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World Affairs Online
The Brussels effect: how the European Union rules the world
How the EU Became a Global Regulatory Power -- The Brussels Effect -- The Brussels Effect in Context -- Market Competition -- Digital Economy -- Consumer Health and Safety -- Environment -- Is The Brussels Effect Beneficial? -- The Future of the Brussels Effect
World Affairs Online
The False Choice Between Digital Regulation and Innovation
In: Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 118, Issue 2, October 6, 2024
SSRN
The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World
For many observers, the European Union is mired in a deep crisis. Between sluggish growth; political turmoil following a decade of austerity politics; Brexit; and the rise of Asian influence, the EU is seen as a declining power on the world stage. Columbia Law professor Anu Bradford argues the opposite in her important new book The Brussels Effect: the EU remains an influential superpower that shapes the world in its image. By promulgating regulations that shape the international business environment, elevating standards worldwide, and leading to a notable Europeanization of many important aspects of global commerce, the EU has managed to shape policy in areas such as data privacy, consumer health and safety, environmental protection, antitrust, and online hate speech. And in contrast to how superpowers wield their global influence, the Brussels Effect - a phrase first coined by Bradford in 2012- absolves the EU from playing a direct role in imposing standards, as market forces alone are often sufficient as multinational companies voluntarily extend the EU rule to govern their global operations. The Brussels Effect shows how the EU has acquired such power, why multinational companies use EU standards as global standards, and why the EU's role as the world's regulator is likely to outlive its gradual economic decline, extending the EU's influence long into the future. ; https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1231/thumbnail.jpg
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Exporting standards: The externalization of the EU's regulatory power via markets
In: International review of law and economics, Band 42, S. 158-173
ISSN: 0144-8188
Exporting Standards: The Externalization of the EU's Regulatory Power via Markets
This Article examines the unprecedented and deeply underestimated global power that the EU is exercising through its legal institutions and standards, and how it successfully exports that influence to the rest of the world. Introducing the notion of "the Brussels Effect," the Article shows how market forces alone are sufficient to convert EU standards into global standards. Without the need to use international institutions or seek other nations' cooperation, the EU has a strong and growing ability to promulgate regulations that become entrenched in the legal frameworks of developed and developing markets alike, leading to a notable "Europeanization" of many important aspects of global commerce. This Article identifies and explains the precise conditions for and the specific mechanism through which this externalization of EU's standards unfolds. Enhanced understanding of this dynamic explains why the EU is currently the only jurisdiction that can wield unilateral influence across a number of areas of law, ranging from competition and privacy to health and environmental regulation. This understanding also helps explain why certain regulations can be externalized via markets while others rely on the EU's ability to exert influence through its political agency. The Article further disputes the notion that the EU's ability to externalize its rules would reflect "regulatory imperialism," as critics have suggested. Instead, it argues that the EU's external regulatory influence has emerged largely as an inadvertent byproduct of its internal goal to create and strengthen the single market. The EU's regulatory authority has been further solidified as the markets, other states, and international institutions have been able to do little to constrain Europe's global regulatory power. In the end, as much as the rise of the EU's regulatory power is a product of its pursuit of internal goals, any limits to this power are likely to stem from within the EU itself.
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How International Institutions Evolve
In: Chicago Journal of International Law, Band 15, Heft 1
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Exporting Standards: The Externalization of the EU's Regulatory Power via Markets
In: International Review of Law and Economics, Band 42
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Sharing the Risks and Rewards of Economic Migration
In: University of Chicago Law Review, Band 80, Heft 29
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The Brussels Effect
This Article examines the unprecedented and deeply underestimated global power that the EU is exercising through its legal institutions and standards, and how it successfully exports that influence to the rest of the world. Without the need to use international institutions or seek other nations' cooperation, the EU has a strong and growing ability to promulgate regulations that become entrenched in the legal frameworks of developed and developing markets alike, leading to a notable "Europeanization" of many important aspects of global commerce. The Article identifies the precise conditions for and the specific mechanism through which this externalization of EU's standards unfolds. Enhanced understanding of these conditions and this mechanism helps explain why the EU is currently the only jurisdiction that can wield unilateral influence across a number of areas of law – ranging from antitrust and privacy to health and environmental regulation – and why the markets, other states, and international institutions can do little to constrain Europe's global regulatory power.
BASE
The Brussels Effect
This Article examines the unprecedented and deeply underestimated global power that the European Union is exercising through its legal institutions and standards, and how it successfully exports that influence to the rest of the world. Without the need to use international institutions or seek other nations' cooperation, the EU has a strong and growing ability to promulgate regulations that become entrenched in the legal frameworks of developed and developing markets alike, leading to a notable "Europeanization" of many important aspects of global commerce. The Article identifies the precise conditions for and the specific mechanism through which this externalization of EU's standards unfolds. Enhanced understanding of these conditions and this mechanism helps explain why the EU is currently the only jurisdiction that can wield unilateral influence across a number of areas of law – ranging from antitrust and privacy to health and environmental regulation – and why the markets, other states, and international institutions can do little to constrain Europe's global regulatory power.?
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The Brussels Effect
In: Northwestern University Law Review, Band 107, Heft 1
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Antitrust Law in Global Markets
In: Elhauge, Einer R., Research Handbook on The Economics of Antitrust Law, Chapter 11 (2012)
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International Antitrust Cooperation and the Preference for Nonbinding Regimes
Today, multinational corporations operate in increasingly international markets, yet antitrust laws regulating their competitive conduct remain national. Thus, corporations are subject to divergent antitrust regimes across the various jurisdictions in which they operate. This increases transaction costs, causes unnecessary delays, and raises the likelihood of conflicting decisions. The risks inherent in multi-jurisdictional regulatory review were prominently illustrated in the proposed GE/Honeywell acquisition, which failed following the European Union's ("EU") decision to prohibit the transaction despite its earlier approval in the United States. Inconsistent remedies imposed on Microsoft following parallel investigations by both the U.S. and EU authorities serve as another example of the regulatory burdens companies face when dealing with multiple antitrust investigations.
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International Antitrust Cooperation and the Preference for Nonbinding Regimes
In: Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy, 16, 2011
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