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Previous studies have consistently shown that religious persons both intend and have more children than their non-religious peers. However, it is yet unknown whether their higher number of children entirely reflects their higher intentions or whether religious persons also realise their intentions more often than non-religious individuals. By including different geographical regions - four countries from Western Europe and four countries from Central and Eastern Europe - this study focuses on short-term fertility intentions and their realisation over 3 years. Our study, which is mainly informed by the Theory of Planned Behaviour, compares three groups, based on two panel waves from the Generations and Gender Survey (2002-2013 and 2006-2016): Christians who regularly attend church services, nominal Christians, and non-affiliated persons. The results confirm that practising Christians generally intend and have more children than nominal Christians and non-affiliated persons. Effects are much stronger in Western than in Central and Eastern Europe. However, we find only weak significant differences in realising childbearing intentions by religiosity. This is in line with the theoretical assumption that obstacles to childbearing are already considered in the formation of fertility intentions.

"The anticipated risk of job loss and material insecurity are related to fertility postponement in the same way as unemployment is. Given the sequential nature of fertility and occupational decisions, unfavorable working conditions should be resolved before having children, and result in an increase in people's assignment of importance to paid work when developing their childbearing plans. We aim to demonstrate this link, focusing on perceived employment and material insecurity, the importance assigned to paid work in forming fertility intentions, the construction of fertility intentions, and their realization. Using two waves of the Austrian Generations and Gender Survey, we apply probit regressions to analyze gender variations in the associations between uncertainty conditions, the importance of paid work, fertility intentions and behavior. Results reveal that work and related benefits become salient when they are insecure, and that material insecurity among men discourages childbearing. For women, we find support for the hypothesis that the anticipated risk of job loss inhibits the realization of fertility intentions - intentions which are less likely to be constructed under such conditions from the onset of family planning processes." (author's abstract)

SummaryThis study analysed childlessness and religion among female research scientists in the Austrian context. The aim of the study was to investigate the role of religion in intended childlessness and realized childlessness. The analysis was based on a representative sample of Austrian women aged 25–45 (N=2623), with a specific sample of female research scientists aged 25–45 (N=186), carried out in the framework of the Generations and Gender Survey conducted in 2008/09. The results indicate that religious affiliation and self-assessed religiosity are strongly related to fertility. Multivariate analyses reveal that education has no explanatory power in terms of explaining intended childlessness, once religious affiliation and self-assessed religiosity are taken into consideration.

AbstractWhile researchers provided insights on the impact of the pandemic on childbirths, there is limited research on how the aftermath of the pandemic has shaped thoughts about family formation in the medium to long term. Our analysis explores perceived consequences of the pandemic on individuals' family plans. We focus on Austria, a high‐income country, characterized by a history of stable and low fertility and deeply rooted conservative family and work arrangements. Using a large representative survey carried out in fall 2021, we study self‐assessed consequences of the pandemic on family plans among women aged 20–45 years and men aged 20–50 years. Results show that only 7.6 percent of respondents intending (further) children before the pandemic changed their plans due to the pandemic. Women, persons of later reproductive ages, and parents of two or more children were more likely to intend to have less children or to have them later than initially planned. Nevertheless, the mean intended family size has remained almost unchanged since the mid‐1990s. Overall, the long‐term impact of the pandemic on family plans can be expected to be modest in Austria. Not even the pandemic made (most) respondents in Austria change their family plans.

Objective: Why do parents decide to have more than two children? Background: This study explores how opportunity costs and socio-cultural factors such as value of children, perceived social pressure and intergenerational fertility transmission influence the transition to higher order fertility in seven European countries. Method: Using panel data for Austria, Bulgaria, France, Georgia, Hungary, Poland and Russia, stemming from the Generations and Gender Survey (GGS), we aim to identify the driving mechanisms behind the birth of a third child and draw attention to socio-cultural factors and opportunity costs. We estimate average marginal effects in binomial logistic regressions. Results: Multivariate analyses demonstrate that lower opportunity costs and perceived social pressure positively influence the transition to the third child – for both sexes. In contrast, emotional and social values of children are not relevant and intergenerational transmission is associated with the birth of the third child for men and women differently. Perceived social pressure turns out to matter in all countries, although the social groups likely to have large families differ across countries. Conclusion: Overall, this study provides insights into the link between socio-cultural factors, perceived cost and the formation of large families in life course, revealing the reasons why women and men may deviate from the widespread two child norm. Therefore, it brings new contribution regarding the motivation for a third child.

In this study, we compare the intended number of children in Germany, Moldova and Norway in 2020 and 2021, during the COVID-19 pandemic. In a first step, we compare the intended number of children (including children born) in the newly available Generations and Gender Survey round 2 (GGS-II) and the German FReDA-GGS data. In a second step, we estimate the number of further intended children with multinomial logistic regression models. The results reveal considerable differences across the three countries. Respondents in Moldova plan to have rather large families (on average 3.3 children, including children born), whereas individuals in Norway and Germany intend to have 2.0 and 1.8 children, respectively. In the multinomial logistic regression analyses, we find differences in the association of educational level and fertility plans by gender and country. In Germany, education is positively related to the intention to have further children. This pattern is more pronounced for women than for men. Furthermore, this association is also found among Norwegian men. In Moldova, we find only weak evidence for this association. For Norwegian women, education and the intention to have further children also seem to be unrelated. While most data about the intended number of children refer to the 2000s or earlier, we contribute to the literature by providing recent insights on the intended number of children in three European countries, including Moldova, a country that is understudied in demographic research.

AbstractThis article provides insights into the role of the nuclear family for refugees' social capital in Austria, with a focus on gender‐specific differences. We use a multimethod approach, based on quantitative data from a survey with 548 refugees from Syria and Afghanistan and semi‐structured group discussions (N = 17 informants). In our analysis, we study frequency of contacts in first language and in German, as proxies for the bonding and bridging social capital. Marital status, childlessness and family work were identified as important factors: Frequency of contact substantially varied by gender and family context. Of all surveyed groups, married childless women and married men with children had the least contacts in both languages. Although an unequal distribution of childcare may limit women's time resources, we observed a positive association between motherhood and frequency of contact in German.

"According to prior studies, female researchers in Austria exhibit a very high level of childlessness and, consequentially, a low mean number of children. Following up on these studies, we analyse childlessness intentions of young female researchers and compare them to those of other highly educated women in other occupations. We examine factors that are related to female researchers' intent to stay childless. The analysis is based on a survey of 196 female researchers between the ages of 25 and 45 (with the majority being between age 25 and 34). Results indicate that few young, childless researchers plan a life without children: Only 7% intend to stay childless and most of them want to have two children (66%). Their intentions are strikingly close to those of their highly educated peers in other occupations. We discuss three factors that play a role for childlessness intentions of female researchers: work-related conditions (employment uncertainty and work-family reconciliation), personal career orientation, and partnership context." (author's abstract)