidense, se equipara con permitir la desinformación. En el contexto legal de Estados Unidos, además, son las plataformas las que deciden qué contenido se queda o se elimina de la red social, dándoles una autonomía total en la moderación de contenidos -al contrario que en el caso europeo, donde la DSA obliga a estas empresas a combatir activamente la desinformación-. Aunque diversas plataformas han decidido simplemente retirarse de la batalla contra la desinformación, otras como X (antiguo Twitter) de Elon Musk han integrado esta proliferación de contenidos falsos en su modelo de negocio. El resultado es la generación a gran escala de desinformación local que no está regulada ni por la administración ni por las propias redes sociales.Una securitización de la lucha contra las noticias falsas¿Podría, entonces, el auge de la extrema derecha europea provocar un viraje hacia la politizada -y a la vez permisiva- dirección estadounidense? En el campo regulatorio, eso parece poco probable. La extrema derecha no tiene mayoría en el Parlamento Europeo y parte de ella -el grupo CRE- ha votado a favor de la DSA. Sin embargo, lo que sí puede cambiar es el discurso hegemónico sobre la desinformación en Europa.De una visión negativa en su totalidad de la desinformación y las noticias falsas, se puede pasar a una dicotómica que considera la interna como discurso amparado en la libertad de expresión y la externa como una amenaza contra la que se debe luchar -a pesar de que la frontera entre actores internos y externos es difusa, y la línea divisoria entre temas locales e internacionales no está clara-. Una deriva en este sentido replicaría la permisividad -especialmente de la derecha tradicional europea- ante ciertas prácticas autoritarias internas de la nueva derecha radical, siempre y cuando mantengan una postura geopolítica proatlantista y antirrusa. Más que generar un sano debate sobre la necesidad y el grado de poder regulador de las autoridades públicas -en un ámbito donde existen preocupaciones legítimas y visiones distintas sobre cómo proteger la libertad de expresión-, la tolerancia hacia cierta desinformación local abriría la puerta a una aplicación partidista sin apenas atisbos de neutralidad. La lucha contra la desinformación ya no sería un mecanismo de protección del derecho de los ciudadanos a una información veraz, sino un arma de defensa selectiva frente a ciertos actores externos. Un viraje así no sería impensable en una Europa con un discurso cada vez más securitizado.Palabras clave: desinformación, extrema derecha, democracia, noticias falsas, UE, Estados Unidos, DSA, regulación, censura, politización, polarizaciónTodas las publicaciones expresan las opiniones de sus autores/as y no reflejan necesariamente los puntos de vista de CIDOB o sus financiadores.

Como introducción al número conmemorativo del 40 aniversario de Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals, este artículo examina la evolución de las relaciones internacionales durante las últimas cuatro décadas, en paralelo a los contenidos de la publicación y en el contexto de la actual crisis del orden (o desorden) internacional: desde el fin de la Guerra Fría y la confianza en la globalización y la democracia liberal en el mundo unipolar de mediados de la década de 1990, pasando por la expansión de los valores e ideas de gobernanza global de finales del siglo pasado, hasta llegar a la creciente multipolaridad, a la rivalidad entre China y Estados Unidos y a la contestación del orden liberal y permacrisis de los últimos años. Se mencionan especialmente las consecuencias de la pandemia de la COVID-19 y de la guerra de Rusia en Ucrania.

En un context de crisis successives, l'última de les quals la sanitària i econòmica de la COVID-19, aquest article analitza les quatre fractures principals a les que s'enfronta la UE (de valors, de solidaritat, institucional i de transformació internacional) per a les quals s'imposen tres mesures si es vol assolir un nou ordre europeu: més democràcia, més flexibilitat i millor acció exterior. La geopolítica actual demana més que mai que la UE defensi els seus valors fonamentals, agilitzi la presa de decisions i augmenti i faciliti la cooperació en les relacions internacionals.

