Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- The reactive sample space -- 1.1 Ephphatha -- 1.2 Games against nature and games against people -- 1.3 Outline: a taxonomy of statistical games -- Response and social information -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Selection and nonneutrality -- 2.3 Social information and coalitional behavior -- 2.4 Nonresponse bias -- 2.5 Extensions and evaluation -- Appendix 1. Some useful integration results for the normal distribution -- Appendix 2. The simple cost-censored majority . c as a function of c -- Appendix 3. The function H -- Response and strategic behavior -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Strategic nonresponse -- 3.3 Strategic revelation: direct testing -- 3.4 Strategic revelation: discriminatory testing -- 3.5 Indirect concordance testing -- 3.6 Design: the census and compulsion -- 3.7 Perspectives -- Appendix 1. Processes for revealing preferences on public goods -- Appendix 2. The normal equation for s h in Section 3.6 -- Publication and the political economy of prediction -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Reflexive forecasting of "hallmark" events -- 4.3 Informational dynamics of political polls -- 4.4 State estimation under reaction: Markovian structure and convergence -- 4.5 The forecasting problem: reactions, myopia, and anticipation -- 4.6 Equilibrium and the social optimality of repeated sampling -- 4.7 Reflexivity and real-time survey schemes -- Appendix 1. Markov convergence results -- Rational expectations and socioeconomic modeling -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Rational-expectations equilibria: the homogeneous case -- 5.3 Heterogeneous information and publication -- 5.4 Multiperiod and ex ante expectational equations -- 5.5 The homogeneous solution: fundamentals versus expectations -- 5.6 Identification and inference -- 5.7 Evaluation.