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AbstractBuilding upon existing theories of political fundraising and citizen participation in elections, this study examines contributions from individuals as an essential form of political participation in state high court elections from 2000 through 2012. Specifically, I explore the degree to which candidate characteristics, state political environments, and the attributes of state institutions affect the size of individual contributions. The findings of this investigation indicate the participation of contributors in judicial elections closely resembles the activities of voters. Like voters, contributors respond to contextual forces that increase or decrease salience and the political information available to state citizens. Of particular importance are state decisions to use partisan or nonpartisan election designs. Decisions by states to use partisan elections have important consequences for the generosity of contributors with larger donations directed to candidates seeking office in the most professionalized elective state supreme courts.

This article focuses on differences in judicial ideology as an explanation of judicial consensus or disagreement in state supreme court decision making. First, state methods of judicial selection (election vs. appointment) are posited to influence the ideological composition of state supreme courts. Second, variations in ideological composition are related to the degree of consensus among judges on cases in the area of capital punishment. Factors other than selection mechanism and judicial ideology are considered as alternative explanations for differences in ideological composition and for the degree of judicial consensus. More broadly, state institutional characteristics, notably judicial selection mechanisms (election or appointment) are found to influence the authoritative presence of state supreme courts.

Do state supreme courts act impartially or are they swayed by public opinion? Do judicial elections influence judge behavior? To date these questions have received little direct attention due to the absence of comparable public opinion data in states and obstacles to collecting data necessary for comprehensive analysis of state supreme court outcomes. Advances in measurement, data archiving, and methodology now allow for consideration of the link between public opinion and judicial outcomes in the American states. The analysis presented considers public opinion's influence on the composition of courts (indirect effects) and its influence on judge votes in capital punishment cases (direct effects). In elective state supreme courts, public support for capital punishment influences the ideological composition of those courts and judge willingness to uphold death sentences. Notably, public support for capital punishment has no measurable effect on nonelective state supreme courts. On the highly salient issue of the death penalty, mass opinion and the institution of electing judges systematically influence court composition and judge behavior.

Elections in the American states are important mechanisms for legitimizing state governments by facilitating the involvement of citizens in electing political leaders. Elections, however, receive scrutiny through challenges in state courts on issues such as contested elections and the structure and context of election ballots. Capitalizing on attention to the role of leadership in institutional maintenance, the analysis presented examines the effects of leadership and other essential political and legal characteristics on building decision consensus in election cases. An empirical test using 203 election decisions by state supreme courts from 1995 to 1998 illustrates that, among other factors, the authority of leadership facilitates consensus where considered jointly with the resources of courts, the state as a litigant, and internal rules that prioritize seniority. Adapted from the source document.

Elections in the American states are important mechanisms for legitimizing state governments by facilitating the involvement of citizens in electing political leaders. Elections, however, receive scrutiny through challenges in state courts on issues such as contested elections and the structure and context of election ballots. Capitalizing on attention to the role of leadership in institutional maintenance, the analysis presented examines the effects of leadership and other essential political and legal characteristics on building decision consensus in election cases. An empirical test using 203 election decisions by state supreme courts from 1995 to 1998 illustrates that, among other factors, the authority of leadership facilitates consensus where considered jointly with the resources of courts, the state as a litigant, and internal rules that prioritize seniority.