This article analyses strategies for preventing and combatting violent extremism in Spain since the Madrid attacks in 2004. Initially concerned with anticipating the terrorist threat by means of police, military, and legal measures, these strategies have gradually incorporated approaches and measures that address the phenomenon of radicalisation. It is argued that the advent of the battle to "counter violent extremism" (CVE) and for the "prevention of violent extremism" (PVE) represents a step forward in the approach to terrorism since its target is not terrorism as such but the factors and conditions that can lead to it. In the case of Spain, CVE and PVE policies come together in the present strategy against violent radicalisation.

Reseña de libro: Esther Barbé (dir.). Las normas internacionales ante la crisis del orden liberal. Tecnos, 2021. 176 págs.

Los temporeros agrícolas en España son noticia año tras año. En 2020, los mismos problemas se repitieron una y otra vez, agravados por el contexto de la pandemia del COVID-19. Este artículo analiza cuatro casos que fueron noticia: las condiciones de los asentamientos irregulares en Andalucía; la situación de las temporeras marroquíes contratadas en origen que quedaron atrapadas en Huelva; las duras condiciones laborales del campo a la luz de la muerte de un solicitante de asilo en Lorca; y la presencia de temporeros en las calles de Lleida, que generó nuevamente un debate sobre sus condiciones de alojamiento en medio de los primeros brotes de COVID-19 del verano. El objetivo final del artículo es ilustrar con casos concretos problemas estructurales que vienen de lejos y, con ello, apuntar posibles soluciones a corto, medio y largo plazo.

The first year of war in Gaza has caused the forced displacement of 85% of the population. While it is central to the conflict, little analysis has been conducted from this perspective.The singular nature of this displacement is threefold: the goal of the conflict is expulsion; the purpose of the expulsion is expansion into the territory; and the expulsion is intended to be permanent, with no possibility of return. These three aspects have been a constant in the history of the Palestinian people since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948.Gaza illustrates the calamitous failure of international law, both in the humanitarian field and regarding asylum. What has gone wrong? How do we explain the unjustifiable? It has now been a year since the attacks led by Hamas on October 7th, 2023. Since then, the Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip has caused the forced displacement of nearly 2 million people and over 41,000 deaths. According to an article published recently in The Lancet, deaths related to the conflict (due to malnutrition or lack of medical attention, for example) are believed to have reached 186,000 in June 2024. These figures mean that 85% of the population of Gaza have had to flee their homes and that 8% (primarily women and children) are thought to have died during the offensive. Taking into account direct and indirect fatalities, the military campaign in Gaza has produced a higher daily death rate than any other 21st century armed conflict. Following South Africa's accusation, in January 2024 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concluded that genocide charges against Israel could not be dismissed.Multiple mechanisms have contributed to the forced displacement of most of Gaza's population. First, the evacuation orders issued by the Israeli government. The earliest ones came just a few days after the outbreak of the conflict and affected the whole of northern Gaza, triggering the forced displacement of over 1.1 million Palestinians in less than 24 hours. As the invasion advanced, others followed, for example in Khan Younis in December and January, or in Rafah in May 2024. The latter led to the evacuation of another 1 million people, many of them already displaced in the preceding months (some several times). Second, forced displacements have also resulted from bombardments, which have destroyed most homes and civil infrastructure (from hospitals to schools and roads) and pose a threat to life even in zones supposedly declared safe. Lastly, on top of all this is the difficulty of surviving amidst severe restrictions on access to safe drinking water, electricity, food, medical supplies and other basic products. In May, the United Nations concluded that the situation in Gaza had "reached unprecedented levels of emergency".While the forced displacement of the population of Gaza is a key element of the conflict, not just a consequence, there is little analysis that focuses on this issue. Hence the need for this Nota Internacional CIDOB, which aims to review the first year of the Gaza offensive through the lens of migration. From an internal perspective, the question arises as to the nature of the forced displacement, which in this case is planned and intended to facilitate the occupation of the territory. From an external standpoint, when the forced displacement is accompanied by a policy of closed borders, the question is: what role do international law, the United Nations and the various parties involved play? Organised forced displacementThe term forced displacement refers to all situations in which people are obliged to flee their homes or place of habitual residence because of armed conflicts, violence, persecution and human rights