Urban productivity and factor growth in the late nineteenth century
In: School of Economics discussion paper 95/35
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In: School of Economics discussion paper 95/35
In: Housing policy debate, Band 24, Heft 1, S. 297-302
ISSN: 2152-050X
In: Public Administration Review, 2020
SSRN
In: Journal of policy analysis and management: the journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Band 28, Heft 3, S. 340-365
ISSN: 1520-6688
AbstractThe lax underwriting in non‐prime mortgage markets is widely perceived as one cause of the recent difficulties in the housing market. Policymakers are currently considering moves such as enforcing more careful underwriting to provide additional discipline to mortgage markets. This research explores the possibility of another approach to supplement or replace some of these efforts, namely the use of policy to create incentives for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (together, the GSEs) to help "check" behavior in non‐prime markets. The hypothesis is that the GSE Act affordable housing goals have increased GSE focus on targeted loan purchases, which in turn has led prime market lenders to compete more aggressively for borrowers on the margin between prime and subprime credit quality. As a consequence, these marginal borrowers will be more inclined to take prime mortgages rather than higher‐cost subprime loans. We test this hypothesis and find empirical support for it. We observe a negative relationship between the growth in GSE market share and the growth in subprime market share over time, and find that the impact of the GSEs on subprime lending tends to be stronger in high‐minority neighborhoods, where subprime lending has been concentrated and growing the fastest. Simulations show that a 10 percent increase in GSE market share (for example, from 20 to 22 percent) can cause 45,000 borrowers using prime instead of subprime loans a cost savings of about $1.7 billion. These results suggest that the GSEs, regardless of their postconservatorship form, should continue to devote attention to serving underserved populations and suggest that significant welfare benefits will accrue. © 2009 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.
In: Journal of policy analysis and management: the journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Band 28, Heft 3, S. 340-365
ISSN: 0276-8739
In: Public administration review: PAR, Band 81, Heft 1, S. 64-80
ISSN: 1540-6210
AbstractAs an embodiment of the collaborative governance model, metropolitan planning organizations in the United States allocate federal, state, and local funds to member municipalities for transportation projects across their regions. To examine how institutional rules and power shape where public investment goes, the authors consider the extent to which the allocation of local voting power in regional governing policy boards influences the spatial allocation of transportation investments. The analysis shows that the power structure of regional policy boards is consistently a major factor associated with the observed geographic distribution of investments. Moreover, the results suggest that the degree of power concentration of the dominant city in the region influences whether the remaining cities' power matters. These results suggest that institutional governance rules may be more important than previously recognized.
In: Journal of public administration research and theory, Band 20
ISSN: 1477-9803
This article analyzes the consequences of our increasing reliance on private agents in the formulation and implementation of affordable housing policy. We describe the policies and processes by which affordable housing decisions are made in the United States-including how many and what kind of these units are built and where. Then, we empirically explore the impacts of different governance arrangements in Massachusetts and New Jersey on public authority and responsibility, accountability, and on policy effectiveness. From this analysis, we find evidence that agents respond to housing policy incentives, and the response varies with the institutional framework established, thus mitigating concerns about a loss of public control in this policy arena. Adapted from the source document.
In: Journal of public administration research and theory, Band 20, S. i143
ISSN: 1053-1858
Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Foreword -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- 1 The Great Migration: Welcome to the Promised Land -- 2 The Land Boom of the Roaring Twenties -- 3 The Great Depression: The End of Banking as They Knew It -- 4 The Home Owners' Loan Corporation and the City Survey Program -- 5 Red Is the New Black: Where Lenders Fear to Tread -- 6 The Fight for Fair Housing -- 7 Crossing the Color Line -- 8 Out From the Gloomy Past -- Index.
Foreword / Raphael W. Bostic -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. The Great Migration: welcome to the promised land -- Chapter 2. The land boom of the Roaring Twenties -- Chapter 3. The Great Depression: the end of banking as they knew it -- Chapter 4. The Home Owners' Loan Corporation and the City Survey Program -- Chapter 5. Red Is the new Black: where lenders fear to tread -- Chapter 6. The fight for fair housing -- Chapter 7. Crossing the color line -- Chapter 8. Out from the gloomy past -- Index.
In: American economic review, Band 98, Heft 2, S. 310-314
ISSN: 1944-7981
In: Housing policy debate, Band 16, Heft 3-4, S. 513-545
ISSN: 2152-050X
In: Journal of urban affairs, Band 44, Heft 9, S. 1224-1243
ISSN: 1467-9906
In: Housing policy debate, Band 29, Heft 1, S. 44-61
ISSN: 2152-050X
In: Brookings-Wharton papers on urban affairs, Band 2007, Heft 1, S. 205-240
ISSN: 1533-4449