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The use of effluent charges as an instrument o f regulatory policy has been the object of much dispute. The controversy between advocates and opponents of replacing directives by incentive strategies in various fields of public intervention has always been rather heated, though carried on more in terms of theory than of empirical evidence drawn from experience with policy instruments in actual operation. Much like permit trading in the United States, regulatory effluent charges in The Netherlands more or less "sneaked in through the back door." The Dutch system o f water quality charges had originally been designed to fulfill solely a revenue‐raising function.The unique features of The Netherlands system make it an interesting example of the use of charges. The Dutch system of effluent charges has been in operation since 1970 and, in terms of the level of the charges, is more than twice as large as the more recent German program. Furthermore its use as a regulatory instrument has been "accidental." It did not replace the official intervention strategy of direct regulation. Given this situation, the Dutch case provides a unique opportunity to examine the effects of these two approaches as they were applied to the same case.Three statistical analyses of the impacts of the policy instrument used, supplemented by two expert assessments of these impacts, show the Dutch effluent charges have had a very remarkable effect on industrial polluters. In Holland, t h e water quality policy i s regarded as one of t h e few examples o f successful governmental intervention. The final section presents some general thoughts on relevance of the Dutch experience with effluent charges for other countries.

The use of effluent charges as an instrument o f regulatory policy has been the object of much dispute. The controversy between advocates and opponents of replacing directives by incentive strategies in various fields of public intervention has always been rather heated, though carried on more in terms of theory than of empirical evidence drawn from experience with policy instruments in actual operation. Much like permit trading in the United States, regulatory effluent charges in The Netherlands more or less "sneaked in through the back door." The Dutch system o f water quality charges had originally been designed to fulfill solely a revenue-raising function. The unique features of The Netherlands system make it an interesting example of the use of charges. The Dutch system of effluent charges has been in operation since 1970 and, in terms of the level of the charges, is more than twice as large as the more recent German program. Furthermore its use as a regulatory instrument has been "accidental." It did not replace the official intervention strategy of direct regulation. Given this situation, the Dutch case provides a unique opportunity to examine the effects of these two approaches as they were applied to the same case. Three statistical analyses of the impacts of the policy instrument used, supplemented by two expert assessments of these impacts, show the Dutch effluent charges have had a very remarkable effect on industrial polluters. In Holland, t h e water quality policy i s regarded as one of t h e few examples o f successful governmental intervention. The final section presents some general thoughts on relevance of the Dutch experience with effluent charges for other countries.

All over the world countries struggle with water stress. Problems vary from water scarcity and a degrading water quality, to floods and a rising sea level due to climate change. The European Union adopted a Water Framework Directive to improve the sustainability of water management in its member states. Water management should be coordinated at the level of river basins as a whole. Interests of various user groups should be better represented. River basin visions should take into account the impact of all human activities on the status of the resource. Water legislation needs streamlining and more focus on its implementation. The European Union advocates regulating water prices by charging the costs of water services on the basis of full cost recovery and the polluter pays principle. This book examines water management integration in the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Spain, Italy and Switzerland. It is based on the European research project EUWARENESS. Per country two case studies are considered, to analyze specific regime transitions at water basin level during the last decades. The twelve case studies are discussed within their national context and compared on conditions that are important for regime change towards sustainability. The book also provides theory on water governance, institutional regimes, and property rights, resulting in a tool for monitoring the progress of integrated water management at the basin level in EU member states or other countries. This book follows another volume published with Kluwer Academic Publishers on "The Evolution of National Water Regimes in Europe", edited by Ingrid Kissling-Näf and Stefan Kuks

The European gas market reform triggered new market designs which aimed to achieve competitive natural gas prices, efficiency gains, and security of gas supply. The paper analyses to what extent the effects of regulation-for-competition on eco-nomic performance in the form of natural gas prices, network tariffs, efficiency gains, and investments in gas infrastructure can be empirically studied in a European wide comparative analysis. We demonstrate that conceptual and data constraints hinder the verification of the impact of regulation-for-competition on those performance indica-tors. Natural gas prices remain oil-indexed and new investment projects are in practice exempted from competition measures. Assuming that a positive impact is a matter of fact is thus premature. A hold-up problem (where industry is reluctant to invest due to regulatory uncertainty and a lack of incentives) is difficult to quantify empirically. However, the industry's strong opposition to ownership unbundling coupled with the popularity of exemptions from third party access while still allowing long-term con-tracts does indicate that the general argument in favour of a hold-up problem has em-pirical relevance.