violations, natural disasters or human-made catastrophes. It is a broad definition that covers very different conditions depending on whether the action that causes the displacement is carried out by states, whether the persecution is individual or collective, whether it is planned action, or the specific purpose with which it is carried out. That is why, regarding the Gaza conflict, Adamson and Greenhill propose a more precise term: "organised forced migration". It is intended to describe those situations where migration is used as a geopolitical tool by state elites and other actors. But again, this term covers very disparate situations, with population movements that can be voluntary or forced and serve purposes as varied as creating an empire or consolidating a nation-state project, negotiating foreign policy with third countries (in what is understood as exploitation of migration), or it may be the result of a migration management policy (deportations, for example). Precisely because the range of situations is so diverse, we believe it is necessary to define the term further – in two respects in our view. One, rather than organised forced migration, we should be talking about organised forced displacement. The switch from migration to displacement is fundamental as we are talking about the expulsion of people from their places of origin or residence. And two, we must remember that in this case the expulsion of the Palestinian population is the other face of Israeli territorial expansion. The ultimate goal of the occupation is the annexation and permanent settlement of the land. The way the Israeli government sees it, this means reducing the number of Palestinians living there to a minimum. In 2016, Yair Lapid, an Israeli politician regarded as a centrist or even liberal and who was briefly prime minister in 2022, declared in a newspaper: "My principle is maximum Jews on maximum land with maximum security and with minimum Palestinians". This is no temporary displacement then. The expulsion is intended to be final and from where the Israeli government stands, and contrary to international law, return is not seen as a possibility. All this leads us to the conclusion that, compared to other situations of forced displacement, the singularity of the case of Gaza is threefold. First, the displacement is not a consequence of the conflict but is rather one of its main objectives, as it forms part of an organised strategy on the part of the state of Israel. Second, the purpose is expulsion from a territory in order to expand into it. In this respect, it is not so different from the case of the Rohingya in Myanmar, where genocide, expulsion and land grabbing went hand in hand. Third, the expulsion is intended to be permanent, which as we shall see later challenges the meaning of international protection and increases the geopoliticisation of migration.Expulsion-expansion The expulsion-expansion pairing has been a constant in the history of the Palestinian people since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. Then, the Nakba ("catastrophe" in Arabic) led to the death of 15,000 people and the forced displacement of 800,000. In 1967, with the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank, a further 300,000 Palestinians were forced to flee their homes. The expulsions have not stopped since. In the West Bank, they have been achieved through land seizures, the demolition of homes, the expansion of illegal settlements, and as a result of severe restrictions on movement within the territory. October 7th has only accelerated these processes, with a surge in attacks and murders perpetrated by settlers and punitive incursions on the part of the Israeli army. In Gaza, the Israeli government withdrew its military presence and the settlements in 2005, but it continues to exercise indirect control, with air, land and sea blockades that have made the population's material living conditions extremely difficult. The academic and human rights lawyer Munir Nuseibah, based in Al-Quds University in Jerusalem, has identified six methods through which the state of Israel has driven the forced displacement of the Palestinian population over the years. The first method is direct and relates to the violence inflicted on the civilian population in times of war. The second is the outcome of administrative engineering, for example constructing precarious and revocable forms of both residency and nationality. According to Israel's Ministry of the Interior, 14,152 Palestinians lost their residency between 1967 and 2011. In 2003, there were estimated to be as many as 10,000 unregistered minors in East Jerusalem. The third mechanism includes imprisonment and deportation, often as punishment for exercising fundamental political rights such as demonstrating or expressing opinions. According to a report by the United Nations special rapporteur for the occupied Palestinian territories, Francesca Albanese, since 1967 over 800,000 Palestinians, including children as young as 12, have been detained by the Israeli army, frequently without hard evidence or trial and subject to inhumane conditions.The other mechanisms to forcibly displace the Palestinian population involve restricting life to such an extreme that there is no alternative but to take flight. The fourth mechanism, then, relates to urban planning and the distribution of resources. For example, it includes Jewish settlements in occupied zones, legitimising the demolition of homes and even whole villages. It also includes infrastructure construction, starting with the 800 km of wall that stretch along the West Bank and surround Jerusalem. As well as annexing territories, this makes it difficult for the Palestinian population to work, live and move freely. It also includes the extraction of resources in the occupied Palestinian territories to Israel's own benefit or the expropriation of properties, for example in zones declared nature reserves. By way of illustration, it is estimated that 500 Palestinian villages have been destroyed by the Israeli government's parks and forests policy. The fifth mechanism is linked to the appropriation of land and property under discriminatory and openly biased courts. Lastly, restricting access to water, food and other basic products also plays a role in driving people from their homes. Restricted access to safe drinking water, exacerbated over the last year, is one of the starkest symbols of the violation of fundamental rights.The history of the Palestinian people since 1948 shows that more expulsions of Palestinians spell further Israeli expansion. Facts aside, the expulsion-expansion pairing is also reflected in political discourse, which has become even more explicit over the last year. Just a few days after October 7th, for example, the Israeli minister Gideon Sa'ar told media that "Gaza must be smaller at the end of the war". Around the same time, a leaked report by Israel's intelligence service revealed plans to permanently transfer the inhabitants of Gaza to Egypt's Sinai Peninsula. The agriculture minister, Avi Dichter, called it the new "Gaza Nakba". In December, the hard-right politician and Israeli finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich, was categorical: "What needs to be done in the Gaza Strip is to encourage emigration. If there are 100,000 or 200,000 Arabs in Gaza and not 2 million Arabs, the entire discussion on the day after will be totally different". On the plans for the day after, the proposition appears to be clear too. In late 2023, a real estate firm espoused starting to build in Gaza. In January 2024, several Israeli government ministers attended a convention of hundreds of settlers (titled "Settlement brings security") that called for rebuilding settlements.Crisis of international lawFollowing the horrors of the Second World War, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which were ratified universally, laid the foundations of international humanitarian law underpinned by a series of rules establishing minimum standards of humanity that must be upheld in any situation of armed conflict. Two years later, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 defined the rights of refugees and the international rules (binding on all signatory states) to protect those who, unable to find protection in their places of origin, had no option but to flee. Gaza illustrates the calamitous failure of international law, both in the humanitarian field and regarding asylum.In a recent article, Cordula Droege, chief legal officer of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), argued that international humanitarian law arose to protect the civilian population when prevention mechanisms or the peaceful resolution of conflicts failed. Ultimately, it implies recognising the right to war (where both sides can kill, injure, detain and destroy), but it prohibits them from dehumanising the adversary. It does not set out to end war, rather to make it humane, striking an equilibrium between two apparently irreconcilable imperatives: military necessity and our common humanity. This means unequivocally prohibiting acts such as torture, rape, taking hostages, targeting the civilian population or the wounded. In other areas the rules are more nuanced, but, in any event, they establish that civilian casualties must be avoided or minimised. The case of Gaza – as we have already said, with the highest daily death rate of the 21st century, mostly women and children – shows its unmitigated failure. A literal interpretation of the norms, which invokes the absence of clear violations, cannot justify the level of death, injury and destruction that international humanitarian law primarily aims to prevent.When protection of the civilian population in conflict contexts fails, what remains is the right to asylum. But that requires crossing a border, and this is precisely what is completely out of the question for the inhabitants of Gaza. In a nutshell, they are driven to leave, but leaving is impossible. There are two reasons for this. First, granting them asylum in another country would mean facilitating and, in a sense, accepting Israel's plans – that is, the expulsion of the Palestinians from the Gaza Strip. Neighbouring countries like Jordan, Lebanon and Syria are only too aware; they have seen how Palestinian refugees settled permanently. There is little doubt that, once again, it would be a departure with no possibility of return, with a state of Israel that would not only refuse to allow them back but also roll out a policy of repopulation with Jewish settlers (in the style of the West Bank) that would make the resolution of the conflict even more difficult. In this respect, for many Palestinians staying is also a form of resistance. Second, the neighbouring countries have no appetite for more refugees or to import the Palestinian-Israeli conflict inside their borders more