The liberalisation of the European gas market is becalmed. Meanwhile regulatory uncertainty looms on the investment horizon. During the last ten years, European gas markets have gone through profound restructuring processes. Initially ambitious, regulatory targets from the European Commission (EC) boiled down to a very basic introduction of competition and liberalisation in the form of the first Gas Directive. Since then, the EC has accelerated the reforms and deepened competition by progressively releasing new directives, regulations and guidelines, while at the same time remaining resolute during the energy sector inquiry. Since the beginning, attempts to liberalise European gas markets have faced strong opposition and resistance from the gas industry and industry-oriented governments, aiming to maintain the status quo of the market organisation, while leaving energy policy as a national issue.

Comparative empirical research on the effects of public policy has only emerged recently within political science. Attention is focused here on comparative intranational research. Review of such research reveals several imperfections: lack of conceptual framework, use of secondary data, unequal definitions & value systems, vagueness about which instruments are compared, vagueness about the form of the policy instrument, uncritical inventories of arguments, lack of coherence of arguments, inattention to effectiveness, & inattention to validity of arguments outside the US. A framework for comparative research on this subject is outlined, & is used to formulate basic hypotheses & a policy typology. Based on this approach, a model of comparative policy implementation research is presented. 6 Figures, 2 Photographs, 75 References. W. H. Stoddard

Climate change has brought to the forefront increasingly urgent concerns regarding future uncertainties, adaptation and risk in many countries. Flooding risks in the Netherlands however have been a high priority for decades. The Dutch Water Boards and other interested parties (other governments, NGO's, local farmers and private citizens) are attempting to deal with this new perceived vulnerability by increasing the resilience of the natural system, giving more space to the water and integrating as many interests into the new projects as possible, thus building stability and sustainability into the resulting system. The adaptive management strategies used to achieve this are comprised of taking a very broad perspective on the interests considered as compatible, deliberate adaptive project design to take advantage of different opportunities for improvements and alterations at different areas of the stream. Based on an existing framework of important governance regime characteristics, we add focus on one newly defined important quality: flexibility. Having both flexible and coherent governance regimes enables projects to meet local requirements and work towards a sustainable situation by synergetic win-win situations, constructive and cooperative planning and implementation and the development of a high level of trust. The paper illustrates and concludes that natural system resilience is dependent on such factors for providing governance system resilience.

This paper presents an analysis of the aftermaths of two firework-blasts from a policy change perspective. The causes of both disasters were completely identical. Both disasters were extensively investigated and findings disseminated. After a 1991 explosion hardly any change in policy occurred while in comparison the 2000 explosion caused gigantic changes, external safety as policy issue developed and became top priority very fast. In this perspective our cases can be considered extreme cases. The analysis is structured by applying six policy change models of which some have already 'earned' their footprints in policy-science. The models are the theory of the policy generations (De Vries, 1999), the network- instrument model (Bressers and O'Toole 1999), the stream-model of the policy process (Kingdon 1984, 1995), the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999), the punctuated-equilibrium model (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) and the elements of governance model (Bressers and Kuks 2001). The core change mechanisms typical for each of the six models are explicated followed by an assessment whether these can successfully explain stability or change with regard to our cases. The analysis is closed by reflecting on the consequences of the analysis for modelling policy change. Especially the relation between policy sub-unit configurations and core change mechanisms is elaborated.