than it already is. King Abdullah II of Jordan (which borders the West Bank, but not Gaza) was succinct on the matter: "No refugees in Jordan, no refugees in Egypt". Responsibility in question Given the circumstances, one might ask what the role of the United Nations has been as guarantor of the observance of international law and the protection of civilians. It is here where the longstanding division between the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) comes in. Following the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, UNRWA was created in 1949 to attend to the development, education, health, social services and emergency aid to Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. When the convention on refugees was approved two years later in 1951, it was agreed that the right to seek asylum and UNHCR's mandate would not apply to those people already under the protection of another United Nations body or agency: in other words, the Palestinians. According to James C. Hathaway, a professor of law at the University of Michigan, this exclusion came in response to a dual concern: on one side, the concern of the Arab nations, which sought to prevent a Palestinian diaspora from being denied the potential to pursue a state of their own; on the other, that of the European countries, who had no wish to see a substantial number of Palestinian refugees arrive at their borders.As a result, since then, the Palestinian issue has remained exclusively in the hands of UNRWA. Yet experts like James C. Hathaway himself and Jeff Crisp argue that there are compelling reasons for UNHCR and Egypt to take joint responsibility for the fate of the inhabitants of Gaza. The first relates to the very article of the refugee convention – Art. 1(D) – that excluded the Palestinians, but only on a contingent and temporary basis. Specifically, this article states that should the United Nations (meaning UNRWA in this case) cease to (be able to) guarantee protection to the Palestinians, these people would "ipso facto" fall under the convention (ergo under UNHCR's mandate). Many legal scholars, including Jane McAdam and Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, suggest that it is time to weigh this option given UNRWA's difficulties in providing protection. It must be remembered that these difficulties have been determined by the direct action of the state of Israel, which has placed suffocating restrictions on humanitarian aid, putting the safety of UNRWA workers at risk (take the six staffers killed in an attack on a school in September 2024 for example). And it has accused the agency of terrorism, which has prompted many key donors to withhold funding (the United States included), even when no hard evidence has been forthcoming. According to Yara M. Así, from the standpoint of the state of Israel putting an end to UNRWA would not only facilitate its expulsion plans but also improve the chances of ending recognition of the Palestinians as refugees and, therefore, their right to return.The second reason for extending protection of the Gaza population beyond UNRWA is related to the principle of non-refoulement. The convention on refugees (Art. 33), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Arts. 6 and 7) and the Convention Against Torture (Art. 3) all oblige states not to turn people away at their borders if returning them could pose a risk to their lives. Given the circumstances of extreme emergency in Gaza, there is no doubt that rejection at the border with Egypt could well present such a case. If so, Egypt, as a signatory to the refugee convention, and by extension UNHCR, would be responsible. Yet neither Egypt nor UNHCR, which has barely commented on the issue of Palestinian refugees in Gaza, appears willing to acknowledge that responsibility. As Jeff Crisp states, while reluctance to facilitate the state of Israel's expulsion plans is understandable, the right to asylum is (or should be) a universal and non-negotiable right.Without the right to leave and to recognition of international protection, the choice is this: either remain under bombardment and in a permanent state of emergency or pay between $5,000 and $10,000 per person to get out. In May 2024, it was revealed that Egyptian companies like Hala Consulting and Tourism Services had exploited the situation by charging mounting sums to facilitate the border crossing and provide transport to Cairo. The firm is estimated to have made around $2m a day, hitting $118m in profits from February to April 2024 alone. The extortionate fees these companies charge is not only attributable to the high levels of corruption at the border but also, as some media outlets have reported, to their direct relations with the Egyptian army and even with the president himself. But fleeing is no guarantee of protection either. Once in Egypt, most remain in legal limbo, with no residence permit and therefore no access to basic services, in a country that hosts 9 million refugees (1 million recognised by UNHCR) and in increasingly precarious socioeconomic conditions.Geopoliticisation of migrationAs they are expelled by the state of Israel and shunned by neighbouring states, the Palestinian refugee issue has become a key element of international relations. It is what we might define as the geopoliticisation of migration. That is to say, when states use their migration policy as a means of conditioning foreign policy or, conversely, when they turn foreign policy into a tool for purposes of migration management. Normally, the two strategies occur at the same time and are reciprocal. While the former exploit their geographical situation and capacity to contain migratory flows to put pressure on the latter in their demands in certain foreign policy areas, the latter base their foreign policy on the former's readiness to collaborate on migration matters, externalising migration control and with that limiting the arrivals of irregular migrants at their borders.In this regard, there is no doubt that the October 7th attacks have placed Egypt centre stage. For the Egyptian government, the invasion of Gaza meant gaining bargaining power at a moment marked by one of the worst economic crises of its recent history and by unprecedented levels of debt. By way of illustration, Egypt is the second-largest debtor to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), with an external debt amounting to a total of $164.5bn, according to the Central Bank of Egypt. In the new context marked by the war in Gaza, and as a country that is too big to be allowed to fail in an increasingly unstable region, in March 2024 the IMF (with the United States behind it) raised the initial loan from $3bn to $8bn. There were also rumours of cancelling its debt in exchange for agreeing to take in Palestinian refugees in the Sinai Peninsula. While the Egyptian minister denied there had been pressure in that regard on the part of the United States and Israel, history reveals that debt cancellation has been used before as a bargaining tool. In 1991, for example, the United States and its allies wrote off half of Egypt's debt in exchange for its participation in the anti-Iraq coalition in the second Gulf war.The relations between Egypt and the European Union (EU) have been more explicit, with the signing of a migration deal in March 2024 in the style of those struck previously with countries such as Turkey, Tunisia and Mauritania. True, the negotiations began prior to October 7th, but it is also true that the invasion of Gaza (and the prospect of a surge in Palestinian refugees heading for Europe) added extra urgency to the talks. Then vice-president of the European Commission, Margaritis Schinas, described Egypt as an "important and reliable" partner in the management of migration. According to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen herself, "Egypt's role is vital for the security and stability of the Middle East, and it hosts a growing number of refugees". But only a fraction of the €7.4bn pledged to Egypt in the agreement of March 2024 is earmarked for managing migration (€200m). The rest is made up of favourable loans to aid Egypt's economic development (€5bn) and investments in the energy sector (€1.8bn). This means that while we are witnessing a gradual geopoliticisation of migration (where cash is exchanged for control, with no conditionalities in terms of human rights, remember), we should not lose sight of the fact that migration is one element of exchange among many. International relations aside, the Palestinian refugee issue, and particularly the breach of international humanitarian law, has also entered domestic politics in many countries. Pro-Israel lobbies are important in countries such as the United States or the United Kingdom, and the history of the 20th century also steers many European governments in a similar direction. But the horrors suffered by the civilian population in Gaza over the course of the last year, and the indefensible inaction on the part of the international community, have positioned a growing share of public opinion in favour of an end to the conflict and a peaceful solution with recognition of both states. That was already the case in most Arab countries, where government positions are much more lukewarm than those of their own people. This gap between the official government line and public opinion is widening in many Western countries too, reflected in the increasing mobilisation of student groups. It is not a minor issue. In fact, it could play a significant role in November's presidential elections in the United States, either shifting a part of the vote towards Kamala Harris or discouraging voters altogether.Return to international lawThere is a common thread running through everything we have said so far: geopolitics comes before the law, interests before lives and destruction of the adversary before common humanity. We must return to international law and reconcile what is politically possible with what is acceptable and fair, or in other words, political equilibriums with legal principles. One thing cannot come at the expense of the other. Like any forcibly displaced person, the Palestinian people have the right to rebuild their lives in a safe place and with dignity. This means providing a multidimensional response: recognising their status as refugees and, therefore, their right to asylum; facilitating access to decent material living conditions; and tackling the solution which, as required by international law, means restitution and, for those who have fled, return. Anything else, that is to say continuing to prioritise interests over rights, is unacceptable, essentially because renouncing our common humanity can only be synonymous with barbarism.ISSN: 2013-4428DOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2024/309/enAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB or its donors.